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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
REVISING THE STATUS QUO OF REVISIONISM,
GRAND STRATEGY, AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER

by
Onur Erpul
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Félix E. Martín, Major Professor
This dissertation examines a type of variance in state behavior pertaining to international
conflict and cooperation. Rather than confining this discussion to a binary understanding
of state behavior, between revisionism and status-quo seeking, it endeavors to provide a
nuanced discussion of the type of grand-strategic orientations states undertake in pursuit of
their interests. It poses the question, “under what circumstances do states aspire to uphold,
seek to reform, or challenge international order?” In doing so, the study helps to
understanding the gamut of behaviors that purportedly satisfied or revisionist states
display.
System-level material opportunities that are filtered by elite-preferences and beliefs
about international order at the unit-level account for the type of grand strategies states will
adopt. Through congruency testing, the dissertation identifies and explains orderconforming, order-reforming, order-retrenching, and order-challenging grand strategies. In
this context, the dissertation addresses debates within Structural Realism on status-quo and
revisionist states as well as grand strategy formation to produce an eclectic mid-range
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theory of state behavior. The hypotheses generated by this theoretical undertaking are
tested through longitudinal, comparative case study examinations of U.S. and Chinese
grand strategies in the post-Cold War period.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1991, the United States stood on the precipice of global power. Under its nurturing aegis,
the liberal world order formalized its triumph over communist totalitarianism, ushering in
the emergence of a truly unipolar international system.1 Some hailed it as the end of
history.2 Others looked forward to a productive and peaceful time in human history as the
forces of democratization, humanitarianism, globalization, and liberalism, with the aid of
American power, could now be projected onto distant parts of the globe without
interference from a superpower rival. Three decades and several costly wars have spanned
since America’s unipolar moment, and the prospects of the liberal world order appear as
bleak as that of an eternal and unbound American hegemony.3 The post-victory status quo
is further challenged by the relentless rise of China and the hostility of dissatisfied states.
No state, however, seems to be particularly interested in challenging the present
international order.
Despite some aggressive posturing, China’s foreign policy is remarkably
restrained, contrary to the expectations of the literature. So-called rogue states, meanwhile,
appear to challenge international order, yet possess insufficient capacity to effectuate

See Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs: America and the World, Vol. 70, No.
1 (1990/91), pp. 23-33.
1

2

See Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" The National Interest, No. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18.

The current “international order” referred to as the liberal international order. While the liberal order has
come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, to the point that many challenge its factual existence. While
it is beyond the scope of this project to evaluate whether or not the liberal international order is an ex post
facto myth, or simply an innocuous epithet for U.S. hegemony, it is argued that the international order, in
general, has a deeper operational logic that transcends the institutions of a single state or ideology; these
points are discussed in the conceptualizations section below.
3

1

change. It is difficult to understand why, then, a proponent of the status quo such as the
U.S. would execute one costly war after another to the detriment of international order. In
an effort to address these counterintuitive state behaviors, this study concerns international
order, inquiring into the way states comport themselves in a broader social world.4 To this
end, this research endeavors to investigate interrelated questions, such as I) When and
under what circumstances are states likely to uphold or challenge international order? II)
When are states more likely to refrain from self-aggrandizing behavior? And most
importantly, III) How do statespeople place their own interests, if at all, within the
framework of global international society?
In what follows, this chapter reflects on the importance of international order and
problematizes a series of questionable and self-serving narratives on state behavior that are
endemic to foreign policy debates in the American academe (which concomitantly inform
IR debates). Thereafter, the reader is presented with this dissertation’s main argument,
which underscores the necessity of recognizing nuances in state practices and appreciating
the role of statespeople in binding international society. Next, it examines notable shortages
in existing theories on status quo and revisionism as well as research on grand strategy. In
the penultimate section, the reader is exposed to important theoretical considerations and
conceptualizations, while the final section provides a roadmap of chapter content for the
rest of this volume.

Like most concepts in social science, “order” can take on many meanings. In this research, however,
international order is unambiguously associated with the English School of International Relations. It relates
to patterns of war and peace, as well as cooperation and conflict in international politics. International order
is predicated on the preservation of values thought to be commonly desired by all members of societies.
These include, among other things, the preservation of life, honoring of contracts, and stable property rights.
See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Columbia, NY: Columbia
University Press, 2002 [1977]), pp. 6-10.
4

2

This study seeks to transcend the binary approach to revisionist and status-quo
states that has become so ingrained in the IR literature. By adopting ideas and concepts
from the English School approach to IR, the dissertation offers a via media approach to
understanding state behavior within the normal operation of international relations. It is
posited that state behavior cannot be reduced to its constitutive elements. Abstract notions
of revisionism and status-quo-seeking have been treated in the extant literature in a binary
way that essentializes the behaviors of states based on their material capabilities, political
structures, ideologies, and identities. This dissertation, on the other hand, addresses the
theoretical lacunae on state behavior and contextualizes important puzzles by examining
trends in the behaviors of states, tracing them to the discourses of foreign policy executives.
It does not purport to invalidate existing theories of state behavior per se. Rather, it
contextualizes them in a way that addresses concerns regarding international order by
underscoring the existence of an abstract notion of international society in the minds of
decision-maker, which in turn influence the short-term behavior of states: whether or not
they challenge, uphold, or merely seek to reform international order.
Consistent with the assumption of most traditional IR understandings of grand
strategy, it is argued in this volume that states generally have long-term designs that lead
them to accept international order. While there are several different mechanisms that can
explain this tendency, from system-level material factors to the domestic ideational, a
state’s grand strategy reflects an awareness of its international social context. Rather than
studying this phenomenon through the lens of prestige or status concerns, as much of the
literature has done, this project deliberates on the notion of common interests upheld in an
international society of states. Specifically, it contrasts the traditional idea of raison d’état,
3

or national interest, with the idea of raison de système, or the interest of the system.5 The
former is itself a nebulous concept because it is notoriously difficult to define.

6

It is,

however, associated with traditional notions of statecraft and Machiavellianism; that there
is a core of principles that governments must recognize and is morally obligated to pursue
them at all costs on behalf of its subjects. The latter perspective, however, contends that
states sometimes need to restrain themselves or forego attainable gains, to preserve the
legitimacy and functioning of international order. Consider the following definition:

The most comprehensive classical definition of raison d’état is probably that of Meinecke, who defines it
as “[that] between behaviour prompted by the power-impulse and behaviour prompted by moral
responsibility, there exists at the summit of the State a bridge, namely raison d’état: the consideration of
what is expedient, useful and beneficial, of what the State must do in order to reach occasionally the highest
point of its existence.” See Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellianism: The Doctrine of Raison d’état and its
Place in Modern History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 4. For more information on
raison de système, see Adam Watson, Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States (Routledge, 1983), pp. 201;
Watson, “Systems of States,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (April, 1990), p. 104; Watson,
The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis (New York City, NY: Routledge,
1992), p. 14. See also David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in
International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 244–251, 273–280.
5

6

There is a long-standing tradition of healthy skepticism towards the concept of national interest in the IR
literature and whether it is an objective fact or a politically-determined expedient. See, e.g., Raymond Aron,
Peace and War (Doubleday, 1966), p. 89; Joseph Frankel, National Interest (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
1970); Rosenau, p. 34. Alexander L. George and Robert O. Keohane, “The Concept of National Interests:
Uses and Limitations,” in Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information
and Advice, by Alexander L. George (Westview Press, 1980), pp. 217‐237. This has also not prevented the
emergence of national interest as a valid subject of inquiry. See Scott Burchill, The National Interest in
International Relations Theory (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 29. Meanwhile, the concept of
a national interest has been central to understanding what animates states, in much of the classical realist
tradition. See Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Primacy of the National Interest,” The American Scholar, Vol. 18,
No. 2 (Spring, 1949), pp. 207-212; John H. Herz, “Political Realism Revisited,” International Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2 (June, 1981), pp. 182‐197, esp. 203. After the Behavioralist Revolution in American
Social Sciences the Rational Actor Model, the assumption of the state as being a rational, unitary, and
interest/utility-maximizing actor, has become commonplace. See Lawrence Freedman, who argues that in
the long-run the “national interest” is negotiated and privileged by domestic actors, which defines the rational.
This is also evidenced by the fact that the system is ultimately hierarchical, which “disciplines” bureaucratic
actors. See, e.g., Lawrence Freedman, “Logic, Politics and Foreign Policy Processes: A Critique of the
Bureaucratic Politics Model,” International Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 3 (1976), 434-449 and Stephen Krasner,
“Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland),” in J. Ikenberry ed., American Foreign Policy:
Theoretical Essays (Pearson, 2005), 447-460. Finally, raison d’état can be affected by the very composition
of the state and the modes of production it seeks to protect and the social classes it seeks to serve. See, Robert
W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York, NY:
Columbia University Press), p. 105.

4

Order is further promoted by general agreements and rules that restrain
and benefit all members of the system, and make it into a society. That
is an aspect of raison de système, the belief that it pays to make the
system work.7

A legitimate and functioning international society can more easily restrain wouldbe aggressors, more effectively prevent armed conflict, and, ultimately, better serve the
interests of all its constituent members. If the subtext is that it pays to make the system
work, then, barring revolutionary state and wars initiated in times of hegemonic transitions,
restraint, and acquiescence to international order is the normal state of affairs.
Secondly, international order cannot be reduced to the operation power politics per
se. State practices extend to numerous policy domains that constitute international politics
and, like balance of power for example, invariably reach an equilibrium that become
ingrained in international politics. As argued here, the fundamental institutions of
international society include international legal and diplomatic practices, as well as special
responsibilities for great power politics that, in conjunction with practices about the use of
force, constitute the rules of the game. It is from this consideration that the dissertation
derives its assumptions about possible state behavior (see figure I. 1).
Thirdly, the relationship between the members of international society and
international order is far more complex than revisionism and preservation. States have
available to them a broader array of strategies with which to interact and shape international
order. While the literature offers material gains, aggrandizement, and intangible benefits
like prestige and status as possible reasons for revisionism, it is not clear why any power,

7

Watson, “Systems of States,” p. 104.

5

especially a rising power, would want to challenge international order. This question is
especially puzzling because rising powers are the greatest beneficiaries of international
order.8 They need not be “revisionist,” nor adopt the role of a “spoiler."
Conversely, they may not be “supporters” of existing arrangements.9 Moreover, in
the shorter-term, states may have specific ways to interact with international order. Some
may conform to international order, while others may challenge it. Beyond this binary,
however, states may also be interested in modifying international order. Rising states can
reform, rather than outright challenge, order. That is, they can introduce alternative norms,
practices, and institutions to the existing international order. Amendments to the political,
legal, and normative framework of international society that is achieved without actively
undermining, in word or deed, international order are “order-reforming.”10 Conversely, it
should be possible for a state to retrench from certain policies and practices when
circumstances require so.
Fourtly, it is important to recognize that foreign policy executives have the final say
in determining foreign policy. Their strategic context and relative freedom of action
determine what is achievable in foreign policy. They are the transmission belt by which
systemic and domestic variables are translated into policy outcomes.11 As the final arbiters
of policy, their interpretation of both the material and social fabrics of international politics,

8

See Schweller, “Rising Powers and Revisionism,” pp. 3-7.

9

Ibid.

For instance, neither China’s diplomatic activism nor its attempts to restructure the entirety of Eurasian
economic order could be instances of aggressive intent towards America and the liberal world order.
10

Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1
(October, 1998), pp. 144–72; Lobell, Neoclassical Realism, pp. 4.
11

6

as well as their domestic interests, affect their decisions. What is absent in extant
discussions, however, is clarity on the extent to which a raison de système logic informs
statecraft. So long as foreign policy executives are willing, for whatever reason, to
acquiesce to the common interests of international society, states are more likely to
conform to international order. Conversely, even the most seemingly innocuous states may
at times assert themselves, whether due to the permissiveness of their environment or to a
willingness to prioritize self-aggrandizement over the common interests of international
society.
The problem, however, is that raison de système necessitates a long-term
commitment to upholding certain patterns of behavior, often longer than the vocational
timelines of elected and other officials. By what reason could we expect decision-makers
to work for longer-term goals? Thus, fifthly, in the long-term, we may witness a
transformation of world order, but it is counterproductive to speculate on such long-term
changes; we should focus instead on the day-to-day operations of state behavior. In the
long-term, states and their behavior fall into a type of equilibrium, either due to systemic
forces or the workings of international society.
The present inquiry traces the discourses of major global and regional powers on
international order in relation to major order-defining events in international politics. While
each case presents unique circumstances, the views of decision-makers on international
society and international order, in addition to material strategic factors, shape the shortterm behavior, or grand-strategic orientations, of states (see figure I. 1. below). “Grandstrategic orientations” are brief cycles within a country’s overall framework of grand
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strategy.12 The countries examined in the ensuing case studies, puzzling due to their
material and ideational circumstances, help to show that neither the distribution of material
capabilities nor the “malevolent” designs of elite groups ossify into intractable grand
strategies. Once we liberate discussions of international order and the intentions of rising
states from the dogmas of Realist and Liberal IR Theories, state behavior becomes less
puzzling.13
Figure I. 1. Overview of the Argument

In sum, this project offers a theoretical and normative refinement of existing
discussions concerning state behavior by advancing a typological theory based on how
state elites conceive of the broader interests of international society within their immediate
strategic environment. The goal of this research is simply to illuminate the circumstances

By “orientation” this dissertation underscores not only the temporal dimension of grand strategy but also
its (comprehensive) scope, which is discussed extensively below. Stephen Ward, who also examines
“orientations,” does not provide a sufficient conceptual clarification of the concept. See Stephen M. Ward,
“Status Immobility and Systemic Revisionism in Rising Great Powers,” Ph.D. Dissertation (Washington,
D.C.: Georgetown University, May 29, 2012).
12

13

Even Ikenberry has admitted, in his defense of the liberal World order, that the deeper historical and
institutional qualities of international order will compel rising states to act towards its preservation, albeit
with greater influence. See Ikenberry, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” pp. 58-61.
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in which states are more likely to be inclined towards one another, as well as when they
are more likely to use force or more innocuous tools of statecraft. Ultimately, this theorybuilding exercise aims to contribute to the IR discipline by revising the simplistic abuse of
concepts like “revisionist” and “status quo.” The next section discusses important concepts
for this dissertation.
Table I. Fundamental Institutions and State Strategies
Fundamental
Institutions
Observable
Categories and
Costs

War

Diplomacy

Use of
Force/Alliances

Balance
of Power

Great
Power
Management

Relations Towards Other
Powers

International Law

Attitude towards
Norms and Rules

Less Costly

Withdrawal

Appeasement

Conservativism

-

Multilateralism

Restraint

Enmeshment

+

Leadership

Expansionism

Reformism

More Costly

Unilateralism

Imperialism

Radicalism

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROJECT
Refining our conceptual understanding of state behavior in the ways proposed above has
further theoretical and normative significance beyond the empirical discussion above. The
puzzling behaviors of great power states such as the United States and China
notwithstanding, there exists multiple lacunae in the literature on revisionist and status-quo
states that stand to benefit from this project. Firstly, it affords the chance to reexamine the
different strands of ideas permeating the Realist paradigm and the International Society
approach.14 Of importance is to challenge the conceptual deficiencies of the literature

The International Society approach, also known as the “English School,” is a major theoretical tradition,
but one that has received comparatively less attention in the United States. Its main insight is that through
proximity and volume of interactions states develop ingrained practices and form a rudimentary “society”
with its own logic, institutions, and mores.
14
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responding to Kenneth Waltz. Similarly, it calls into question the need to attribute the
behavior of rising and/or revisionist states to either power, identity, or status-related
concerns per se. Second, it provides the context for mid-level theorizing based on Gilpin’s
contributions. Gilpin’s framework captures the broader tendencies and life cycles of
international systems. This study’s most obvious contribution would be to develop more
concrete propositions about the interactions of a declining hegemon and a rising great
power in a power transition period from the “redistribution of power” to the
“disequilibrium” phases of the cycle.15 Gilpin elaborates at length on hegemonic wars and
also elaborates on some of the non-military means by which other states can affect change
on the international order.
The way the literature is aligned suggests that all rising states are destined to
“revise” international order, but the nature of transitions differs across cases. Basing future
projections on the basis of historical experience could lead to counterproductive recourse.
This is an important discussion to have at a time when scholars and policymakers are losing
confidence in the liberal world order and its custodians.16 Can we have a plural
international order that can accommodate such diversity or accept normative syncretism?
If the answer is “no” and all rising states truly are destined to be illiberal and revisionist
with reconciliatory policies to bide their time in preparation for a challenge to the global

15

Gilpin, War and Change, p. 12.

See Richard N. Haas, “Liberal World Order, R.I.P.” Council on Foreign Relations (March 21, 2018). URL:
https://www.cfr.org/article/liberal-world-order-rip. Last Accessed: March 23, 2018.
16
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leadership, then it may not be worthwhile to pursue diplomatic options, which would
increase the likelihood of major war.17
Third, it enriches the dialogue between Realism and English School, with
contemporary Neorealism by helping to refine notions of strategic restraint.18 This is
achieved by developing greater syncretism between Neoclassical Realist framework for
foreign policy and relevant concepts from the English School. The former, by definition,
does not consider the importance of social forces at the system-level (that are in abstract
terms considered as an international society of states). The latter, meanwhile, has no formal
theory of foreign policy that incorporates domestic political variables, such as those at the
level of foreign policy executives, despite their expressed interest in doing so. The
theoretical implications are also important because they suggest that the main opposition
to international order and international society in many ways originate from domestic
politics, as others, notably Armstrong, have argued. This research also has further
normative dimensions beyond the theoretical puzzles and contributions discussed above.
This is a reasonable goal in view of the founding principles of the IR discipline as well as
the moral debates at the heart of the seminal works of IR.19
Revising the concept of status quo and revisionist behavior can disentangle

17

See A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kuegler, The War Ledger (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press,
1980); Robert Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No.
4 (1988), pp. 591-613.
18

Realism is one of the major theoretical traditions in International Relations and highlights, among many
other things, the problem of international anarchy, the importance of material power, the prominence of the
state, and the inevitability and efficacy of violence in all human affairs.
19

For an overview of the discussion, see Nicholas Guilot [ed.], The Invention of International Relations
Theory (Columbia, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011).
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political rhetoric from theory and lend greater impartiality to the study of international
order in three specific ways. Firstly, it may help recognize that, despite the significance of
U.S. preponderance, international order transcends the perceived national interest of one
or a small coalition of states. It helps to recognize that “revisionist” behavior is a special
and rare type of orientation, rather than any type of resistance to dominant states or the
fabric of international order. The fact that many so-called great or regional powers, stagnant
or emerging, challenge aspects of the international system does not necessarily qualify
them as revisionists. The study of order and grand strategy should not be conducted with
the view of promoting, or making palatable, the policies of any state through the evocation
of politically-charged tu quoque fallacies. This is most visible in debates concerning U.S.
foreign policy and its “discontents.”
Secondly, it seeks to dispel theoretical myths about the efficacy of adherence to a
specific regime type (such as a Liberal democracy) correlating with “amicable” behavior.
Specifically, the Inter-Democratic Peace hypothesis (an idea echoed by policy-making
elites) need further revision on the grounds of its theoretical insignificance. The discussion
will attempt to show that elites’ commitment, the congruity, and compatibility of their
interests with an international order, has greater significance on the permutations of war
and peace. While the core thesis arguing that the absence of war between Liberal
democracies remains an important empirical finding, its theoretical significance diminishes
when one develops a more nuanced typology of behavioral orientation. There have been
critiques over the frequency of conflict between Liberal democracies (generally considered
as necessarily “status quo” states) and non-democracies. Kydd, for example, asserts that
Liberal democratic states can communicate their policy preferences and intents due to
12

democratic transparency resulting from freedom of expression, free press, and government
accountability.20 However, one cannot disregard the impact of elite interests in propagating
jingoist discourse and fomenting revisionist foreign policies.21
When, moreover, the argument is recast using the “software” of the English School
approach, it is possible to see that liberal democracies not only can but do, engage in wars
against non-democracies, but often violate the tenets of the world order they purport to
uphold: by undermining sovereignty, aiding non-state actors and other violent
entrepreneurs, effectuating regime change in the developing world through coups d’état,
and even defying international law.22 Far from achieving a perpetual peace among
democracies, an international order saturated with liberal and cosmopolitan values may not
even be conducive to peace or, simply, viable in the future.23 For these reasons, we need a
more nuanced understanding of state behavior that not only considers the temporality of
their behavior but also assesses the role of international society in restraining states,
independent of liberal or other values. In his way, the dissertation revisits many of the
debates over regime type and behavioral disposition of states and takes us back to the
essence of the ethical debates of the IR discipline at its infancy: the problem of justifying
lupine behavior with sheep’s brays.24

20

See Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing,” pp. 119-120.

21

See, Joe Parent, Uniting States: Voluntary Union in World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011).
This applies to virtually all global interventions by the US’ Western and non-Western allies, the War on
Terror, and ancillary wars in the periphery since the end of the Cold War.
22

Cf. See G. John Ikenberry, “Why the Liberal Order Will Survive,” Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 32,
No. 1 (2018), pp. 17-29.
23

24

See E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 216-217.
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CASE SELECTION
The nature of the phenomena and the research question inevitably limits one’s universe of
cases. While the research scrutinizes under what circumstances do states choose certain
policies over others with regards to international order, much of the existing literature
privileges established and rising powers. This is understandable also because states with
superior capabilities have greater freedom of action in international politics. Similarly, why
weak states restrain themselves is not a puzzle as we already possess the theoretical tools
to illuminate instances of imprudence by weak states.25 Being a great power, established
or rising, also bestows unique privileges and responsibilities that necessitate the
contextualization of great powers’ behavior.26 Even acting in defense of the status quo
necessitates a nuanced understanding of restraint. The United States and China fulfill the
power criteria.
As the hegemon, the foreign policy of the United States significantly affects
international politics. Its foreign policy, resembling those of rising and revisionist states,
presents conceptual and theoretical challenges to most existing accounts. The United States
appears to display qualities consistent with the grand strategies formally-articulated by
academic and policy-making circles as the United States have displayed enlightened selfrestraint on the side of the spectrum, various “reformist” policies that can be associated
with “defensive accommodation,” “offshore balancing” and even “selective engagement,”
as well as maximalist orientations akin to “primacy.” In recent years, especially, U.S.

25

Why some of these states do not “fall by the wayside” is a far more interesting question.

26

Bull, Anarchical Society, pp. 194-199; Buzan, U.S. and Great Powers.
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foreign policy can be described as order-challenging. It is argued in this dissertation that
the permissive environment of the post-Cold War (i.e., the unipolar moment) does not
sufficiently explain the roguish turn in U.S. foreign policy. While there is a plethora of
alternative system and unit-level explanations, it is argued that there has been a
considerable decline in American foreign policy executives’ considerations for the raison
de système, or the broader interests of the international community, in this period. While
this may be symptomatic of a broader phenomenon, it is sufficient, for the purposes of this
research, to establish if there is a detectable change in the way U.S. foreign policy
executives consider something that approximates to the abstract notion of international
society.
China is the second puzzling case and provides an explanation through a nonevent.27 Despite so many incentives, why does China not behave like a typical rising,
revisionist-great power? Rather than challenging international order, Chinese restraint can
be best described as order-reforming. That is, China has significantly increased its
entrenchment in the institutions of the liberal world order. China is loath to illegitimate and
unilateral use of force. Its impact on international order is primarily positive and manifested
in diplomatic, international legal, and economic statecraft. China’s diplomatic activism is
worthy of note. Aside from expanding diplomatic links and increasing its presence in
global governance, China has concluded a series of territorial border re-negotiations with
all its neighbors since the 1990s, terminating a series of border clashes. It has, moreover,

27

For an example of a similar type of study, but concerning American restraint, see Power and Restraint, p.
xi.
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sought to re-engineer the entire economic order of Eurasia through legal and institutional
arrangements. In a sense, China may not be “liberal,” especially in its domestic politics,
but its declared geopolitical goals and means seem to correspond to the idea of a plural
international society.
Table I. 2. Prescriptive Grand Strategies and Grand-Strategic Orientations.28
G.S. Orientations

The U.S.A.

China

Order-Retrenching
(Least Ambitious)

“Neo-Isloationism”

“Hide the light, bide the
time.”

Order-Conforming

“Restraint”/Offshore
Balancing

“Peaceful
Rise/Development.”

Order-Reforming

“Selective Engagement”

“Striving for More”

Order-Challenging
(Most-Ambitious)

“Primacy”

N/A

The phenomena under consideration severely limit opportunities for a Large-N
study and further necessitate a bias in case selection towards established and rising great
powers. There are many instances, however, within these country cases that can help
illuminate grounds for inference.

28

See, Nuno P. Monteiro, Theory of Unipolar Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014);
Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Grand Strategy for the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2014); Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002);
Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics; and Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing
Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter, 1996/97), pp. 4, 30-33, esp.
cit. 42, 44; Aaron L. Friedberg, “Globalization and Chinese Grand Strategy,” Survival: Global Politics and
Strategy, Vol. 60, No. 1 (February-March, 2018), pp. 16; Holslag, “Smart Revisionist.”
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ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The succeeding chapters help to illuminate the numerous theoretical, empirical, and
normative problems in the study of international order, and its Discontents. Chapter 1
discusses problems with extant definitions of order, revisionism, and status-quo, as well as
missing components to the study of grand strategy. Chapter 2 develops the main arguments
of the dissertation by reviewing the literature more thoroughly to lay out the major causal
processes that serve as alternative explanations for the proposed theory herein. A state’s
grand strategy can alternate between fully conforming to, or abnegating, international order
along different dimensions and these variations are a product of different permutations of
system-level opportunities (restrictiveness and permissiveness) and elite interests at the
unit level. The succeeding Chapter 3 further develops the methodology employed in this
research, specifically pertaining to the content analysis of elite discourses on the
international use of force. It expounds the congruency procedures used to demonstrate the
viability of the hypotheses on grand-strategic orientation. Alternative hypotheses from
competing theories, developed in Chapter 2, are used to evaluate the validity of the
explanations developed in this research.
Next, Chapter 5 concerns the United States foreign policy in the Post-Cold War
period. Specifically, this chapter identifies key moments in the post-Cold War period in
which the U.S. used force externally. A major test for the validity of any hypothesis is to
ensure ceteris paribus conditions, except for the crucial variable we are studying. In the
case of the grand-strategic orientations framework and U.S. foreign policy, the Gulf Wars
is a suitable place to begin. The First Gulf War in which a U.S.-led UN coalition rebuked
in Saddam Hussain’s invasion of Kuwait, was undertaken with support from the

17

international community and managed to restore the status quo ante bellum. The U.S.
undertook a similar operation in 2003 against the Saddam regime, this time without the
enthusiastic support of the international community and setting into motion a destabilizing
conflict in Iraq that paved the way for further regional conflicts. Interestingly, the U.S.
acted with greater multilateralism, at a time when its power was at its apex. This is a
challenge to Realism. The permissiveness of the strategic environment naturally
engendered greater U.S. interventionism. Yet, the American-led interventions in many
parts of the world, ostensibly undertaken for humanitarian ends, have served to undermine
international orders. What is surprising is that the U.S. conformed to international order
and principles of multilateralism at the apex of its power in the so-called unipolar moment,
yet other interventions, especially in the third world, were accomplished unilaterally,
resulting in great harm. The Second Gulf War and America’s overbalancing of states like
Iran further evidence a disregard for the common interests of the international society of
states. Finally, U.S. foreign policy in the seminal period of the Donald Trump presidency
further reinforces this unilateral tendency.
Chapter 6 details order-reforming behavior in which permissive international
environments, combined with foreign policy executives that are sensitive to the common
interests of international society, engage in the order-reforming behavior. This chapter
examines China’s order-reforming grand-strategic orientation through an analysis of its
territorial agreements, its diplomatic activism and efforts to establish a China-centered
regional economic order in Eurasia, and its efforts within major international fora to press
for new values and agendas for global governance. It highlights the confluence of a
favorable international environment and the surprising restraint in China’s foreign relations
18

as well as diplomatic activism as a viable alternative explanation to rising great power
restraint. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the study with a comparative discussion of the case
studies.
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1

STATUS QUO, REVISIONISM, AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER

In what follows, this chapter reflects on the importance of international order and
problematizes a series of questionable and self-serving narratives on state behavior that are
endemic to foreign policy debates in the American academe (which concomitantly inform
IR debates). Thereafter, the reader is presented with this dissertation’s main argument,
which underscores the necessity of recognizing nuances in state practices and appreciating
the role of statespeople in binding international society. Next, it examines notable shortages
in existing theories on status quo and revisionism as well as research on grand strategy. In
the penultimate section, the reader is exposed to important theoretical considerations and
conceptualizations, while the final section provides a roadmap of chapter content for the
rest of this volume.
1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM
Order is characterized by stable configurations of power, clear demarcations of political
rights and privileges, and property rights among social actors. While domestic orders are
hierarchical, international order concerns the life and death of nations. Unlike domestic
orders, moreover, international order is not necessarily enforced by a “Leviathan,” but
rather reflects a conscious and unified design by self-interested states.29 We can infer,
therefore, that the cooperative decisions of disparate political units, each with varying
levels of power, resources, and influence at their command, determine international
outcomes.

29

Anarchy is thought to be the defining feature of international relations. Some scholars posit that the totality
of practices and interactions between states, with common interest in preserving order, amounts to an
international “society of states.” See Bull, Anarchical Society, pp. 13-19.
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The collective wisdom of the IR discipline shows that international orders emerge
and collapse in tandem with rising or declining great powers, hegemonic wars, and the
diplomatic efforts of international society. Through war and agreements, international
orders generally incline towards equilibrium.30 States that are content with a given
configuration of power will seek to preserve it; those that are not will seek to change it.31
The latter is inevitable given that the metrics of state power are perpetually in flux. As an
example of this phenomenon, the Westphalian international system has hosted devastating,
system-wide hegemonic wars roughly every century since the 1600s. Each of these wars
has been punctuated by prolonged periods of relative calm conceived by the diplomatic
efforts of major powers in the postbellum.32 The American-led liberal world order, a
product of World War II, and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union have together
produced one of the most peaceful and prosperous global arrangements in history. It is
clear, however, that the present equilibrium will not last indefinitely. For this reason,
understanding the way states comport themselves, particularly rising states and great
powers, is crucial.33
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See Robert W. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),
pp. x, xii.
31

Ibid., pp. 10-11.
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A chronological listing of major wars, and peace settlements, in the Westphalian international system are
as follows: The Thirty Years War (1618-1648) and The Peace of Westphalia (1648); the War of the Spanish
Succession (1701-1713) and the Treaty of Utrecht (1713); the Wars of the French Revolution (1792-1815)
and the Congress of Vienna (1815); World War I (1914-1918) and the Peace of Versailles (1919); and World
War II (1939-1945) and the Wartime Agreements between the Allied Powers (1942-1946).
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Great-power states are those that possess a special status in international society and accorded special
privileges and duties because of their superior military and economic capabilities. See Bull, The Anarchical
Society, pp. 194-199. For other capability-based explanations, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great
Power Politics (New York City, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), p. 5. See also Jack S. Levy, War in
the Modern Great Power System, 1495- 1975 (University Press of Kentucky, 1983), pp. 10-19, and for a
good overview see Barry Buzan, United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First
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The theoretical and empirical significance of preserving the present international
order is underscored today by the emergence of new great powers and the perceived relative
decline of extant ones. Three major narratives on this issue stand out. Firstly, there is a
palpable concern over the emergence of China as a potential rival to the United States.34
The rise of China is tantamount to a fin-de-siècle for the apex of global power.35 With
American power diminishing in the face of China’s growing power and confidence, history
is coming full circle. Notable scholars, such as John Mearsheimer, have speculated that
this power transition will not be peaceful, as an emboldened China will have the
wherewithal to provoke a war with the United States.36 Even if China appears at present,
as some argue, to be an integral part of the liberal world order, it is doing so to preserve
the façade of pacifism —that China is simply biding its time.37 It is entirely possible that
China’s rise may indirectly destabilize international order in other ways. Chinese elites
may, for example, choose needlessly aggressive strategies due to their hubris.38 This, in

Century (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), pp. 58-76.
See John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise.” Current History, Vol. 105, No. 690 (2006), pp. 160162; Jonathan Holslag, China’s Coming War with Asia (Cambridge: Polity, 2015).
34

For an overview of the popular views on China’s rise see Yongjin Zhang, ‘China Anxiety’: Discourse and
Intellectual Challenges,” Development and Change, Vol. 44, No. 6 (2013), pp. 1407-1425.
35

See Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 401-402. For an overview of Mearsheimer’s
argument, see Jonathan Kirshner, “The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of
China,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2010), pp. 53-75.
36

Status-quo states are “nations that either desire to preserve the established order or that, while actually
desiring change have renounced the use of force as a method of bringing it about.” Revisionist states are
simply ones that seek to overturn the status quo, through force if necessary. See Arnold Wolfers, Discord
and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), pp.
125-126.
37
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Edward N. Luttwak, The Rise of China vs. The Logic of Strategy (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 2012), pp. 9-10.
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turn, may further vex China’s already agitated neighbors into embracing an anti-China
alliance.
The ascendency of a non-democratic power like China may also undermine
international order by reducing the efficacy of non-military tools that have traditionally
enabled status quo powers to keep minor states in check. The U.S. and its Western allies
have, through bilateral agreements and formal international organizations, leveraged
economic and political conditionalities upon states that sought developmental aid. Many
developing countries find these conditionalities to be repellent for authoritarian states since
they seem to lack the lofty moral standards of the West. Instead, an emerging power like
China can woo the developing world with promises of no-strings-attached developmental
aid, thereby further enervating the present international order.39 Whatever the specific
consequences then, China’s rise will challenge the existing America-centered political,
economic, and normative pillars of the liberal world order.40
A second inter-related narrative is equally ambivalent about lesser powers in other
regions. In this narrative, it is believed that two types of states, rising revisionist powers
and “rogue states”, seek to fundamentally transform international relations.41 From
Venezuela in South America to Iran in the Middle East, and to North Korea in East Asia,
some regional powers continue to undermine the liberal world order and frustrate
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See Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (New York City, NY: Vintage, 2009).

Christopher Layne, “The US-Chinese Power Shift and the End of the Pax Americana,” International
Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 1 (2018), pp. 89-111.
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See Gilpin, War and Change, pp. 39-49. Cf. G. John Ikenberry, “The Future of the Liberal World Order:
Internationalism After America,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 56 (May/June, 2011), pp. 56-59.
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America’s global designs. These states are not necessarily rising powers, but their
dissatisfaction with international order has manifested as an aversion to the United States
and the very premise of a liberal world order. However, these states are comparatively
weak and cannot pose a vital threat to the United States. Generally, these countries tend to
be authoritarian states with abysmal relations with the United States, often displaying noncompliance with international law and norms, or endangering countries allied to the United
States. Notable examples include such countries as Iran, which is perceived by Israel as an
existential threat but is ultimately considered a rogue state due to its support for Shi’ite
terrorist groups. Iran’s potential threat to the global energy supply is exacerbated by its
location, dangerously close to major energy routes like the Persian Gulf. Iran’s ambition to
achieve civilian nuclear power continues to spark controversy as it is perceived to be an
aggressive move by the Iranian regime to acquire nuclear weapons. North Korea is
similarly disposed. In the backdrop of the unsettled Korean conflict, the North Korean
regime has withstood the United States’ economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure, all
the while continuing its drive to attain nuclear weapons, thereby posing a direct challenge
to key United States allies such as South Korea and Japan.
The third set of narratives concern the role of status quo states that have a vested
interest in preserving order. Some have attained great-power status, so seeking to preserve
international order is natural. Others are too weak to effectuate any meaningful change in
international relations and therefore assent, either willingly or due to external coercion, to
international order. Additionally, adherence to a plethora of liberal and democratic norms,
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institutions, and regimes restrains many of these states.42 Status-quo states either accept
international order or have incentives to uphold international order. Their efforts to uphold
international order are often frustrated by revisionist and rogue states. The difficulty for
status-quo states in resisting revisionist states lies in the difficulty of assessing the aims of
states, especially non-democratic ones.43 This is further exacerbated by the consequences
of compelling revisionist states to change their behavior. When undertaken, efforts like
military intervention, for example, appear to reinforce hypocritical imperial practices that
not only strengthen illiberal states but also lead to a domestic blowback that subverts the
domestic liberalism of status quo states.44 For these reasons, it is not uncommon to see
variations of narratives asserting that the United States must be directly involved in
regional conflicts while its allies should be perpetually vigilant against rogue states to
protect global world order.45 If such narratives are to be believed, the appropriate policy
response, then, is for the United States to implement a variety of measures to defend the
liberal world order through a change in its grand strategy to balancing emerging threats.46

See discussion in Andrew H. Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each
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From such a declinist perspective, one can infer several policy prescriptions: that the U.S.
may need to reinforce its alliances in the region, invest in greater military capabilities,
pursue further diplomatic and economic measures, and ultimately adopt a grand strategy
that affirms American primacy.47 It appears that status-quo powers, especially the United
States, have their work cut out for them!
These narratives are fundamentally problematic given that labels like revisionism
and status quo are a posteriori labels. States have available to them a variety of strategies
that can preserve or challenge international order in several ways, and it is generally
through outcomes we can even begin to infer whether a state is revisionist (also
disregarding the disjuncture in a state’s intent and international outcomes). We can,
however, think more clearly about the behavior and capabilities of the aforementioned
states and identify the disjuncture in these narratives in turn. Regarding rising powers,
scholars rightfully point out that China is not outright challenging the United States. Not
only does China refrain from confronting the United States with military threats, but it is
also its largest trading partner. China unambiguously appears to be a major pillar of the
liberal world order due to its diplomatic networks, sheer demography, massive
manufacturing output, and voracious appetite for raw materials. Others further note the
asymmetry of China’s relationship with the United States at present, arguing that the
former cannot challenge the hegemon without destroying its own fragile, export-dependent
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economy. The fact that the U.S. is indebted to China means that China cannot risk
damaging the U.S. economy.48 That said, being the focal point of global capital, the U.S.
enjoys an unassailable advantage as transnational capitalist classes build support for U.S.
foreign policy at home.49 In fact, displacing a hegemon may be an undesirable goal as
China may be more interested in fulfilling other intangible status goals than in pursuing the
costly goal of establishing itself as a new hegemon.50
For lesser rogue or “revisionist” powers, the material logic presents even lesssurmountable obstacles. As it is a rising great power, it is prohibitively expensive for any
status-quo power, even the United States, to preemptively strike China. Most other socalled revisionist states hardly possess the capabilities to resist determined status-quo
powers, let alone topple international order. Revisionist states may not necessarily be rising
or powerful, then. They may still be revisionists, however, because they possess
revolutionary governments or espouse authoritarian ideologies that run counter to the
prevailing progressive values of international society. Not content with transforming one’s
society only, revolutionary movements often spill across borders and threaten international
order not only in terms of property rights but also the internal stability of states that
constitute international society –without stable states with sufficiently legitimate
governments, the international order could not operate for long. Since these regimes are
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generally cemented with political ideology, cults of personality, or religion, their foreign
policies run counter to the broader interests of the international community. For these
considerations, revolutionary states are therefore thought to pose threats to international
order, as their domestic and foreign policy agendas impel them towards authoritarianism
at home and violence abroad.
Such a rendering of revisionist states runs into problems because these behaviors
do not seem to correspond with the behavior of past revisionist states. An examination of
diplomatic history is revealing. In the past, states that have fundamentally challenged an
established international order and its proponents have invariably failed. Many have failed
to follow-up on their domestic transformation, overextending and reaching their
culminating point of victory before consolidating their gains, as in the cases of
Revolutionary France or the Axis Powers.51 Others have failed not necessarily because of
military downfall, but because of the processes of socialization.52 Revisionist states are
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subject to the same strategic dilemmas as other states in international politics and grapple
with similar trade-offs. Trade-offs such as to starve for permanent revolution or to
compromise revolutionary principles; to become a member of the diplomatic community
or to risk becoming a pariah. For better or worse, “revisionist” states tend to respect the
general rules of the game, rather than risk falling by the wayside.53Revolutionary states
from the 20th century, most notably the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and Iran, eventually
normalized their diplomatic relations with most of the international community. Even
today, most of these revisionist states’ ostensibly-rogue-like activities are confined to the
discursive (i.e., denouncement of great powers) or to asymmetric violence, such as
supporting armed non-state actors (i.e., terrorist groups). These non-state actors are
indubitably harmful to international order because they undermine the qualities on which
it is predicated.54 Worse, they generally cannot be traced to a specific address, and their
sponsors can rarely be punished.
The claims about status quo states are also dubious. It may also be pertinent to ask
how established great powers, those that are ostensibly content with the current state of the
international order, comport themselves in international politics. As the most powerful state
in the international system, the United States has since the end of the Second World War
overseen the creation of the liberal world order, as well as a series of international
organizations and liberal institutions aimed at generating wealth and economic growth,
fostering liberal values, and, ultimately, projecting American power. It is only natural for
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the United States and its allies to act on behalf of the international community and rebuke
revisionist states, thereby upholding international order. To this end, the United States and
its allies have been involved in many regions and conflicts from the 20th century to the
present.
These interventions have featured innocuous acts as well as destructive policies that
are hardly indistinguishable from the tools allegedly employed by revisionist states. In
other words, as a status-quo power, the United States has engaged in policies that
undermine international order. Many can rightly point out that there is no puzzle here. The
United States is, after all, a hegemon in a unipolar system. This means that there are no
other sufficiently great powers that can deter the United States from using force.
Unipolarity is so overbearing on world politics that any form of balancing behavior that
would otherwise be considered as automatic and prudent response to a systemic threat
would logically be considered revisionist behavior!55 The puzzle, then, is not that a state in
the position of the United States uses force, but that it does so to the detriment of the world
order it has forged in the past half-century.56 Once again, the current terminology fails to
capture the full spectrum of state behaviors. In fact, this failure calls into question the very
premise of the United States and allies as being beneficial for international order. Without
exonerating the foreign policies of revisionist or status-quo states, there are, however, some
nuances to “revisionist” behaviors that need to be addressed.
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It is here that the dissertation seeks to leave its imprint on the literature. Much of
the extant discussion on international order seems to juxtapose the efforts of established
great powers to pursue their enlightened self-interest while providing desirable services to
the global community, such as peace and functioning international institutions, with the
activities of the malcontents that frustrate international peace due to their parochial
interests or radical ideologies. States are seemingly-unproblematically classified as either
“status quo” or “revisionist,” depending on the fluctuations of their material capabilities
and their allegiance to the liberal world order.
The problem with this taxonomical imprecision cannot be overstated. In simplest
terms, such an approach essentializes the subject material. It precludes the possibility of
thinking about international order and its evolution beyond a binary view in which states
are either for or against preserving international order due to qualities intrinsic to them.
States seeking to preserve the status quo may misprognose the international security
environment and choice towards maladaptive foreign policies.57 This may, among other
things, lead them to inflate non-threats and overbalance them.58 Other times, states may
underestimate, even at a domestic-discursive level, the aggressive intent of a state.
Most importantly, it may preclude states from recognizing opportunities that can
help them peacefully accommodate regional and system-level challengers. Applying these
concerns to contemporary discussions on U.S. foreign policy, for example, demonstrates
the risks. There is a very particular discourse that undercuts discussions concerning the
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liberal world order: that of the necessity of American leadership for the preservation of
order. This discourse presupposes that if the U.S. fails to uphold these values, the liberal
world order will decay.59 The paradox is that when the U.S. acts in the name of preserving
order, this manifests as overbalancing significantly weaker states, often with grave
consequences for the domestic viability of these states, as well as for the stability of the
regional orders they inhabit. The tendency of leadership to manifest as unilateralism further
reduces American credibility.60
Whatever the specifics of a given international order may be, however, international
society is irreducible to a specific vision of “order.” International order is neither
immutable nor reducible to one’s allegiances or adherence to the dictates of a single
ideology. The only sufficient condition for international order is that states agree upon
some standard practices and interests within international society, for which homogeneity
of the constitutive units is not a necessary condition. Even the U.S.-backed liberal world,
for example, is a manifestation of an abstract notion of international society that merely
happens to have been shaped primarily by the fiat of a superpower and its allies, but which
still accommodates illiberal states. International order has, in the past, accommodated far
greater diversity and heterogeneity than we often appreciate. The extent to which
international society ought to support a diversity of state types and practices, or interfere
in their autonomy in service to broader humanitarian principles, is a major debate in
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International Relations theory.61 For an international order to be stable, nevertheless, it
needs to distribute a modicum of justice to its constituents.62 States may be interested in
rectifying some of these injustices, real or perceived, but it is difficult to equate this with
revisionism unless states pursue these ends at the cost of order. In sum, there are many
reasons why states may want to challenge international order. What the present discussion
and qualifications reveal, however, is the fact that the way states pursue these ends matters.
It is possible to pursue self-interest without abnegating the idea of international society or
international order. States need not entirely acquiesce to hegemonic power, nor seek
confrontation. They can instead reform international order without unraveling it.63
1.2. PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING DEFINITIONS
Given the scope and theoretically syncretic nature of the project, some conceptual
clarifications are needed to identify extant problems and demarcate the dissertation’s
intended contribution. The following sections rely on existing definitions in the literature
to contextualize what is meant by “international order,” “status quo,” and “revisionism”
(all of which are summarized in table 1. 1. below).
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1.2.1. Defining Order
Since international (and regional) orders display notably different qualities over time, it
may be a worthwhile scientific endeavor to produce taxonomical studies of international
order. 64 The problem, however, is that international order also refers to something static,
perhaps as an acceptable modus vivendi as to how power is exercised productively in
international politics. International order nevertheless is also inexorably in a state of flux,
with some agents advancing agendas that may serve to strengthen international
conventions, and others undermining it by seeking their own aggrandizement. One is
therefore left to ponder the interplay of these dynamics to deduce something useful,
meaningful, and generalizable about the whole of international order. Understanding the
purposive behaviors that serve international order, as well as those that enervate it, is,
therefore, a worthwhile endeavor. What follows is a brief description of notable approaches
to international order inferred from different schools of IR thought.
From its inception, the International Relations (IR) discipline has concerned itself
with understanding patterns of war and peace in international politics. Chief among its
objectives is to clarify the conditions under which wars break out and, by extension, to
generate useful insights for practitioners of statecraft to effectuate the desired normative
goals of the field: principally, the abolishment of international war and the promotion of
other humanitarian goals. The salience of building a peaceful international order is a
recurring theme in IR. It is hard to think otherwise considering the circumstances
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chronicled in one of the seminal texts of the field.65 Whatever the entry point of any general
inquiry into the operation of world order, one fact is incontrovertible: that orders arise and
unravel. Their fortunes, linked as they are to the everyday operations of their constituent
members, fluctuate with structural-material circumstances, prevailing ideational forces,
and the imposition of other historical exigencies. In this respect, the history of international
order is coterminous with that of the rise and fall of various great powers, how they comport
themselves inter se, and their efforts to preserve arrangements favorable to their common
interests.66
When describing international order, Hedley Bull’s definition is often invoked as
the golden standard: order is “a pattern of activity between and among states that sustains
the basic goals of the society of states.”67 What makes this conceptualization so powerful
is that it paves the way to thinking about the possibility of achieving peace, cooperation,
and other desirable international outcomes despite the much-maligned presence of anarchy.
There are, nevertheless, limitations to this conceptualization as order is conflated with
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consistent behaviors.68 Instead, as Tang argues, it is more appropriate to think of
international order as the “degree of predictability of what is going on within a social
system, presumably because agents’ behavior, social interactions, and social outcomes
within the social system have all come under some regulation.69 This research, therefore,
defines international order as simply that which consistently promotes certain outcomes
and compels states to behave in relatively-predictable ways.
There exists various school of thought in IR as to the general operation of
international politics and how to achieve order. For security and interest-based theories,
such as Realism, international order is tantamount to the general absence of war due to the
effective functioning of the balance of power.70 The pursuit of “stability,” then, is the
supreme virtue because it is a situation in which established power relationships remain
static, preventing the rise of powerful aggressors, reducing the likelihood of hegemonic
wars and, ultimately, ensuring the survival of most states.71 Interstate war is the first place
to look when tracing the components of status quo and revisionism. Structural theories of
international politics, especially Neorealist approaches, causally link their understanding
of order, which is an equilibrium of power, to states’ efforts to secure themselves under
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conditions of anarchy and uncertainty. States have a few policy options.72 Internally, states
can improve their military and economic capabilities to increase their likelihood of
defeating threatening powers.73 Externally, they can forge alliances to counter threats.74
For these reasons, international politics has a recurring tendency towards an automatic
balance of power—an approximation of a stable order.75
Polarity, or the number of great powers comprising the international structure, can
affect the war-proneness and, thus, the stability of the international system.76 This power
equilibrium differs greatly depending on the number and composition inter se of greatpower states.77 In descending number of great powers, multipolar, bipolar, and unipolar
systems constrain or enable states in diverse ways. Polarity also has consequences on the
perceptions of decision-makers and their levels of uncertainty about the intentions and
capabilities of other states.78 In multipolar systems, states may commit themselves to
counterproductive unions in which an ally might blunder into a war, thereby needlessly
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dragging along its allies into the conflict.79 Conversely, the failure of an ally to honor
alliance commitments could have adverse effects on international order as well.80 The
importance of buck-passing is particularly relevant in the case of great-power states that
shirk responsibilities. Apart from undermining the balance-of-power logic, buck-passing
can strengthen the resolve of aggressive states and culminate in major wars.81
In bipolar systems, states generally gravitate to an alliance with one of the two
superpowers, resulting in increased certainty about the sources of threats.82 Combined with
the looming possibility of nuclear Armageddon, bipolarity ensured a delicate equilibrium
between the superpowers that prevented direct war. The polarity-based argument founders,
however, when one considers that the alleged “Long Peace” failed to secure order and
justice in the global periphery, leading to what is known as the stability-instability
paradox.83 The historical boundedness of the argument, however, diminishes the
contemporary utility of any argument about state behavior, or international outcomes for
that matter, based on system-level variables such as bipolarity.84
Unipolar systems are thought to be less stable since a sole superpower is an
unbounded one. A “unipole” is so overwhelmingly superior that other states cannot hope
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to balance its ambitions. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the unipole is free to act
with relative impunity, which would explain why the most powerful state in the
international system might act unilaterally and persist in behaviors that the traditional
literature associates with preserving the status quo. Unipolarity is a mixed blessing.
Achieving unipolarity can essentially guarantee a state’s security, and therefore its survival.
The downside is that a unipole’s lack of a credible rival reduces other states’ willingness
to tolerate unilateralism and other forms of self-aggrandizement. This reduces the overall
efficacy of the unipole’s foreign policy as it provokes resentment and soft-balancing.85 The
absence of foes, or the resentment by allied and neutral states still would not explain why
a unipole would engage risky and unilateral foreign policies —apart from some form of
miscalculation. Overall, however, the promise of credible punishment by the unipole would
logically increase the likelihood that states, especially would-be revisionists, acquiesce and
pursue pacific foreign policies.
Another strand in Realist thinking on international order emphasizes the role of
hegemony and economic structures in shaping world politics. In a sense, amassing
overwhelming power could be conducive to order. Attempting to become more powerful
than the opposing coalition is sensible because this can either prevent war or help secure
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territorial gains, thereby increasing wealth and power.86 This view is somewhat
corroborated by the emergence and fall of world orders. Within an order, one can expect a
system change, a systemic change, or interaction change.87 The first embodies a change of
the units. The second, the primary focus of Gilpin’s as well as most other hegemonic
transition research refers to the changes in the governing coalition (i.e., the hegemonic
state). The last, meanwhile, concerns to changes in the way states interact with one
another.88 As to the principal means by which changes can occur, these can be achieved in
an incremental or revolutionary way.89 The differential rates of growth between one state,
or a coalition of states, can lead to system-wide wars as the costs of either maintaining or
preserving order can incentivize established powers and rising states to either obey or
challenge the order. While states may be dissatisfied with a given order for myriad reasons,
the analytical focus is always about how dissatisfied states challenge the hegemonic
coalition that governs a world order in the long-run.
This tendency to highlight hegemonic war is somewhat surprising (and of limited
utility in contemporary world politics) given that there have been instances of hegemonic
transitions in which the rising power did not directly confront the hegemon. America’s rise
to world power is a perfect example. While its rise was not entirely peaceful, the U.S. rarely

86

For a detailed discussion on conventional theories of security-based alliances, see Stephen Walt, Origins
of Alliances; Thomas Christen and Jack L. Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance
Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring, 1990), pp. 137-168.
87

See, Gilpin, War and Change, p. 40.

88

Ibid., pp. 39-44.

89

Ibid. p. 70.

40

confronted major European powers.90 Most importantly, the U.S. did not confront the longdeclining hegemon, Great Britain, and opted instead to ally with them in the both World
Wars. U.S. “hegemony” consolidated after successful wars against what the traditional
literature would call revisionist states. Why is this exposition important? Simply, it is
possible to have hegemonic transitions in which a rising state becomes a hegemon while
not necessarily exhibiting revisionist qualities in the traditional sense, like unbounded
expansionism and pursuing a hegemonic war against major status-quo powers.
There is also an IR liberal version of this “hegemonic stability theory.” Liberals
highlight the social and institutional aspects of order, arguing that international orders are
formed as the body of rules that constitute world politics and manifest via international
organizations, regimes, and norms.91 While these rules can theoretically operate under any
international power structure, the modern liberal world order emerged in the aftermath of
a hegemonic war and propagated by a benevolent hegemon.92 Victorious states have an
incentive to establish various international institutional mechanisms to achieve order so
that they may preserve the status quo postbellum. Hegemony is one strategy to achieve
this. Liberal scholars, most prominently John Ikenberry, have argued that victors of
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hegemonic wars establish international institutions that promote the economic
interdependence between states and the economic well-being of allies.
A hegemonic state, especially a benign one like the United States was in the
aftermath of World War II, can attain special political privileges and act on behalf of the
international community to promote order. These functions can be both economic or
political. Economically, these may include such privileges as having seigniorage rights
(over the global reserve currency), being the lender of last resort, and running, at times,
deficits to promote the economic wellbeing of lesser allies. Politically, the hegemon has
the capacity and legitimacy to act on behalf of the international community. The formal
institutionalization of political, military, and economic norms, backed up by the power of
the hegemon, result in institutional “lock-in.”93
There are problems with this liberal interpretation of international order as well.
Institutions can become shackles. Abuses of power through unilateralism reduce the
hegemon’s freedom of action.94 Despite this paradox, there is no credible explanation of
why states, especially a hegemon, would exercise restraint, especially long after the
previous hegemonic war when the international conjuncture has changed to the detriment
of the hegemon. It is unclear to what extent liberal and democratic values constitute a
sufficient condition for restraint since the hegemonic state and other democracies do
undermine international order. More importantly, this also begs the question of what
happens to states that fall outside of these institutional arrangements? This perspective, in
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sum, does not seem to accept the possibility that non-liberal states can participate in the
making and preservation of international order indefinitely because they are non-liberal
and prone to rogue behavior.
China, for example, has so far been an enthusiastic participant of the liberal world
order. Its further rise and eventual eclipsing of the United States, combined with its
fundamentally illiberal values, however, could transform or destabilize international
order.95 In a sense, the liberal institutional argument is unconvincing. It suffers from the
same problem as the traditional Realist perspectives that purport to theorize about world
order. It fails to provide mid-level theorizing about shorter-term state behavior. Why would
a benign hegemon, for example, undermine its international order by acting in illiberal
ways? Why, if participating in the liberal world order is so beneficial, should any rising
power, liberal or not, seek to undermine it in the name of domestic values? Examinations
about the general contours of world orders, their rise, and fall, are vitally important. It is
also imperative to understand the conflict between rising and declining states, to
meaningfully engage with questions over order.
As in the case of Realism, material capabilities and the balance of power play a
crucial role in managing international order, but without reducing international security to
the raw function of material capabilities. International politics remains “social” as states
delineate a scope of acceptable practices, or institutions, towards one another that reduce
uncertainty and help promote their common interests. This, however, should not be
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misidentified with the core principles of IR liberalism, for the institutions of international
society are Janus-faced. Just as international institutions create a basis for states to form
common expectations and standard for cooperation, they also embody principles aimed at
preserving the autonomy of its units.96
For Critical and Marxist approaches, social classes constitute world politics and, as
such, world order materializes when a favorable permutation of ideas, institutions, and
material power establishes a hegemonic bloc in one state that subsequently becomes global
in scope.97 International order, therefore, is simply an extension of the mutual interests of
a transnational capitalist class that influences international outcomes, although this group
is hardly monolithic as different industrial sectors and fractions compete with one
another.98 Ruling classes seek to protect a particularly favorable mode of production and
relationship with other classes. These concerns shape the “form” that a state will take, and
the strategies elites will employ to increase domestic cohesion, i.e., the willing consent of
society. This is further enhanced by the use of mechanisms of international order to spread
favorable modes of production abroad.99 The modern international order, characterized by
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globalization, is simply an extension of the institution founded in the era of Pax Americana
but with an added internationalization of production chains.
While none of the previous approaches are necessarily mutually-exclusive, the
English School approach provides the most syncretic approach as it posits a via media
between Realism and Liberalism. It does by highlighting the importance of an international
society of states from which order can arise through its constituent states’ mutual
recognition of their common interest in sustaining it.100 That is to say that order arises
neither from a balance of power, uniform values, nor even hegemony per se, but through a
combination of these within the framework of an international society of states.101 The
English School also recognizes that “order” is not intrinsically desirable becasue it can
stifle states, and other actors, and consign them to unfavorable circumstances.102
Consequently, order and justice are “at loggerheads with one another.” Orders that fail to
provide justice is also contradictory to the preservation of the goals of international life.
So, for the English School, international order is defined by international outcomes that in
addition to establishing regularities in behavior and stability in relationships, but also an
understanding that states deem something to be legitimate or not. The way order can be
sustained or challenged, moreover, occurs through a multitude of practices and norms that
pervade among the members of an international society. The fundamental institutions of
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international society, commonly observed in all international societies throughout history,
thus shape the quality of an order through statecraft.
International order, therefore, has material, ideational, and normative components,
as embodied in the fundamental institutions of international society. In regards to how
order can be challenged or preserved along these dimensions, the following section
considers how revisionism and status-quo seeking is defined in the IR literature. It is argued
that there is a glaring omission of “reforming” international order through existing legal
and normative mechanisms.
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Table 1.1. A Typology of Order103
School of IR

Type of
Order

Main
“Variables”

Unit(s) of
Analysis

Order
defined by

Expectations

Main
Author

Realism

Anarchical

Distribution of
Material
Capabilities

International
System/
Political
Outcomes

Stability/
Equilibrium of
Power

The Balance of
power preserves
stability, engenders
peace

Waltz
(1979)

Gilpinian

Hegemonic

Distribution of
Material
Capabilities,

World Order

Stability of a
governing
coalition

Hegemon’s
preferences
remains stable until
challenger
emerges, resulting
in hegemonic war

Gilpin
(1981)

Capabilities,
Institutions,
Regimes,
Norms

Liberal
International
Order, States,
International
Organizations

Nature of
transactions
and adherence
to liberal
principles

Benign hegemonic
leadership and
liberal values
ensure order

Ikenberry
(2001;

Realism

Hierarchy of
Prestige

Liberalism

Constitutional

2011)

English School

Anarchical

Primary
Institutions of
International
Society

(Global)
International
Society &
World Society

Order is
obtained by
practices of
states; justice
helps preserve
order

Mutual recognition
of common
interests restrains
states

Bull
(1977);
Hurrell
(2007)

English School
(II)

Hegemonic

Primary
Institutions of
International
Society,
especially
great power
management

Primary
Institutions of
International
Society

Order is
obtained by
practices of
states; justice
helps preserve
order

Hegemony is
exercised
collectively by great
powers or a
unipole.

Clark
(2011)

NeoGramscianism

Hegemonic

Material force,
ideas,
institutions

States, Social
Classes/
Transnational
Capitalist
Class

The
emergence of
a historic bloc

The confluence of
capabilities, ideas,
and institutions
constitute world
order

Cox
(1981)

See Bull, Anarchical Society; Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Cox, “Social Forces, States, and
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Hegemony and International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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1.2.2. Limitations Of Status Quo And Revisionism
The conceptual logic of revisionism and status quo is not controversial, but every school
of IR underscores distinct aspects of world politics, including prestige, balance of power
dynamics, power transitions, unit-level interests, as well as other immaterial
considerations. This section briefly considers extant definitions in the literature as well as
inferring assumptions about these concepts, thereby highlighting their limitations. As the
International Relations discipline has generally focused on war as the major global blight,
revisionism has appeared in the literature about dissatisfaction felt by states and a desire to
achieve satisfaction in the form of self-determined distributional justice, as either enhanced
access to global resources or advancement in the global hierarchy of prestige.
In the Westphalian international system, wars have been fought primarily for selfaggrandizement, or in the name of preserving a balance of power, which would ensure that
no state would become too powerful such that they pose a threat to other states. So
pervasive is this theme is that one of the earliest works of IR, for example, concerned this
very issue. Writing on the eve of the Second World War, E. H. Carr argued that the victors
of the Great War established themselves at the apex of global power and influence,
consigning in the process the defeated powers to second-class status. The only way to
maintain peace was for the “Haves” to recognize the legitimate grievances of the “HaveNots” so that the latter would not attempt to undermine international order in their quest to
seek justice.104
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Status-quo seeking and revisionism became inexorably linked to the pursuit of
power in international politics and, especially, the latter appears to have taken on the same
qualities as the pursuit of power for its own sake.105 Much of the earlier writings on
revisionism and status quo also followed this logic as revisionism was essentially the label
for states that wanted to overturn a particular power relationship or sought aggrandizement.
With the advent of Structural Realism, states were essentially assumed to be securityseekers, and that conflict was reduced to an unintentional outcome of security dilemmas
rather than dictates of human nature.106 Nevertheless, according to Offensive Realists, the
anarchical system incentivizes expansionist behavior, and so revisionism can manifest as
sensible security-seeking behavior.107 This is because rationality dictates that challenging
the status quo in pursuit of hegemony is the ultimate guarantee of one’s security.108
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In addition to system-level security considerations, revisionism and status-quo
seeking are increasingly attributed to unit-level variables —either as stand-alone
explanations or as additions to structural theories. Neoclassical Realism, for example,
combines systemic and unit-level variables to study status quo and revisionism. This
perspective discussed above argues that states balance rising and threatening states, which
explains why balances of power are recurring features of international politics, and
hegemony is rare. Deductively, one must either assume that sometimes order challenging
behavior is beneficial, but decision-makers often miscalculate their strategic environment,
or that their domestic systems and decision-makers are flawed in ways that impel them
towards war.109 Otherwise, war would logically be inconceivable in international
politics.110
The second component of status quo and revisionism then is as a quality of
domestic politics that affect states’ strategic calculi. It fills in an important gap between
structural theory and unit-level agency: the idea, ceteris paribus, that when facing the same
threats and opportunities, the internal qualities of some states will lead them to adopt
drastically different policies. Neoclassical Realists, do not explicitly theorize on why states
challenge international order, but their framework is highly suited to examine a related
concept of “maladaptive” behavior. That is, why do states sometimes fail to identify and
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counter rising threats, or why do they engage in self-destructive, expansionist behavior?
From revolutionary regimes and leadership pathologies to the composition of the
selectorate, and from authoritarianism to the inscrutable agendas of interest groups, there
is no shortage of relevant variables that lead states on the path of external aggression.111
While the framework offers a convenient way to examine a vast array of variables, existing
studies have not been mobilized to answer the order-related behavioral puzzles driving this
research.112
By the same token, it is possible to associate status-quo behavior with domestic
variables as well. In this, the Liberal IR tradition has examined the role of domestic regime
type, institutions, and, most importantly, the role of ideas. One of the major facets of the
literature on the democratic peace is premised on the pacifying effects of liberal
democracies inter se.113 Democratic regimes purportedly increase a rational and democratic
society’s scrutiny over foreign policy, while shared common values reduce the likelihood
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of war.114 This suggests that democracies are less likely to be revisionist states in general,
and especially towards one another, although in practice this has not prevented democracies
from initiating wars against less-powerful and less-threatening states in the periphery.115
The process, moreover, of becoming a democracy unleashes the destructive energies of
societies leading, at least in the short-term, to more aggressive and expansionist foreign
policies and behaviors that are commonly associated with revisionist states.116 Jeffrey
Meiser has most recently argued that American grand strategy in the late 19th and early 20th
was restrained due to the pacifying effects of a liberal domestic political structure.117 This
explanation, nevertheless, is too specific to generate any useful insight for contemporary
policy puzzles. In its essence, Meiser’s analysis concerns the liberalism-induced
peacefulness of a rising democratic state at the turn of the previous century. The liberal
restraint argument founders when applied against an authoritarian state like China and a
highly belligerent U.S.118

114

The gist of the argument is that democracy brings transparency to public debate and national
bureaucracies, thereby engendering a better signaling of peaceful intent. See Bruce Russet and John R.
O’Neal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York
City, NY: W. W. Norton & Co., 2001). Cf. Sebastian Rosato, “On Democratic Peace,” in Christopher J.
Coyne and Rachel L. Mathers (eds.), Handbook on the Political Economy of War (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2011),
pp. 281-314; and Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” International
Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Autumn 1994), pp. 5-49.
Cf. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Correspondence: Fair Fights or Pointless Wars.” International Security, Vol. 28,
No. 3 (2003/04), p. 181.
115

See Snyder, Myths of Empire; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger
of War,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer, 1995), pp. 5-34. See also Harris Mylonas, The
Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2013), who extensively utilizes the concept of revisionism without appropriately
contextualizing it.
116

Which he mistakenly labels as “strategic culture.” See Jeffrey Meiser, Power and Restraint: The Rise of
the United States, 1898-1941 (Georgetown University Press, 2015), pp. 17-20.
117

It is, in other words, doubly wrong. Meiser’s analysis also notably suffers from a conceptual imprecision
as his approach differs from the standard inter-democratic peace hypothesis through the addition of strategic
118

52

Another important facet of IR Liberalism concerns the role of ideas.119 Unlike
identity and even political institutions, ideas are much more amenable to change and,
therefore, to measurement. Jeffrey Legro’s study of grand strategy formation and
international order provides a reasonable explanation not only for order preserving and
challenging behavior but for why these can change over time.120 Legro convincingly argues
that decision-makers’ beliefs about international order and their attitudes on how to engage
with world politics are subjected to change under special circumstances, such as when the
weaknesses of preexisting paradigms are revealed, and when new ideas are articulated and
consolidated.121 It is difficult to understand, however, why states would prefer one set of
ideas over others; why a state would go from isolationism to integration with international
society. One could not obviously infer sources for revisionism without some form of
exogenous shock. Legro also does not sufficiently address the role of material power in
shaping the decision-making circumstances of leaders and, importantly, also does not
distinguish between ideas and behavior. That is to say; it is entirely possible for leaders to
hold certain ideas yet to implement policies that contradict them. Legro also misses an
important opportunity to engage with the composition of decision-makers themselves.
Revisionism and status-quo seeking may also be related to the social aspects of
international politics. Various Constructivist and English School scholars have
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underscored that the international system is a social system in which states assume certain
roles and statuses just as individuals do in social settings.122 Similar to classical Realists’
emphasis on the international hierarchy of prestige, revisionism according to status-based
perspectives is the function of states’ desire to achieve a higher status in international
politics.123 It is nevertheless unclear what tangible pay-off prestige confers upon states. The
disjuncture between capabilities and relative influence, in terms of shaping the normative
aspects of world politics or, simply, control over outcomes is thought to be important.
Others, like Ayşe Zarakol, suggest that defeated great powers, particularly non-Western
ones like Japan, Russia, and Turkey, are particularly sensitive to their stigmatization and
loss of status, which has encouraged them to pursue various revisionist grand strategies.124
Some scholars have even suggested that rising in the international hierarchy of prestige
confers overall psychological satisfaction in the form of ontological security.125
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These recent approaches constitute the state-of-the-art in revisionist and status-quo
foreign policies. Their major strength is in their ability to connect material power with its
non-material aspects as they recognize that states can have different motivations for
revisionism, and these need not always lead to war-mongering or expansionism.126 This
also corroborates somewhat the need for rising states to validate themselves in international
politics, not only to keep in awe their citizens but also to signal strength and resolve to the
outside world. China’s foreign policy, for example, approximates to such rationale.127
While they bring to bear plausible and valuable explanations to state behavior, there
are several problems with identity and status-based approaches to state motivations. Firstly,
it is difficult to measure status-inconsistency arguments –ideational variables also present
challenges to research. If one supposed, without prejudice, that status concerns simply adds
another layer of complexity informing decision-making then it would still be difficult to
account for contradictory behavior. For example, if the foreign policy executives of a greatpower state were to believe that their state should be accorded more recognition and
influence in world politics, but do not follow up this assessment with some type of
measurable policy, one would not be establishing any causality between status and
behavior.
Secondly, this type of analysis risks over-anthropomorphizing the state. Foreign
policy executives that oversee their state, moreover, possess tangible domestic, material,
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and personal interests that outweigh less-tangible considerations as their country’s status –
unless status can be translated into some form of power. Since this is also about the way
other states or audiences think about your state, it is rather difficult to say anything concrete
about status-based motivations. At the end of the day, however, the state is not a monolithic
entity and the myriad of decision-makers, interest groups, and even their domestic
audiences have different preferences about their country’s status. A higher status is
logically desired by all members of a nation but the process of getting there, or what
constituents expect from their leaders, can take on different forms. Stephen Ward’s status
immobility theory, for example, takes this logic into consideration and explains how a
state’s beliefs about the attainability of their goals in international order and the reactions
of other states can empower specific groups of decision-makers (i.e., hardliners) that lead
to aggressive, revisionist foreign policies.128
Thirdly, and most important of all, while status-inconsistencies credibly explain
some forms of revisionism, it simply does not explain the specific way states approach
order. Dissatisfaction need not necessarily result in revisionist behavior that harms
international order. Similarly, a satisfied state like the United States might be affected by
the anxiety of being eclipsed by China, for example, but it cannot be used to explain its
behavior towards other members of the international community. It is for all of these
reasons that we can make the following declaration: the literature is predicated on a false
dichotomy of revisionism and status quo. A more comprehensive analytical referent, grand
strategy, is explored in the next section. A grand strategy can accommodate a broad range
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of variables and behaviors over a longer period, thereby affording a nuanced explanation
of state behaviors, such as reforming order.
1.2.3. Reforming Grand Strategy
Attempting to explain any type of behavioral disposition is an ambitious project, one that
concerns how states relate to international order. Firstly, because status-quo and revisionist
behaviors manifest themselves at diverse levels and echelons of policy, the task of
transcending these categories and forging an eclectic typology of state behavior requires a
comprehensive referent. Secondly, this referent needs to have a broader time horizon and
consider lingering tendencies, rather than examining individual policies. Finally, such
referent also needs to be relatable to decision-makers and environmental stimuli. To these
ends, grand strategy will serve as the main analytical driver of this research because it is a
distinct realm of thought and action in terms of its purpose, scope, and time horizon. 129
Grand strategy is defined in this study as the process of how statesmen select or
reject national ends and means within the material and ideational parameters of their
environment. The justification for this conceptualization, based on the commonly held
assumptions of the theorists of strategy, is as follows. Firstly, grand strategy is a process;
not a set of a priori policies determined by decision-makers. As Williamson Murray
explains, it is not an “enunciated set of goals and principles to which statesman and military
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leaders adhere in a consistent fashion.”130 Strategy—grand or not— concerns a clash of
wills in which strategists constantly have to adjust and readjust their moves.131 This applies
to statesmen who have to react to shifts in the international and domestic environment
constantly. This is the crux of the argument being developed in this research. Statesmen
calculate and react to opportunities, threats, and ideas around them, whether these emanate
from international anarchy, domestic society, or the social superstructure of world
politics.132
Secondly, the prefix “grand” is telling. Grand strategy is the highest abstraction of
strategy. In some ways, it is “the most crucial task of statecraft.”133 This is because it
encompasses the totality of policy tools and national resources available to the
statesman.134 Thus, grand strategy is not tantamount to foreign policy or military strategy.
Rather it encompasses these tools and levels of abstraction and combines them to fulfill the
ends of national policy. For example, specific diplomatic strategies, a disposition towards
international arbitration, pursuit of trade agreements, and force posturing are simply
components formulated with the view of achieving the national goals informing grand
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strategy.135 As such, grand strategy is not only conducted in times of war and peace. Its
scale, variety of tools, and purpose (of managing the survival and secondary goals of a state
under conditions of uncertainty) is more comprehensive.
Third, grand strategy can also be conceptualized in ideational terms. According to
Barry Posen’s classical definition, grand strategy “is a state’s theory of how best to provide
security for itself.”136 Hal Brands similarly defines grand strategy as an intellectual process;
a “theory, or logic, that guides leaders seeking security in an insecure world.”137 What this
suggests is that grand strategy may be based on material realities, but its tenets rely
ultimately on the identity and interests of policymakers. In short, how they view order and
locate themselves and their state within that order should logically shape the contours of
national policy and, more important for this intellectual endeavor, that it can be divined
through various modes of observation.
Finally, regarding this study’s caveats about grand strategy, the following are
neglected aspects in the literature. Firstly, grand strategy has a domestic component. If one
is to accept the premise that grand strategy is for the benefit of a political community, two
more assumptions naturally follow. First, grand strategy must logically serve the interests
of those that speak on behalf of the national interest (i.e., policy executive). As a result, the
time-horizon and toolkit of grand strategy can be altered for the sake of elite interests as
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long as such opportunities present themselves. Two, grand strategy must serve to cultivate
and coordinate national instruments in addition to external ones.138 In fact, the
accommodation of international order can manifest itself in domestic politics.139 Secondly,
grand strategy can be used to study the incongruence in the values embodied by
international society and the respective national foreign policy establishments in charge of
maintaining it. “Order,” in this sense, reflects a relationship between a state and the broader
international society in terms of hierarchy, privileges, obligations, and the way to
harmonize national interests with international goals.
Grand strategy refers to the policy process of selecting and combining instruments
of statecraft for the fulfillment of a nation’s goals. While it is in the long-term interest of
states to carve out a favorable position for themselves in the international order, prospects
of immediate or short-term gains, possibly resulting from a domestic agenda, may induce
states to change their tool-kit in part or full. In the long term, however, states seek a stable
order that guarantees their security, sovereign independence, and autonomy. Ultimately, it
may sometimes be beneficial to partake in the existing international order by
bandwagoning with the hegemon; other times it is not, as decision-makers may be
motivated to pursue short-term interests.
In this context, then, the true hallmark of revisionist behavior is not balancing
against the hegemon or refusing to participate in its order. Revisionism is rejecting the
tenets of the deeper international life. A state is not revisionist if it obeys the normative
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framework of international society, accommodates some semblance of legitimacy and
justice with order by upholding legal and diplomatic practices, and avoid policies that could
upset the cohesion and sovereignty of other states.
Nothing in the literature fully captures the complex issues facing international order
at present. There is a considerable disjuncture in the literature on rising states, revisionist
states, and the actual behavior of states like China. There is also little insight into why a
hegemonic state, like the United States, would act like a revisionist power since doing so
clearly undermines its international political capital. Only recently has the literature even
begun to consider notions that approximate to “reforming” behavior. Finally, of the few
approaches that take into thoughtful consideration the relevance of international society as
a relevant explanation, virtually none have sought to craft testable hypotheses of state
behavior that can enable practical ends such as foreign policy analysis.
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2

THEORETICAL INVESTIGATIONS

The previous chapter documented important puzzles in the apparent grand strategies of the
United States and China, highlighting in the process the conceptual dearth and theoretical
limitations of existing conceptualizations of international order as well as status quo and
revisionism in world politics. This chapter picks up the earlier discussion to examine the
specific manifestations of revisionism and status-quo behavior in prominent IR theories,
focusing on their causal mechanisms so as to lay the foundations for an alternative theory.
The formal inquiry of this chapter is to take stock of the IR literature on behaviors that
approximate to order-challenging, order-reforming, order-conforming, and orderretrenching. Although articulations of status quo and revisionism form the core of this
chapter, the comprehensive nature of the order-based typology of state behavior
necessitates the evaluation of a broader array of other relevant approaches to state behavior.
In what follows, therefore, the chapter 1) explores relevant approaches to our subject, 2)
examines their assumptions with a special emphasis on their ability to explain order
conforming, reforming, and challenging behavior, 3) identifies weaknesses in said
approaches, 4) unpacks the theoretical underpinnings of grand-strategic orientations, and
5) unveils the intended theoretical argument of this study in detail.
The grand traditions of IR are often subject to unfair criticism for failing to predict
or explain post-facto international political outcomes, which understandably has led to a
helpful reminder on the differences between theories of international politics and theories
of foreign policy.140 While mindful of this nuance, there are nevertheless important
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implications for state behavior that require scrutiny and appraisal. Secondly, the intended
contribution of this volume is not mutually exclusive with many of the prominent
approaches to grand strategy. There are, unavoidably, numerous approaches to
international order that address some facet of state-preference formation and its relation to
international order. It differs primarily in terms of its temporal scope and the causal
significance of elites.
On the topic of state preferences, this study contends that while grand strategy opts
towards regularity and conformity to international society, foreign policy executives’
preferences (and anxieties) about staying in power determine their disposition about
whether or not they prioritize domestic or international issues. In the continuation of their
decision-making process, expectations about future gains or losses, determine elites’
propensity to take risks. Based on available resources, elites choose in the shorter-term
policies that we can approximate to grand-strategic orientations.
To better describe how this researcher arrived at this theory, the following sections
examine relevant arguments and processes concerning state behavior from the purview of
Realist, Pluralist, Innenpolitik, and Cognitive approaches. Overall, only a handful of
approaches offer any improvement on the status-quo and revisionism binary as the
arguments are deterministic in that revisionism and status-quo are permanent qualities of
states. Equally frustrating is the propensity of some theories to equate behaviors or state
strategies as being inherently revisionist or status quo since it is possible that even force or
a modicum of unilateralism can be used to reprimand threats to international order and
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other important values. Finally, most of the accounts present an overall simplistic view of
international order and state dissatisfaction that capture some aspects of the
counterintuitive state behaviors under consideration in this dissertation.
2.1. REALIST APPROACHES
Understanding international order, and “ordered” behavior for that matter, at the systemlevel hinges on the problem of international anarchy. As the IR discipline has generally
focused on war as the major global blight, much of the literature has concerned itself with
the study of anarchy, its deleterious consequences, and the looming question of what states
can do to tame it.141 The reason, simply, is that survival is the primary goal of states.142 In
that in the absence of an overarching authority, states have no way to ensure this except by
their own machinations. The survival logic coerces states into self-regarding behavior that,
by

design,

prioritizes

self-aggrandizement

over

sustained

international

cooperation.143Although there is now greater scholarly agreement that international
anarchy is inescapably “hierarchical” and rule-based, the anarchy assumption remains the
basic starting point, and problem, for major schools of IR thought.144 International order
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and, consequently, any notions of “ordered” behavior, then seem to figure into IR theories
to the extent that they mollify anarchy.145 This juxtaposition of international anarchy and
order is further complicated by each IR school’s analytical predilections, emphasizing
either the preponderance of material forces or ascribing analytical weight to non-material
and sociological forces.146
2.1.1. Structural Realism
Starting at the materialist end of the scale, we find that Realism problematizes anarchy and
offers solutions grounded in material factors. Any configuration of a balance of power
approximating to “order” is simply coincidental; a temporary byproduct of states’ pursuit
of self-preservation.147 While it is not immediately evident that states should pursue selfregarding and aggressive policies, for Kenneth Waltz the social and competitive nature of
the international system teaches states to act so through processes of competition (and,
therefore, elimination) and socialization.148 While states have a relatively-limitless number
of policy options available to them, only those who play the game a certain way seem to
thrive.149 Accordingly, states learn that more-powerful states are potentially threatening
because of their latent capacity to subjugate others; the very existence of more-powerful
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states aggravate insecurity. Thus, weaker states will over-time automatically balance
against more powerful ones by building up their military and economic capacity (internal
balancing) or engage in the less-costly policy of forging alliances (external balancing),
resulting in the recurrence of balance-of-power politics.150 From this assumption, it follows
that states learn to avoid provoking counter-balancing coalitions that undermine their quest
for security. One can therefore reasonably expect that decision-makers of powerful states
ought to pursue moderate and non-expansionist foreign policies lest they provoke a war
and fall by the wayside.151 Indeed, if the international system was solely comprised of states
driven purely by security-seeking motives, it is not obvious why any state would want to
expand by conquest or develop overwhelming military capabilities.152 Such expansionism
could trigger fruitless arms races that increase insecurity and the stakes of crisis
situations.153 Assuming that the axioms of Structural Realism and the security dilemma
hold, if the accumulation of more power encourages other states to offset this dynamic,
then the quest to develop more capabilities is indeed self-defeating.154 Conquest does not
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pay.155 We infer, therefore, from Structural Realism that the twin logics of competition and
socialization compels states towards status-quo behaviors as this is the prudent orientation
in world politics.156 Unfortunately, the reality of world politics presaged the opposite as
evidenced by numerous and varyingly successful attempts at world conquest. The vast
discrepancies of power in world politics and the unevenness of existing alliances belies the
notion of an automatic balance-of-power.
One reason could be that threat perception, rather than raw material capabilities,
governs the balance of power.157 States are more likely to balance against states they
presume to be more threatening, and may even opt to bandwagon with the threatening
state.158 A state’s perceptions of what constitutes threats, such as what engenders the
security-dilemma, are in turn affected by systemic multipliers such as geographic
proximity and the balance between offensive and defensive weapons systems.159 While
their consequences have been examined, it remains unclear why states cannot overcome

155

See Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.”

See Fareed Zakaria, “Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 17,
No. 1 (1992), p. 192.
156

157

Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).

158

In his study of alliance patterns among Middle Eastern states in the course of the 20th century, Walt
observes that traditional balancing (against threatening states) is more common than the standard Waltzian
view of balancing against superior power per se. Walt also finds that states that are too weak, that are unable
to find allies, or simply want benefit from featuring on the winning side of conflict, may opt instead to
bandwagon with the threat, thereby elevating the power of the threatening coalition. Walt, Origins of
Alliances, p. 17.
See Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,”; Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson,
“Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally Against the Leading Global Power?” International Security,
Vol. 35, No. 1 (Summer, 2010), pp. 7-43; Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, “What Is the Offense
Defense Balance and Can We Measure It? Offense, Defense, and International Politics,” International
Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring, 1998), pp. 44-82.
159

67

uncertainty since a state’s means alone cannot determine intentions.

160

To follow the

internal logic of the theory, if states want security, then status-quo orientations should
prevail because security is not a zero-sum good.161
Revisionism, on the other hand, does not fit into the standard Structural Realist
argument beyond the assumption that some states have revisionist goals and that
sometimes their presence may induce other states to join them to pursue revisionist goals
collectively.162 These goals elude explicit theoretical scrutiny since this version of Realism
is explicitly concerned with material constraints. Being fundamentally a theory of great
powers, Structural Realism nevertheless has detailed insight into the ways states evaluate
their strategic position in response great-power states, which may explain revisionism in
terms of conflict-proneness. For Structural Realists, international outcomes, the “quality”
of any international system is defined by its poles; the number of great powers and their
relations inter se.
Waltz, for example, posited that international systems with two super-power states,
a bipolar system, is more peaceful than other polar configurations as lesser states will
converge around these superpowers. As most states in the system are allied to one of the
superpowers, bipolarity dispels uncertainties about states’ allegiances and intentions, and
promote stability and peace by deferring to the two poles the power to arbitrate

160

See Schweller, “Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias.”

See Randall L. Schweller, “Realism and the Present Great Power System” in Unipolar Politics: Realism
and State Strategies after the Cold War, edited by Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York, NY:
Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 28-57.
161

162

See Stephen Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse” Survival, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Spring, 1997), p. 158.

68

international politics.163 Historically, with the additional consideration of nuclear
deterrence, it is clear that bipolarity promoted an aberrant collaboration between the only
pair of states that had a substantial-enough impact on world order to cooperatively manage
doomsday. Deductively, bipolarity is likely to lead to status-quo sentiments due to the
rigidity of alliances and the prohibitive costs of expansion.164 Indeed, the Cold War led to
peace and stability among “great” powers, even though the historical record also reminds
us of the deleterious effects of the “Long Peace” on third parties.165 Simply, bipolarity,
especially combined with nuclear weapons, seems to have a pacifying effect on superpower
ambitions.166
Other polar configurations, however, are not as likely to promote the status-quo.167
Historically, most common configuration, multipolarity is a system featuring several great
powers. Multipolarity intensifies uncertainty and provides states the freedom of action to
pursue revisionist strategies.168 In fact, states with revisionist intentions are far more likely
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to succeed in their agendas simply because the availability of allies and the flexibility of
coalitions are likely to garner support. Significantly weaker states may opt to bandwagon
with threatening ones for security.169 Multipolarity is more liberating for great powers and
rising states alike. This distribution of power allows great powers to hedge their bets on
existing coalitions and may help them to avail themselves of strategic opportunities to more
easily pursue self-aggrandizement. For example, minor powers in Eastern Europe, as well
as, Italy and Japan sought to ride the wave of success from Germany’s victories during the
Second World War.170 Multipolarity nevertheless allows the formation of roughly equal
alliances that can reduce the utility of expansion.
Finally, unipolarity is an international system comprised of a single superpower.
This is an exceptional situation in international politics and very puzzling for our purposes.
From the perspective of the unipole, the most powerful state in international politics, must
by definition be satisfied and be least willing to expend resources additional resources,
apart from the bare-minimum need to reinforce the status quo.171 From the perspective of
other states, a unipolar structure naturally favors the preponderant state because it is
virtually impossible to form a coalition that could possibly hope to resist the unipole. Yet,
a unipole is virtually unbounded in the absence of viable balancing coalitions that can keep
it in check. Conversely, there can be no incentive or opportunity for weaker powers to
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pursue revisionist strategies lest a state is punished by the unipole. In fact, any act of
meaningful balancing against the unipole, which has the power to wherewithal to lead the
international order, is tantamount to revisionism. For these reasons, in a unipolar structure
revisionism by other states would logically be least plausible because of the threat of
credible punishment by the unipole and its allies. A cursory examination of U.S. foreign
policy, however, reveals that the unipole itself may find itself with the opportunity to abuse
its preponderance.172
Despite this, the U.S. encounters relatively little pushback. There are two important
explanations for this in the Realist camp. First, U.S. allies “soft-balance” the U.S. by simply
withdrawing support for U.S.-led multilateral enterprises. The diplomatic cost of noncooperation indirectly balances the power of the unipole by raising the costs of diplomatic
and political action, as well as the cost of projecting military power.173 Overall, U.S. allies
appear to be compliant on most other matters.174 Second, it is also conceivable that while
U.S. power may be threatening, the fact that its absolute advantage lies in its naval and
economic capabilities means that the U.S. should be considered maritime power. That is,
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as Levy and Thompson convincingly argue, despite its overwhelming power, U.S. is less
threatening to other great powers due to its relative geographic isolation.175
In theory, it is risky for emerging great powers to want to challenge the unipole; it
is inconceivable for smaller, regional powers to defy the unipole either.176 The unipole has
the power to revise the system since it is overall unopposed by allies. Thus it gets what it
wants most of the time. It is for these reasons that the question of restraint is so
controversial for U.S. grand strategy.177
On a broader theoretical note, the balance of power theory and, its many antecedent
hypotheses on the effects of polarity, threats, and types of balancing, cannot meaningfully
illuminate status quo and revisionism in IR Theory. This is because Realists implicitly
invoke revisionism to theorize about international outcomes, all the while prescribing
ideal-type “prudent” policy options, but often lack a compelling way to account for
aberrant policy choices. Why, for example, would a state choose to be revisionist in the
first place if it is such a costly endeavor. Structural Realism’s built-in “status-quo bias”
fails to explain state behavior meaningfully.178 Suffice it to say, for some states the security
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dilemma assumption may is predicated on the false premise. Sometimes, survival is not
enough; sometimes states do desire to harm others.
Fortunately, later Realist theories have developed three distinct ways to address the
general limitations of Defensive Realism by introducing assumptions that explain why
states would want to challenge international order. These approaches are enumerated in
what follows.
2.1.2. Offensive Realism
If security is not zero-sum, then whence cometh evil? The seminal works of the discipline
viewed the pursuit of power for its own sake as a manifestation of the “evil” inherent to
Man. Expanding one’s power was a moral imperative and the cornerstone of prudent
foreign policy. Offensive Realists harken back to the seminal period of Realist IR to
provide a structural-rationale for the pursuit of power for security’s sake. For John
Mearsheimer, a stable balance of power is not an absolute guarantee of security.179 By
consenting to a structural equilibrium, states essentially surrender their fortunes to the
expectation that other states will continue to honor their agreements and that an equilibrium
will effectively cause peace. Instead, Offensive Realists posit that states are rational actors
that seek to maximize their interests, which in this case is survival.180 By assuming that
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superior military and economic power ensures security and engenders survival,
maximizing power is the best guarantee of security.181 In simplest terms, expansionism is
necessary and profitable for states because it allows absolute security.182 Revisionism, as
it so happens, is built into the theory because until a state becomes a veritable hegemon, its
survival is not assured. “Great powers,” Mearsheimer declares, “have revisionist intentions
at their core.”183
The question is why then we would have status quo states in an Offensive Realist
world? Two reasons. Firstly, domination is expensive. International politics is not in a
perpetual state of war against all is because there are natural geographic limits to expansion,
which reduces the efficacy and utility of subjugating distant regions. 184 The stopping
power of water, and other multipliers raise the cost of projecting power to distant
regions.185 Geography, therefore, shackles states and checks their revisionist ambitions.
Second, attaining regional hegemony is an enviable situation and a sufficient condition for
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or an Intellectual Blind Alley?” in Ernest R. May, Richard Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner, eds., History of
Neorealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 322-340.
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security provided that no challengers can emerge.186 Unfortunately, the stopping power of
water argument holds no water. Oceans not only provide protection from distant shores,
thereby reducing investments into defensive systems that may be invested elsewhere but
also provide outlets for commercial activity. Add to this intersection of relativeinvulnerability and economic potential the role of the oceans in enhancing power
projection, and one is left with an unconstrained dominant state.
This brings us to the third point, that powers may be satisfied because they have
attained some form of dominance that keeps all other states in awe, such that they feel
secure. The problem, however, is that while such states, especially a hegemon, are likely
to be satisfied, they are also least likely to be constrained. If these shackles were somehow
transcended, possibly through the accumulation of sufficient power, would states not then
logically seek global hegemony also?
Here is the final problem with Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realist world: the only
threat to an established hegemon is the emergence of other regional hegemons to rival its
overall global influence. Mearsheimer proposes the minimalist grand strategy of offshore
balancing as a panacea for America’s global quandary, arguing that the U.S. ought to
assume hegemony in the Western hemisphere but work with allies abroad to prevent the
rise of other regional hegemons in other parts of the world. States that seek their ultimate
guarantee of security, by attaining regional hegemony, are then directly in confrontation
with U.S. Moreover, those who covet regional hegemony are automatically considered
revisionist, and perceived as being destined to confront the U.S. The absence of direct
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conflict is because rising challengers may be restraining themselves to bide their time.187
It is as if the state, as a rational actor, has no other choices or means to achieve security
apart from expanding or biding for time. Offensive Realism does not correct the status-quo
bias of security-seeking under anarchy; it merely aggravates its dysfunctions with the
addition of a revisionism bias.
2.1.3. Power Transition and Realist Hegemonic Stability Theories
Another alternative to Waltz’s “pacific” theory of international politics is readily provided
by Power Transition Theory (PTT, hereafter). As a distinct research program within
Realism, PTT has a theoretical pedigree bar none, but neither it nor its variants have
enjoyed the same level of recognition.188 Conversely, Waltz’s observation that balances of
power have been a recurring feature of the Westphalian international system has proven to
have staying power. PTT seeks to uncover the sources of war and thereby predict when
and under what conditions major wars are likely to occur.189 One of its main contentions is
that preponderance of power (i.e., hegemony), rather than the balance of power, preserves
peace.190 That is, changes in the distribution of material capabilities, especially the
projected trends in power capabilities, engender war. By weighing robust empirical

See John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise.”; “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US
Power in Asia,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Volume 3, No. 4 (December 2010) pp., 381–
396. Even if China acts with restraint, for Mearsheimer the fundamental change in power dynamics, and the
responses to China’s growing power, is likely to exacerbate security dynamics. Kirshner concurs from a
classical realist perspective but finds Mearsheimer’s approach to be incorrect. See Kirshner, “The Tragedy
of Offensive Realism,” pp. 57-61.
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research against historical trends, PTT shows that periods of power transition make for the
most volatile and war-prone periods.191 As one great power rises, it is expected that it will
seek to challenge the dominant power and thereby establish itself as a hegemon.192 Why
changes in capabilities would automatically lead to war is difficult to divine without the
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wellspring of inspiration. See, for example, Robert W. Gilpin, “Theory of Hegemonic War,” Journal of
Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring, 1988), pp., 29-30. Other “Classical Realists” have followed
suite. See, e.g., Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics Tragedy of Realism: Ethics, Interests, and
Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). See also Tudor Onea, “Immoderate Greatness: Is
Great Power Restraint a Practical Grand Strategy?” European Journal of International Security, Vol. 2, No.
1 (2017), pp. 111-132, esp. pp. 127-128. See the discussion further below on status-driven revisionism, which
purport to improve on PTT and HST with notions of status-related dissatisfaction.
Respectfully, this research would also draw attention to the contrasting agendas and beliefs of
Athenian and Lacedemonian decision-makers in regards to their relative concern for domestic versus external
issues and how they frame expected gains and losses. It is not surprising that the insecure Spartans, often
facing the grim prospect of slave (Helot) uprisings generally avoided external conflict since they also lacked
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mention the psychological impact of performing rites on soldiers who died from the initial clashes of the war
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the rubric of order-challenging. See Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, 2.34-2.46.
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consideration of unit-level and social elements.193 The hegemon, for its part, may recognize
the rising state as a threat and take preemptive measures, thus culminating in war. So
pervasive is this idea that prominent scholars draw parallels between Greek city-states and
modern geopolitics as they invoke the “Thucydides Trap” to raise awareness of the
impending American-Chinese confrontation.194 For PTT, in sum, the history of
international politics is one of recurring wars due to global material, technological, and
political changes. Major wars, however, are not as common and tend to have epochdefining qualities that create international orders, with its specific set of power hierarchies
and international sociopolitical relationships that tend to make orders more robust.
Writing in 1981, Robert Gilpin argued that in the aftermath of these major wars,
the victorious power establishes a new, or assumes control over the previous, world
order.195 The governing coalition is founded on the basis of the distribution of material
power, the hierarchy of prestige, and the rules of the system. Gilpin argues that the
dominant state(s) establish world order thanks to their superior material capabilities and
reserve the right to make rules and decisions owing to their superior prestige.196 The
confluence of military-economic power and prestige are contingent upon processes and
trends that occur within states. For example, differential rates of economic growth and
technological diffusion in international politics lead to disequilibria in the power and
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corresponding hierarchies of prestige.197 Unlike Waltz’s approach, which is a very
mechanical explanation and rooted in the assumptions of microeconomics, Gilpin draws
attention to the social aspects of international relations. International anarchy is not a
transhistorical void wherein world politics is simply a reoccurrence of balances of power.
Rather, there is a significant element of hierarchy as dominant states establish mechanisms
of control, such as international institutions, that help to produce order that maintains
hegemony. While “order” in this sense is more deliberative than what is implicitly
espoused by Structural Realism, the institutional architecture of world order, as enshrined
in international organizations, regimes, and treaties are ultimately for the benefit of the
hegemon.198
A hegemon’s goal is to maintain the favorable status quo it has struggled to forge.
Once attained, however, sustaining hegemony, is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, in
so far as a hegemon is successful in imposing its vision onto other states, thereby attracting
followers, it needs to be its final arbiter. A hegemon, in other words, needs to distribute
international public goods like security to lesser states, sometimes at costs and risks to
itself, to preserve a stable order. For example, the hegemon would naturally be one of the
first states to oppose any kind of revisionist state that threatens lesser powers because an
unchecked expansionist power can grow from strength to strength thereby to rival the
hegemon. This is a questionable assumption. Too often, the hegemon/unipole is considered
to be a status quo power because it is difficult to imagine that the most powerful state, the
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one that preempts challengers and malcontents to keep them in awe, would want to change
its own system. For example,
[ … ] the question of whether, as a new unipole, the United States might
adopt a more revisionist stance has not figured centrally in international
relations research. The reason was a key assumption built into almost all
research on hegemonic stability and power transition theory: that the
leading state in any international system is bound to be satisfied. Hence,
research on the origins of satisfaction and revisionism is overwhelmingly
about subordinate states, not the dominant state.199
A hegemon will change international order if it can afford to do so, but there is no
real endpoint, short of creating a world state, to what a hegemon could want. The primary
issue is that at a certain equilibrium, the hegemon will find it too hard to change
international order simply because of the rules and relationships it has created earlier.
Efforts to preserve order places onerous burdens on the hegemon by often constricts its
freedom of action, which may prompt the hegemon to become dissatisfied with its own
order. A hegemon is simultaneously unbound but also restricted by its own rules and
institutions.200 This is the crux of the problem. Why would a hegemon undermine its own
order, which raises the cost to enforce order, for the pursuit of other gains? This tautology
has no clear answer, but a purely abstract, cost-benefit analysis, cannot answer it alone.
One can speculate that a hegemon might conceivably wish to expand further its political,
economic and military apparati if it believes that its security interests would be served.201
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While this could account for the puzzling tendencies in US grand strategy with respect to
international order in the post-Cold War period, Gilpin’s modest goal of providing an
economic-sociological framework on the rise and fall of world order is less applicable to
the puzzling behavior of rising and secondary states, due in part to an absence of mid-level
and unit-level hypotheses.
This brings us to the second point: that the fruits of world order often benefit lesser
states. The transience of the balance of power is a natural phenomenon not only because of
the variance in distributive costs in preserving world order but because of changes in
fortunes of states. By fostering open trading systems, hegemons increase not only
economic penetration but the diffusion of technologies. This in turn, and in conjunction
with natural unit-level processes, results in differential rates of economic growth among
states, which explains dynamics of decline, fall, and the recreation of world order. For
example, the U.S.’ decision to maintain an open economic system was helpful in preserving
the post-World War II status quo, but as it propped up its allies, trade and the diffusion of
technologies had the unintended consequences of creating a list of competitive economic
rivals, of which China is the most recent and critical member. As Schweller and Pu note:
Why would an increasingly powerful state that is growing faster than its
established competitors want to overthrow the very system under which it
is benefiting (given its unmatched growth rate) more than any other state?
further challenges from other states, thus resulting in a positive feedback. See Gilpin, War and Change, pp.
194-195.
There is nevertheless a method to this madness as one could speculate the efficacy of the reversestrategy of expansion. The Roman Empire’s shift from the Julio-Claudian “forward defense” to “defense-indepth” under Diocletian during the crisis of the 3rd century, for example, is relevant for the perennial debate
about which sides of the Oceans begins the defense of the United States. Order-challenging behavior from
the hegemon could be interpreted as a series of preemptive wars in solo barbarico. See also Edward N.
Luttwak, Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, From the First Century A.D. to the Third (Baltimore, MD:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 13-19, 127-144 and Stuart Elden, The Birth of Territory
(Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), p. 89.
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This core question can be leveled at all hegemonic theories that posit
revisionist powers as the primary agents of change.202

If the distributional effects of hegemony favor lesser-great powers, why then would
rising powers ever want to be revisionist? Within Gilpin’s theory, there exists the notion
of social forms of power, in some ways akin to Classical Realism, in which a hierarchy of
prestige affects the extent to which a state has influence over international outcomes. No
matter how powerful a rising challenger may be, the hegemon often declines to relinquish
entirely, or in part, its control over international order. At some point, therefore, a
dissatisfied state will invariably challenge the hegemon to unseat it from the reins of power.
Much of the power transition literature has dedicated its research agenda to explaining the
specific (material) conditions that are conducive to hegemonic wars.
In view of the rise of China debate, China appears to be reaping the benefits of the
U.S.-led world order and will persist so long as it is satisfied with prestige and authority
accorded by the international community.203 Suffice it to say that many speculate that
Chinese foreign policy is attributable to its status-related drive. PTT and its offshoots
nevertheless believe that China will continue to bide its time until its power and
dissatisfaction reach a critical point.
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PTT and HST advance important assumptions about state behavior that relate to
material power, and yet it seems that absent an extra-theoretical component, it is difficult
to make sense of individual states’ motivations. What really causes states to become
dissatisfied with a given international order? This problem is more acute when decisionmakers have to weigh against each other the incompatible costs of preserving and changing
an order. Traditional approaches to PTT and HST fail, moreover, to provide a satisfactory
way to study not only great-power but also minor, states’ grand strategies without reference
to power dynamics. For these reasons, PTT research has begun to examine transition
dynamics through inclusion of social factors such as status (discussed below). This is a
sensible development given the relative neglect of social factors as well as the limited
engagement with unit-level theories as well as micro-processes; all of which are venues for
further exploration in this dissertation.
2. 1. 4. Neoclassical Realism
204

Since the 1990s, the Realist research program has expanded to include unit-level

variables.205 Prominent Realists understood and articulated the need for nuance, indicating
that states can be differentiated not only by their material capabilities but also by their
motivations.206 Having been deemed a logical extension of the Realist paradigm,
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Neoclassical Realists research programs begin with the assumption that foreign policy
executives of every state act as interlocutors between system-level pressures and domestic
parameters.207
Since its publication, Neoclassical Realist Theories of International Relations has
retroactively reclassified the research program along three distinct types of research.208
Type I research demystifies foreign policies deemed by Structural Realism to be
counterintuitive and counterproductive. Whereas the Waltzian state disregards
international structure at its own peril for unknown reasons, the state under the analytical
scrutiny of Neoclassical Realism is thought to suffer from domestic dysfunctions that
reduce its foreign policy efficacy. In this vein, Neoclassical Realism can be considered as
simply the most recent, and sophisticated, entry within a broader research program on the
limits of rational and structural theories and the relative significance of agents vs. structure.
Earlier studies that have been identified ex post facto as Neoclassical Realist often framed
their puzzles in terms of counterintuitive or maladaptive state behavior such as over
expansionism and underachieving foreign policies as caused by domestic coalitions, elite
fragmentation, elite perceptions, social cohesion, ideology, and state capacity. 209
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It would be a mistake, however, to pigeonhole Neoclassical Realism as a merely a
supplement to other theories since its emphasis on the unit-level leaves it uniquely qualified
to craft and test hypotheses of state behavior and international political outcomes via
historical case studies. Accordingly, Type II analyses seek to produce new insights into
foreign policy. Specific policy outcomes, such as assessing internal balancing outcomes to
great power intervention in the periphery, to broad examinations of grand strategies
overtime that shapes international political outcomes, the research program is exceedingly
rich.210 Most recently, Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell argue that it is possible to extend
the scope and time-horizon of Neoclassical Realism so as to explain international political
outcomes (Type III).211
So, what causes revisionism and status-quo behavior according to Neoclassical
Realists? To the consternation of Liberal IR scholars, the answer lies in the choices of
foreign policy executives due to domestic expediency or ideologies.212 Imperial foreign
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policies, elite indecision and lack of consensus can also lead to fractured foreign policies
that are unable to identify, or respond to, emerging threats, thereby leading to
underbalancing, as a form of status-quo behavior. The definitive, as of yet, statement in
this camp is that of Jason Davidson, who provides an excellent discussion on the origins
of status-quo and revisionist states by combining international opportunity (in terms of the
balance of allied resolve and shifts in capabilities) and the disposition of domestic
coalitions (whether they favor nationalist or welfare policies).213 The temporal and
contextual specificity of this account reduces its generalizability. This is a problem for
Neoclassical Realist studies because often-times, especially the “Type II” theories purport
advance theories that can potentially have broader applicability since the analyses often
proceed from theory-building and theory-testing comparative case-study analyses.
Where the Neoclassical Realist frameworks fall short is in their underspecified
relationship between the independent variable, system-level material factors, and the unitlevel intervening variable. The former, by the necessity of the paradigm, commands
analytical priority but this leaves the intervening variable in an ambiguous place, which
makes it difficult to determine the extent to which the former influence the latter and the
specific nature of the interaction is left ambiguous.214 The emphasis of the system-level
independent variable as a material one prevents an honest assessment of the type of
pressures that decision-makers are subjected. Neoclassical Realists have therefore adopted
a subtle view of system-level variables by elaborating on the traditional polarity and
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capability argument with concepts like clarity or the permissiveness of the system that
synthesize aspects of earlier Realist multipliers on the system-level such as threat
perceptions, availability of allies, geography viz.215 One could even call this a type of
freedom of action or, for example as Trubowitz calls is, geopolitical slack.216 In view of
the diminishing utility of military force, as opposed to economic statecraft and social
pressures at the system-level, this dissertation argues that permissiveness and
restrictiveness has a social component based on the perceived legitimacy of a hypothetical
action.
Neoclassical Realist studies have also underappreciated international order and its
social components that necessarily animate international politics. Where such studies exist,
the dependent variable under scrutiny relates to state’s balancing choices, especially
regarding the composition of regional order and the extent to which states follow or reject
the leadership of the hegemon.217 A state’s attitude towards the hegemon, whether it
chooses to balance or bandwagon, hardly constitutes a satisfactory measure of revisionism.
To illustrate, consider the following dilemma: bandwagoning with the hegemon is orderconforming behavior par excellence because it affirms the status quo. Yet, such
acquiescence can further unbind the hegemon, thereby undermining international order. It
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is important therefore to better understand the social context in which a state’s decisionmakers frame international order and their policy options. Thus, while Neoclassical
Realism (as well as PTT research) performs reasonably well compared to other approaches
(see Table 2.1.), it nevertheless falls short in holistically the importance of international
normative and ideational factors. To this end, the following examines the plurality of
alternative approaches to the Realist Paradigm.
Table 2. 1. Summary of Realist Approaches
Approach

Structural
Realism

Offensive
Realism

PTT/HST

Neoclassical
Realism

Major
Variable

Material Power

Material Power

Changes in Material Power,
Technology; Prestige

Regional
Hegemony is
the goal

Power shifts; Costs of
upkeeping vs. changing
order

Material Power; UnitLevel and
Perceptional
Variables
Ideology, Regime,
Coalitions,
Overbalancing

Hegemon establishes World
order after Hegemonic War

Ideology, Regime,
Coalitions,
underbalancing

Types of dissatisfaction;
states can contest and
change aspects of order

N/A

Revisionism

Polarity (?)

Status Quo

Balance of
Power

Reform

N/A

(Prescriptive
notion of
Offshore
Balancing)
N/A

Explains
Cases?

NO

NO

Partially

Partially

Problem

Binary
approach; SQ
bias

Binary
approach;
Offense bias

No unit-level theorizing;
insufficient engagement with
social factors

Binary approach;
Methodological
issues; insufficient
engagement with
social factors

2.2. PLURALISM
The theoretical lacunae in Realism point to the need for a more comprehensive framework
of grand strategy that incorporates power and ideational elements with the view of divining
international order. This section contemplates the efficacy of Institutionalism, English
School, Ideas and Identity-based approaches, and Status as suitable repositories of
theoretical insights for international order and state preferences.
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2. 2. 1. International Institutions and Liberal Hegemony
Whereas Realists lament the uncertainties and difficulties associated with achieving
cooperation, Institutionalists profess qualified optimism. They expound an alternative to
the Realists’ security-centric approach to international politics by asserting the significance
of state interests beyond security concerns. Institutionalism is a variant within Liberal
IR.218 It is distinct because of its emphasis on the role of voluntary agreements, regimes,
and norms at the level of the international system (such as liberal trading agreements and
other institutional oversight mechanisms), as opposed to domestic liberal-democratic
values.219 This section argues that overall the Institutionalist argument asserts a status-quo
bias, akin to Defensive Realism and that revisionism originates from unit-level factors such
as elites’ choices, which, again reinforces the need to think about international order as
being inexorably linked to elites.
To briefly explain the approach; Institutionalists argue that since the international
system engenders interactions, it is possible to think of it as an arena of iterated games. By
interacting with one another, IR Liberals reason, states may develop “shadows of the

218

Nevertheless, the Institutionalist argument has crafted its ideas on the experiences of European integration
and projects a structural-functionalist logic in which cooperation in one issue area will likely have spill-over
effects in other domains. See, for instance, Karl Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social,
and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958).
Stephen Kranser defines as “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which
actors’ expectations converge in a given issue-area.” See, Idem. “Structural Causes and Regime
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1982), pp.
185-205. See, also, John G. Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” In Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1983).
219

89

future” and bargaining reputations that affect their future interactions.220 States learn,
therefore, to accommodate one another on a range of issues and aspire to goals beyond
military competition. Evolving technologies and deepening economic linkages between
states intensify states’ dependence on each other in the quest to satisfy their economic,
welfare, and other political goals.221 This is especially desirable for Liberals who reject the
notion of international politics as a zero-sum game in which states only seek to gain relative
to others; a point that has placed Neorealists and IR Neoliberals at odds.222 As
interdependence increases, states are expected to become ever more pacific towards one
another.223
To understand why states would conform to or challenge international order per the
institutionalist argument, we need to take note of the role of hegemony in facilitating these
institutions. The Institutionalist approach became a hallmark of theoretical debates during
the latter half of the Cold War, with the relative-rise of powerful economies within the
U.S.-led camp, and the intensification of Soviet penetration in the global periphery, all of
which challenged the notion of American preponderance.224 Some sought to explain the
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possibility of cooperation despite the persistence of anarchy (in the face of America’s –
allegedly declining– hegemonic presence).225 Before U.S. hegemony provided a lynchpin
for the global economy, and members of the Liberal World Order could expect the U.S. to
step-in to correct systemic problems whenever the situation arose. That is, states could be
compelled to adhere to “rules” despite the absence of superior power to coerce them as
states may further enhance their relations by fostering bargaining reputations, mutual
economic interdependence, and other international institutional mechanisms to honor, or
enforce, agreements.226
Thus, while a hegemon may be necessary to enforce some rules, the historical
emergence and decline of institutions, such as free-trade regimes, rely significantly on the
consent of elites in both the hegemon and lesser states.227 Reforming or challenging aspects
of international order then seem to originate either from these states’ failure to integrate
into global institutions. This is because elites in these states have not sufficiently socialized
to adopt liberal values and regimes, or, possibly because of the way international liberalism
becomes a power projection tool for elites.228 It is nevertheless difficult to disaggregate the
political and security dimensions of international politics entirely from institutional
cooperation. If the institutional logic prevails in international politics, why do states deviate
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from regimes or fail to coordinate so often? Given the plurality of states’ interests, how
could any state avoid free-rider problems and coordinate indefinitely on such a broad
spectrum of issues in the absence of a preponderant power?
Enter, Ikenberry, who examines the rise of these international institutional
mechanisms and thereby elaborated a Liberal theory of hegemonic stability.229 Ikenberry
concludes that international orders are established in the aftermath of major wars as the
dominant state imposes its values on the vanquished. In the process, the dominant power
also forges military, diplomatic, and economic institutions that, if managed well, have the
potential to maintain a particular international order ad perpetuum.230 Such systems are
attractive for lesser states because they are not able to reject such an imposition from a
superior power. Far more importantly, however, states have incentives to participate in an
international order because doing so provides its constituents a way out of the multitude of
collective action and free-rider problems between lesser powers that would otherwise
bedevil interstate relations.
As Ikenberry explains, liberal orders, as opposed to balance of power or hegemonic
orders, are constitutive: they are “rules-based” and function multilaterally. A liberal
hegemon provides public goods to its constituents in the form of security guarantees as
well as a commitment to maintaining an open trading system.231 While the hegemon
benefits the most from this arrangement, elites of lesser powers usually obtain mutual
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benefits too. By consenting to honor its commitments to other members and restraining its
appetite, the hegemon enmeshes its interests into the tapestry of international institutions.
Invoking a type of domestic analogy, it is argued that in constitutional order, the density of
institutions, alliances, and rules diminish the returns on power (what he calls “implications
of victory”), thereby lowering the incentives for states to renege on commitments and raise
the costs for defection.232 These institutions shape state practices and behavior and set
states on path dependent trajectories, thereby “binding” the order.233 In addition to the
power discrepancies, prospects of material gains and other public goods, and
multilateralism as exercised via other institutions, an element of normativity pervades the
liberal argument:
Elites in these states “buy into” the order in some fundamental normative
way. That is, participation in the order is seen by these elites as something
that is desirable, given the array of choices that they confront. Indeed, elites
in key subordinate states actively seek and participate in the creation of the
liberal hegemonic order. To be sure, this may be constrained consent—and
there will surely be different degrees of consent or approval that may be
manifest, ranging from grudging acquiescence to outright normative
embrace.234
Now to unpack this account. From the purview of Liberal HST, it is not self-evident
why states would ever want to challenge international order. If rules come to constrict the
behavior of states, including that of the hegemon (because it is a constitutive order, which
is why other states buy into it), then states can at best hope to alter minor aspects of the
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system with relative impunity. If Institutions empower the hegemon in numerous ways, but
significantly restrict its freedom of action in other ways, it could explain why a hegemon
would seek to “revise” its own order in the sense that its own rules undermine more coveted
goals, such as perpetuating preponderance. None of these considerations can be discussed
satisfactorily using Ikenberry’s framework.
Ikenberry, therefore, expands on After Victory with Liberal Leviathan, wherein he
argues that there are not necessarily different types of order, but that every order has
elements of three logics: balance of power, command, and consent, and that the present
Liberal order, and U.S. foreign policy, evinces elements of each.235 The liberal hegemony
of U.S. is distinct from past (liberal) orders and, in the post-Cold War, exercises arbitrary
power and displays command logics as well. In recognition of America’s “orderchallenging” foreign policy, he also notes the numerous tensions within the liberal
international order and its constituent states.236 As a standalone explanation of the
emergence of the present “liberal” international order, therefore, Ikenberry’s account of
post-war U.S. grand strategy is superlative. Unfortunately, it is difficult to divine from this
approach why the U.S. would challenge its own liberal world order.
Ikenberry’s explanation is that in the absence of an effective way for states to decide
on and intervene in order-threatening crises like humanitarian disasters, and in lieu of any
natural restraint on liberal internationalism, benign intentions can manifest as a distorted
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imperial project at the hands of powerful elite groups.237 From Wilson to Bush, the
confluence of ideas and specific elite choices drive order-challenging behavior. This is not
necessarily a problem for Ikenberry’s account, but it demonstrates that the liberal logic of
order, far from representing a kind of status quo, challenges the “deeper logic of
international life.” Ikenberry concedes this when he says, “these various “waves” and
“layers” of international order coexist within the contemporary global system.”238
As for the challengers, it is not clear why a rising state would want to overthrow a
liberal international order since, as we observe with China, it would benefit enormously
from the open economic system of the order without assuming the onerous political
responsibility of maintaining the structure. Ikenberry also notes this.239 In fact, China is
likely to uphold the order, and possibly become more liberal in the future because of the
benefits conferred by the system. Underlying this guarded optimism is, again, the notion
that China may have a propensity for order challenging due to its regime type and
illiberalism. The problem, fundamentally, is that China is actually less likely to be affected
by the “tensions” within liberalism that bedevil the liberal world order. In an undemocratic
China where the state fears its population and is overall satisfied externally, why would
any Chinese FPE take the risk of pushing for a dangerous, revisionist foreign policy?
Clearly, Institutionalist/Liberal HST approach supplies us with profound insight
into why states would want to establish and preserve international order and explain with
the logic of game theory why cooperation is possible and desirable. Unfortunately, they
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too fall short in satisfactorily explaining the roots of order-challenging and orderconforming, simply because it is difficult to conceive of why a non-liberal state would want
to preserve institutions and why a liberal hegemon would want to challenge its own order,
beyond domestic and elite-based interjections. So, what affects elites views about
international order? We now turn to the social and cultural aspects of international politics.
2. 2. 2. Ideas and Identity
While it is difficult to challenge the imminence of material factors in international politics,
ideas and identity can profoundly shape actors’ interests and therefore affect international
politics. Broadly speaking, these concepts are in the domain of Liberalism and
Constructivism. Why states should choose to uphold or challenge international order must
by necessity reflect a consideration of the specific interests and preferences that are rooted
in how states the broader international order and their position therein. If any of the base
Structural or Offensive Realist arguments hold, we would logically expect either perpetual
peace or war, barring any other unit-level or social factor. Institutions, in the meantime,
change states’ expectations and encourage them to internalize new norms of behavior and
adopt strategies (like tit-for-tat, for example) they otherwise would not have absent an
iterative relationship with their peers.
Unlike the previous approaches, Constructivism is not a theory per se, but an
approach to world politics that emphasizes the role of ideas in shaping interests and
material outcomes.240 Constructivists argue that international order is not only material but
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contains social components; that anarchy is not a materialist vacuum.241 One variant
suggests world politics is ideas all the way down and that we could not conceive of any
social reality or relationships independent of ideas.242 A more-mainstream approach
accepts the immanence of material forces and foresees the possibility of crafting testable
theories, arguing that it is ultimately the relationships between actors that affect the nature
of interactions and thereby constitute the structure of world politics.243 This is because
ideas, identities, and preferences are not simply reducible to individuals, but rather pervade
across groups and organizations as collective beliefs.244 For this reason, even in the absence
of a hegemonic state to enforce rules and compliance, it does not naturally follow that states
must act in self-regarding and aggressive ways as Realists predict.245 Instead, units (i.e.,
states) co-constitute the social structure of international politics through their interactions
with one another. States’ interactions help to forge a particular image of self and others,
and these identities, in turn, shape their interests, ranked preferences, and foreign policy
dispositions. World politics, therefore, is the product of identities, the extent to which a
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certain cultural understanding of order is “internalized” by states, and, ultimately, how
statesmen help replicate these cultures by performing their constructed roles.246 Having
delineated the general qualities of one, albeit authoritative, interpretation of
Constructivism, the next step is to examine propositions concerning status quo and
revisionism.
It is unclear from the base Structural Realist argument whether or not states seek to
maximize security, or power, but for Wendt making such an argument requires a priori
assumptions about states’ behaviors.247 For example, an anarchy among securitymaximizing states would be different from one in which the system is populated by
aggressive power-maximizers. In the latter, there would be no limit to the revisionist aims
of states as they would naturally seek to destroy another state.248 Other states would soon
learn that this behavior is common and necessary to ensure their own survival, and thus
revisionism would become a widespread practice. In other words, they would internalize
what can be approximated to a “Hobbesian” culture of anarchy, as reflected in the
intersubjectively constructed identities, discourses, and practices of states. For example,
notions of the state as an organism and ideas about Social Darwinism was a common
feature of international thinking in the 19th century and, save a few exceptions, manifested
in unrestrained imperialism. Conversely, it is possible that other types of “identities” that
Wendt approximates to “Lockean” and “Kantian” cultures of anarchy can take root over

246

See Wendt, Social Theory, pp. 98, 172.

247

Ibid., pp.104-105.

See J. Samuel Barkin, “Realist Constructivism,” International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September,
2003), pp. 325-342, esp. p. 330. On “predator states” see Wendt, Social Theory, pp. 407-408.
248

98

time. Through their interactions states reinterpret their identities and interests and therefore
adopt new policies to fulfill their self-prescribed roles as, say, “honest-brokers” or “peacemakers” among many other things.
Two important dynamics that of socialization and internalization are crucial. These
reflect the extent to which states learn from each other or come to accept certain ideas and
interests as being essential and intrinsically worthy of legitimating.249 This could be simply
because once internalized, ideas become part of an actor’s identity and that informs, as far
as a collective like a state is concerned, the national interest.250 Alternatively, the quest to
acquire social goods may drive states to pursue foreign policies aimed at satiating these
needs. The Social Identity Theory and Status-based approaches, which are discussed
below, build exactly on this logic and underscore the importance of state identities and
positionality of “social” power vis-à-vis one another.
While culture and identities are amenable to change, they are unlikely to do so
quickly enough to explain shorter-term trends and variations.251 It is often difficult to
determine, given the dynamism of world politics, to assess the extent to which identity and
culture to play into policy choices consistently.252 Liberal IR theories also underscore the
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importance of ideas and how they shape preferences.253 This notion is naturally a challenge
to theories that axiomatically privilege material factors and political actors’ imperative for
self-preservation. If Realists and Institutionalists conceive of revisionism in terms of
behaviors, strategies or outcomes, approaches that underscore ideas and preferences
approach the issue as one of societal values.254 There is always a fundamental disjuncture
in what states –and, therefore, statespeople– want in international politics and what policies
and outcomes reach fruition. Jeffrey Legro’s study of grand strategy formation and
international order, for example, is a reasonable explanation not only for order preserving
and challenging behavior but for why these can change over time.255 Legro convincingly
argues that decision-makers’ beliefs about international order and their attitudes on how to
engage with world politics are subjected to change under special circumstances, such as
when the weaknesses of preexisting paradigms are revealed, and when new ideas are
articulated and consolidated.256
It is difficult to understand, however, why states would prefer one set of ideas over
others; why a state would prefer to go from isolationism to integration with international
society. One could not obviously infer sources for revisionism without some form of
exogenous shock. Legro also does not sufficiently address the role of material power, apart
from “shocks” that may call into question existing approaches to a policy if the said idea
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has not become entrenched or failing spectacularly. One of the inherent difficulties with
such an approach is distinguishing between ideas and agency. It is entirely possible for
leaders to hold certain ideas yet to implement policies that contradict them. Legro also
misses an important opportunity to engage with the composition of decision-makers
themselves. In this respect, an ideas-only approach like this fails to capture the nuances in
elite preferences originating from sectoral and institutional sources, and even international
society more broadly, absent liberal values.
In sum, ideas and identity offer alternative motivations for decision materialist and
institutionalist approaches. It is not possible to infer how states understand themselves and
their peers in relation to international order independent of how they think about and
construct through discourse and action, international politics. Agency, nevertheless, also
requires a capacity to act. Decision-makers base their priorities based on material
expectations and their capabilities. Their most pressing concerns at times may be banal and
relate only to the preservation of their rule rather than that of the state. Where both
approaches are helpful, though, is in suggesting ways with which identity, interests, and
discourses can interact to produce an understanding of what strategies are beneficial for
decision-makers, their state, or the international community more broadly, and how these
are legitimated.257
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2. 2. 3. International Society
The English School presents a curious case. Rather than dominant powers creating a
hierarchical system and bestowing relevance to social processes, as in the case of Gilpinian
Realism, the English School envisages the possibility of order within anarchical systems.258
So long as two or more states within an international system are able to divine a common
interest in preserving order, and affect each other’s’ calculations beyond merely the
security dilemma, it is possible to conceive of an international society of states.259 Within
international society, regularized state behaviors/practices concerning the relations of
states inter se determine the relations between states, designate appropriate legal and
diplomatic practices, and circumscribe the legitimate use of force.260 In addition to coercion
and self-interest, therefore, states may feel compelled to act a certain way because they
deem it legitimate to do so.261
Geographical, political, and cultural proximities can facilitate international
societies, as has been the case historically, as these tend to foster more shared
understandings and a basis for norms. For the English School theorists, traditional
diplomatic practices of the European great powers, the Balance of Power System, and the
post-Vienna Concert system have been wellsprings of inspiration. The last of these, for
example, united all European powers in their quest to resist liberal revolutions at home and
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proved to be a durable system of peace until it unfolded in WWI. While these states had
“similar” regimes and values, homogeneity is not a sine qua non for international society
as its core purpose is to facilitate coexistence among a plurality of diverse states. It is
common for very dissimilar states to achieve the bare minimum of practices needed to
coexist.
Propositions on revisionism and status quo in international society are more
problematic to assess. International order, by its very nature, is a status-quo oriented project
and the theory in some ways examines the remarkable durability of international order. It
is at once the natural product of evolving interacts between geographically and culturally
proximate states, and a purposive endeavor.262 The defining feature of order is, therefore,
the operation of an international society of states in which states have a shared “common
interest” in making the system work. It is unclear from the classical texts when and why
certain states would want to challenge international order. There is an equally troubling
tendency to read into the English School approach as a too-peaceful endeavor wherein
states are naturally inclined to cooperate, and that the operation of fundamental institutions
will, over time, lead to further integration.263 Bull adamantly opposed any notion of
structural-functionalism and path-dependency.264
Within the standard day-to-day functioning of international society, its constituents
always have the option of adhering or acting contrary, to international order. The order
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can be purposive and yet not always a desirable goal for states. It is difficult, moreover, to
distinguish within an English School framework what constitutes as “revisionist” behavior.
The questions of “when” and “who” has received less attention as contributors to the
English School have avoided because they recognize the duality of institutions of
international society. To wit:
In terms of the contemporary analysis of emerging powers, it becomes very
important to resist binary distinctions and lazy dichotomies. The impact of
globalization on emerging states and societies has all too often been
conceived in polar terms — incorporation vs. exclusion; fusion vs.
fragmentation; modernizing, liberalizing coalitions vs. confessional,
nationalist or third-worldist counter-forces.265

Nevertheless, scholars broadly fall under the English School designation
nevertheless have entertained ideas about what constitutes revisionism and status quo, as
well as several types of strategies. Within the specific discussion on pluralism and
solidarism in international society, states content with international order can be
unproblematically considered status quo; although this status quo orientation would
necessitate activism and willingness to use legitimate, multilateral, force to protect the
subjects of international society.266 As for revisionism, one could arguably make the case
that Barry Buzan, who inserted himself into the English School, provides a useful tripartite
understanding of revisionism, which he breaks down into orthodox revisionist, reformist
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revisionist, and revolutionary revisionist.267 An orthodox revisionist is essentially content
with international order, but may desire specific alterations to some of its aspects, possibly
by acquiring more influence or power.268 A reformist revisionist accepts some aspects of
international order, but rejects others, while a revolutionary revisionist seeks to overthrow
international order entirely and establish its own rules. While the typology is valuable and
highly consistent with the main purposes of this project, these concepts serve at best as
useful labels to think about state behavior.
On the origins of revisionist behavior in international society, there appear to be
three prominent sources. Firstly, one can take the cue from the traditional practices of
European statecraft and posit the importance of the balance of power as a fundamental
institution. Though nebulous in its meaning, the balance of power is understood to have
contributed to the very possibility of an international society of states predicated on the
notion that no single power ought ever to dominate the system at the expense of the rest.269
The implication is that force can well be used by great powers inter se, or used to form
coalitions against an emerging hegemonic order, and thereby preventing shifts in the
balance of power that could upset the status-quo. In such a situation, identifying which
actors and behaviors constitute revisionism would be a political matter. Moreover, the
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historical prevalence of suzerain-state systems and the present reality of U.S. cast doubts
on this interpretation.270 Furthermore, it is even possible for a single hegemonic state to
integrate into international society so long as its right to authority is legitimated by other
states (i.e., lesser-great powers) and can, therefore, act to preserve it.
Secondly, the International Society Approach also places a premium on norms and
values, and it is possible to envisage revisionist attitudes originating from outsiders’
dissatisfaction. The present international order was created by the expansion of the
European-based Westphalian international society, which inculcated by reason of force,
and law, its values upon non-Western peoples.271 Consequently, many of these polities had
to adapt to the mores of European international society not only as “outsiders” but also as
having formal legal inferiority.272 To elaborate, international societies develop both explicit
and implicit rules concerning the conduct of interstate relations. This so-called standard of
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civilization ascribes legal and moral inferiority to the outsider/newcomer to an international
society.273 members of international society by conforming to international society, even
at the proverbial cost of self-harm.274 Established members can then deny to an outsider
the advantages of membership to international society and justify discriminatory, coercive,
and outright imperialist policies against the outsider. While this stigmatization can lead to
dissatisfaction, it is likely to goad these states to redouble their efforts to become respected
The standard of civilisation effectively frames the conflict between established Western
and rising non-Western powers and is possibly a useful point of entry into discussions
about the rise of China as well.275 It is possible that states on the “receiving end” of
civilization are likely to socialize into international society through extended interactions
and adoption of norms, albeit not fully.276 Some units, however, are so fundamentally
different than those of an international society that they nevertheless challenge its
fundamental constellation of power and values, especially in times of uncertainty and the
declining power of an international order.277
Having examined outsider states’ discontent towards international society, we can
now turn to order-challenging from within the core members of an international society, in
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the form of revolutionary movements. Revolutionary movements, such as the American,
French, and Russian revolutions led to the creation of “revolutionary states.” Revolutionary
states, Armstrong argues, abide by an alternative discourse and seek to overturn an
established order, but nevertheless are compelled to socialize into international society
once a revolution develops aspirations of statehood.278 That is, even if revolutionary states
change the moral, normative, and material landscape, they nevertheless eventually align
their domestic and international conduct to conform to international society.279 The
revolutionary state approach is very useful to understand the emergence of revisionist states
in the traditional sense, but not so much revisionist behavior common in world politics.
These points are worthy of consideration, but while our subjects of inquiry have undergone
revolutions, the specific mechanisms that affect decision-making require a unit-level
analysis operationalizing the secondary effects of such upheavals given their temporal
remoteness.
Finally, and as a response to the oft-cited Liberal arguments concerning the
normative fabric of international society, the nature of international society simply
incentivizes rising states to pursue greater influence. While Liberal IR scholars lament the
possibility that revisionists may undermine liberal values, the International Society
Approach takes seriously the justice demands and the unique values of non-Western states.
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It might be a mistake, however, to suggest that the normative content of principles
outweigh the immanence of power politics as Newman and Zala argue that rising states are
concerned primarily with issues of authority. Rising powers are concerned with
representational issues, or who gets to make the rules and set the global agenda, rather than
the normative problem concerning the content of the rules in circulation.280 Revisionism
does not occur necessarily in the form of aggressive military action but more at the
discursive level as well as political cooperation among rising states in other ways.281
Newman and Zala also touch on some very important points about the way the
English School approaches the study of revisionism, which serves as the point of discussion
for this critique. Notably, the English School’s limited engagement with the unit-level and
the specific mechanisms that animate foreign policy and concerning the evidence by
scholars come to understand state behavior. There is, as of yet, no formal English School
theory of foreign policy, nor has the statesman, commonly invoked for English School
theorizing, ever received due attention.282 Furthermore, scholars are loath to study the
discourses of rising states due to their –allegedly– misleading nature; a point discussed
earlier. While Newman and Zala seek to amend this glaring omission, they nevertheless
lament the absence of country-specific frameworks and studies with which to understand
the revisionist tendencies of states.283 There is, however, one final line of inquiry into
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revisionism that has received scant attention, until recently, and complements many of the
material and social approaches elucidated above: The next section explores states’ desire
to pursue positional and non-material goods in international society, which can be linked
to their status concerns.
2. 2. 4. Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Status-Based Approaches
The previous subsections enumerate material and social factors as well as processes that
explain revisionism and status-quo seeking. As an ad-hoc approach that is consistent with
PTT, HST, English School, and other Constructivist approaches, “status” transcends any
clear distinctions based on the traditional schools of IR, and thus merits the status of having
its own section. Most of the prominent IR theories developed in the past decade have
developed propositions about hierarchy and the value of positionality in the social system
to delve deeper into the status-aspirations of states as a major driving force in state
behavior.284 Rather than thinking about international politics as purely a materially-driven
habitus, therefore, there is an evolving track in the literature that traces the motivations of
states to their positional aspirations. In doing so, status-based approaches mend important
gaps found in conventional materialist explanations as well as under-developed aspects of
theories with explicitly social components.
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As noted earlier, Gilpin’s understanding of concepts such as the hierarchy of
prestige and status are essentially linked to the relative-preponderance of states and their
demonstrated prowess on the battlefield in the previous war. Since status affects a state’s
relative command of the system, it is deemed as important.285 Gilpin, however, did not
append his approach to accommodate the multifarious aspects of status as a potential
driving force of state behavior, independent of states’ compulsion to pursue survival and
material power.286 That is to say, that while Gilpin and PTT generally ascribe a purely costbased logic to the maintenance and challenges of international order, the historical track
record of counterintuitive state behavior suggests the operation of other forces.287 Within
PTT and Gilpin’s framework, status may conceivably explain why states sometimes pursue
expansionist, seemingly uncooperative, unilateral, or, simply, self-regarding foreign
policies that may potentially undermine international order. Simply, states that are not
satisfied with their status in world politics may seek to enhance their position through selfaggrandizing policies, but divorced of concerns over material benefits, it becomes
impossible to accommodate dissatisfaction. Much of the claims of status-oriented research
seem to grapple with obvious contradictions.
To rectify the incompatibilities of combining material and status-based approaches,
it has become a necessity to devise theories of state-motivation; ones that intrinsically link
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to ideational and identity-based understandings of international relations. Essentially,
status concerns how states perceive their capacities in one domain as compared to others.288
This emphasis on the “self-esteem” of the unit can be rationalized within a broader
anthromorphic-turn in IR.289 As if harkening back to Morgenthau’s concept of animus
dominandi, status is based on research into human evolutionary behavior. It is argued that
status is an important motivation for human-beings, not simply as a means but as an end in
itself.290 Unlike prestige or great-power status, which rely on the absolute obtainment of
material capabilities and adaption of social practices, status is wholly positional and
requires the unambiguous understanding by the entire status community of this fact.291
Positionality is a sine qua non for status because, to paraphrase Schweller, where “everyone
has [high] status then no one does.”292 From these basic observations of Social Identity
Theory (referred to as SIT, hereafter) it is possible to make a number of inferences about
the circumstances in which states are willing to challenge, or not, international order; by
which mechanisms they seek to affect change; and which states are willing to do so in the
first place.
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If status is the end goal of international politics, revisionism can arise from three
general sources. Firstly, uncertainty. Wohlforth, for example, has argued that status and
polarity arguments together can explain the durability of unipolar systems.293 By dispelling
uncertainties about status and material power preponderance, unipolar systems have
reduced the risk of challengers seeking to overthrow the unipole. By this logic, therefore,
as the gap in material and technological between the unipole and rising great power
diminishes, the latter may more likely seek to challenge the unipole. Recalling, then, the
aforementioned discussion on unipolarity we can observe a decline in America’s relative
power since the 1970s, yet the world is not pushing back; not even China. Instead, we see
that the U.S. grand strategy appears to contravene the tenets of its own rules-based order.
If status concerns being at the apex of authority that controls over the system, the U.S.
seems to have a counterintuitive way of preserving the status quo.
Secondly, revisionism can manifest when absolute goods like power fail to
translate, for whatever reason, into enhanced status.294 When a state is denied what it
“feels” it deserves, it will lash out. This type of research focuses especially on the
dissatisfaction arising from the combination of frustrated status ambitions and the domestic
political struggles of ruling elites. Much of their revisionist behavior and their intractable
challenges to the hegemon, therefore, originate from the dissatisfaction of not having the
same level of respect. Rising powers are particularly prone to this affliction because they
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are arrivistes and established great powers are unlikely to relinquish any control.295 This
problem is compounded by the inclusion of “ontological security” in which the denial of a
coveted good can be perceived as being an existential threat to the state.296
For example, Russian foreign policy and Iran’s “revisionist” ambitions of seeking
regional leadership, and procuring nuclear weapons, can, therefore, be attributed to the
fundamental feeling of insecurity that can only be conferred by the attainment of material
goods that would force other states to recognize their power.297 Rising states are at a further
disadvantage because there may be notable cultural disparities between the rising state and
the established powers. One need only consider rising states’ relative material deficiencies,
as compared to established powers, and they're distinct historical and cultural contexts.
Zarakol, for example, argues that having lost their empires, elites of vanquished nonWestern powers, have sought status-enhancing policies by aggressively adapting to the
standard of civilisation. To this end, countries like Japan, Russia, and Turkey have
internalized grand strategies geared towards domestic revisionism, manifesting as
aggressive modernization, a rejection of stigmatizing labels, and consequently a tendency
to be selective about upholding international norms.298
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Similarly, Stephen Ward eloquently argues that rising states are likely to adopt
radical forms of revisionism if their moderate status ambitions are not accorded. Rising
powers naturally covet the status quo since conformity is not only economically beneficial
but also helps rising states to socialize into international society and earn a rank among
their peers. Nevertheless, they may seek to redress territorial, and other material-based,
grievances. These grievances are comparatively minor since it is possible to accommodate
them. The problems become more acute when rising powers attempt to translate material
power into social influence of the system.299 Normally, and as also espoused by this
research, states tend to benefit from conformity since acquiesce to international rules and
norms is beneficial. Since challenging these rules would provoke a more dangerous
response from status-quo powers, rising states would logically avoid such antagonisms.300
Whenever status become immobile, that is when elites adopt a pessimistic attitude that the
status-quo order cannot accommodate them, elites are less likely to support that order.301
As these attitudes become ingrained within a society, political actors are likely to benefit
from discourses that challenge the normative order of international politics, all of which
are likely to galvanize radical revisionist policies.
Finally, we can conceive of revisionism as originating from the anxiety of dominant
power. In what is, in essence, a sophisticated rendering of the Thucydides Trap, asserts that
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states aspire towards achieving the top rankings in military and economic capabilities, as
well as prestige (defined in the Gilpinian sense). Once at the top, the preeminent power
obtains psychological satisfaction from preserving its spot.302 As with the rest of the PTT
literature, the argument goes that a dominant power’s perceived decline will militate action
so that it can stave off an impending loss of rank. In other words, the type of orderchallenging behavior predicted by the present research could be explained away by the
dominant state’s status anxiety. While the inclusion of psychological factors is clearly a
sensible improvement to the PTT argument, it is nevertheless of limited utility for the
present inquiry. In Onea’s study, the dominant state will accept its decline or will seek to
resuscitate its prestige via war; the crucial factor depends on whether or not the dominant
power perceives a rising state as being dominant in necessary categories. Britain, for
example, acquiesced to America’s rise and declined to view it as a rival because it saw,
based on trade-metrics, that Germany was a bigger threat to its status.303 Conversely,
France initiated multiple wars against Britain in the late 18th century as Britain was the
clear challenger to its declining preponderance.304 The question then is, how does the
dominant power in the present conjuncture act towards other states? By any metric of
military and economic power, the U.S. is peerless; save for China’s growing GDP. Given
the incommensurability of the cases with modern geopolitics (nuclear weapons, lowfungibility of force, economic interdependence), it is unsurprising that we have not yet
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witnessed anything akin to a preemptive war. It is also inconceivable that U.S.’ wars in the
periphery or flaunting of (its) international order cannot be ascribed to stats anxiety.
Status-based approaches suffer from other issues too. Status fails to deliver a
substantial improvement over traditional status-quo and revisionist arguments, or improve
upon the classical PTT arguments in any meaningful way. Status is often treated as yet
another of the myriad of dynamics that produces dissatisfaction and, concomitantly, can
militate a state against international order. States may be acting to the detriment of
international order because they are dissatisfied by their relative rank and therefore may be
seeking to enhance their status by way of revisionist and expansionist foreign policies. How
would status explain the tendency of states with higher status to abrogate international law
and abnegate the principles of a normative order that places them at the top of a hierarchy?
For the purposes of this research, such a claim would be eminently sensible. Through
conformity and upholding of the international order, and given enough material
capabilities, a state could, over time, achieve a higher rank without having to expend
unnecessary resources.305 Dissatisfaction with one’s status, moreover, may drive behavior
but conflict, especially aggressive war against the hegemon, is unlikely to confer a higher
status unless the bid for hegemony is successful and awes other potential contenders. It is,
therefore, somewhat of a contradiction to say that status is important because it helps states
accumulate material power when in fact significant material power needs to be spent to
enhance one’s status. Since states have no way of controlling how they are perceived by
their peers, the quest for status would seem to be self-defeating.
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Taken together the material and psychological arguments point to the need to
more-effectively incorporate domestic variables since status arguments implicitly rely
upon them.306 Far more importantly, and not sufficiently elaborated, is the role of the
decision-makers.307 Once decision-makers and domestic politics become involved,
however, the task of connecting system-level variables to unit-level ones become infinitely
more complex, and it is difficult to assign any analytical preeminence to status concerns
per se due to the often-inscrutable motives of decision-makers and the constituents of
political coalitions. It is conceivable ceteris paribus that decision-makers would covet
status-enhancing foreign policies because they seek to enhance their own power and
prestige, but what would happen if the two dynamics were to clash?
Consider this dilemma: Setting rules, undertaking responsibilities for global
governance, and ordering regularities in international politics are all hallmarks of states
ranking at the top of the status hierarchy. Maintaining order would necessitate enforcement
of existing rules. Yet, bearing the costs of doing so would contradict the interests and
beliefs of decision-makers or the preferences of domestic political actors. The former may
have no intrinsic commitment to international order, while the latter may prefer to endorse
a government prioritizing short-term policies that deliver domestic dividends over
principled commitment to order.308 Status matters for decision-making elites, but does it
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matter more than, for example, silencing dangerous domestic dissidents, and thereby
violating norms that diminish the social standing of their state? There is thus a fine line
between that which benefits the state, and its custodians. Unfortunately, status research
does not yet seem to address this nuance sufficiently (nor do other pluralist apporaches as
summariezed below in table 2. 2). Such a distinction would be unnecessary outside of the
Westphalian context, in which the state and the personage of the sovereign were conflated,
but this does not seem to be the case even in the age of populism. We would, therefore,
have to ascribe to status at best a supplementary role in explaining states’ disposition
towards international society unless we also expand on relevant domestic parameters. The
review avails itself of this opportune juncture to crossover into unit-level variables.
Table 2. 2. Summary of Pluralist Approaches
School

Institutionalism

Ideas and
Identity

English School

Status

Major
“Variable”

Institutions
(Regimes, Norms)

Identity; Ideas;
Culture

International society;
institutions as historical
practices; socialization

Positionality within status
community

Sources of
Revisionism

Nature of Liberal
Values, Non-Liberal
Regimes

Standard of Civilisation;
Revolution;
Peripheral
Actors

Desire for Status
(expectation); or avoiding
status loss (anxiey);
ontological insecurity

Sources of
Status Quo

Effective functioning
of Institutions;
Liberal Hegemony;
Liberal Regimes

Sources of
Reformism (if
applicable)

N/A

Explains
Cases

Partially

Type of
socialization;
ideas about
order;
legitimization
strategy
Type of
socialization;
ideas about
order;
legitimization
strategy
Type of
socialization;
ideas about
order;
legitimization
strategy
Partially

Problems with
approach

Binary approach; SQ
bias

Binary
approach;
Offense bias

Raison de systéme is
beneficial, all polities
aspire to statehood and
membership to IS

Desire for Status; or
avoiding loss of status

Nature of dissatisfaction is
often representational

Esteem; StatusEnhancement

Mostly

Mostly

No unit-level theorizing, no
foreign policy approaches
or theories of state
behavior; poor
methodology

Anthropomorphizing state,
overdetermination of status
as opposed to other values

Hegemony and the Future of the Liberal International Order," International Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 1 (2018),
pp. 133–150, especially p. 135.
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2.3. INNENPOLITIK
While some IR theories consider states to be undifferentiated, others argue that
understanding foreign policy outcomes, as opposed to international political outcomes,
sometimes requires an examination of unit-level variables. To this end, the following
domestic sources of revisionism and status-quo orientations in the form of Domestic
Structure, Regime Type and Processes, and Coalition Politics.
2. 3. 1. Domestic Structure
State capacity refers to the administrative and institutional ability of the state to perform
governmental functions. The capacity to enact and implement policy goals would in part
explain revisionist policies simply because revisionist and expansionist strategies tend to
demand a greater investment of resources.309 There are many viable indices of state power,
ranging from extractive capacities such as taxation to infrastructural-power projection as
measured by road and railway densities, as well as other metrics such as the implementation
and maintenance of public schools and other welfare functions.310 Perhaps one of the most
significant determinants of the structure of domestic power is the relationship between the
state and its society. Since decision-makers must contend with domestic issues, their
efficacy depends on the relative-acquiesce of their supporters. An interesting dilemma
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emerges when one considers the impact of state capacity on the disposition of states to
overturn international order. Along a continuum of most and least capable states, the least
“aggressive” states tend to fall at the poles.311 This finding is consistent with other
Innenpolitik approaches that examine the domestic-foreign policy nexus via scapegoating,
diversionary war, and other policies aimed at balancing domestic threats.312 In general,
decision-makers in strong states are less dependent on deceptive and other exclusionary
tactics, while their counterparts in weaker states may favor them.
Benjamin Miller, for example, highlights how a state’s likelihood of upholding
international order is contingent upon its state-to-nation congruence. That is the extent to
which a state’s boundaries reflect the ethnic/nationalist affiliations of society orders its
relationship to the state.313 An asymmetric state-to-nation ratio, for example, is more likely
to produce revisionist states, particularly if a nation is institutionally capable but possesses
a heterogeneous population or borders countries with considerable numbers of fellow
nationals. Dissatisfaction and propensity for external war are greater because politicians in
fragmented societies deem it useful to engage in externalizing domestic problems via
scapegoating tactics and invoking diversionary war.314 Conversely, institutionally capable
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states with social cohesion tend not to suffer from these domestic dysfunctions and are thus
inclined towards status-quo policies.
The inclusion of societal-level dynamics with state capacity helps to expand on
Structural Realist arguments. Unfortunately, the “revisionist motive” is too mechanical and
reduced only to nationalism-based expansionism motives or attempts by elites to secure
their regimes. Nationalism is an important force, but it is important also to remember that
national congruity, as an expression of in-groups versus out-groups, can be defined along
bases other than ethnicity. As prominent Constructivist works demonstrate collective
identities, loosely defined as bundles of beliefs about self in relation to others, for example,
can shape the preferences of decision-makers and the relationship between the state and
society.315 Even if one were to concede the Societies with an “agreeable” state-to-nation
ratio are more than capable, and willing, to challenging international order, not just for
territorial or parochial reasons, but also normatively as well, which Miller does not address.
2. 3. 2 Regime Types and Regime Processes
Regime types are also associated with states’ propensity for revisionism. According to Jack
Levy, the idea that democracies do not fight other democracies is the closest thing we have
to an “empirical law in International Relations,”316 The so-called Inter-Democratic-PeaceHypothesis (or IDPH, for short) is premised on a reading of Kant’s 1797 pamphlet on the
hypothesized pacifying effects of republicanism.317 Democratic regimes purportedly
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increase a rational and democratic society’s scrutiny over foreign policy, while shared
liberal-common values reduce the likelihood of war.318 This is not to suggest that
democratic nations are more peaceful per se, but simply less likely to attack other
democracies. Rather, liberal states tend to view each other as being more legitimate than
other types of regimes.319 Furthermore, widespread political participation engenders open
debate, and thus the pluralism afforded by liberal democracy, as opposed to a more
insulated regime actually allows states to communicate their intentions better.320 Finally,
in conjunction with liberal economies and international institutions (as discussed above),
liberal democratic regimes form the Kantian Triad: a trifecta of mutually reinforcing liberal
institutions.321
While these accounts showcase that democracies are less likely to be revisionist
states in general, and especially towards their kind, in practice this has not prevented
democracies from initiating wars against less-powerful and less-threatening states in the
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global periphery.322 Since liberal rules and norms pervade the present international order,
one must inevitably question why a liberal state would undermine aspects of international
order. Liberalism-induced pacifism ironically extends only to other liberal states, which
also calls into question the extent to which a liberal and rules-based order can accommodate
pluralism. Jeffrey Meiser has most recently argued that this logic obtains by subjecting it
to a litmus test: one in which rising great power exercises considerable restraint against
much weaker rivals. Democracy and liberal values can promote restraint as evidenced by
American grand strategy in the early 20th century, which exhibited remarkable restraint due
to the pacifying effects of a liberal domestic-political structure.323 Meiser cites not only the
liberal constitutional framework of the U.S. but also what he mistakenly calls “strategic
culture.”324 Useful as this study is, it is too specialized an explanation and does not offer
much in the way of advancing the liberal argument since the contemporary U.S., which is
more liberal than in the past, has been willing to undermine international order. Moreover,
why then is an authoritarian China, albeit economically liberal, similarly restrained as the
U.S. was during its rise? This brings us to the flip-side of the argument: that authoritarian
and illiberal regimes are more likely to produce aggressive foreign policies. Traditionally,
the literature considers political authoritarianism to be more conducive to revisionist
behavior because foreign policy can change according to the whims of powerful and
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insulated leaders, independent of the scrutiny of a rational public. Authoritarian systems,
including nominal (but illiberal) democracies, are much more likely to externalize domestic
problems by invoking external threats.325 The diversionary theory of war, for example,
exemplifies such domestic mechanism as there are abundant examples of authoritarian
regimes going to war, especially in times of domestic crises.326 While there are merits to
authoritarian regimes as being conducive to revisionism, there is a wealth of literature that
suggests otherwise. Authoritarian states often suffer from internal dysfunctions that
because internal coercion become necessary to buttress incumbent governments.
Consequently, authoritarian regimes will seek to redress relative internal (in)security rather
than dissatisfaction towards distributional grievances at the system-level. A notable quality
of third-world regimes is their proclivity for cooperating with external powers so as to earn
leverage against domestic threats.327 Military regimes, in particular, suffer the most from
this dysfunction as regime insecurity begets an internally-oriented military apparatus that,
far from projecting power externally and seeking to challenge international order, is likely
to be capable only of maintaining domestic order.328 While this would not preclude the
possibility revisionism by military regimes, it certainly reduces their chances of credibly
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rectifying whatever dissatisfaction they may have with international order. Where the quest
for regime security trumps other considerations, it comes as no surprise that under certain
conditions, military and authoritarian regimes can work together to produce regional
peace.329 There is, in other words, no a priori reason to assume that military regimes are
less sociable internationally and incapable of managing regional order given the historical
coincidence of international orders, and cooperation, in spite of widespread autocracy.
Liberal values and domestic structures do not inevitably produce status-quo orientations (a
case can be made that they are capable of producing revisionist behavior) and, likewise,
authoritarianism does not engender dissatisfaction with international order. Many of the
pillars of the U.S.-led liberal world order, its allies outside of Europe, are decidedly
authoritarian but compliant, overall, with U.S. hegemony and the bare-minimum
requirements of co-existence within the framework of international society.
Changes to regimes also engender significant foreign policy changes. Studying
processes, such as how closed systems transition to democracy reveals that democratization
can unleash the destructive energies of societies leading, at least in the short-term, to more
aggressive and expansionist foreign policies and behaviors that are associated with
revisionist states.330 This is an important finding because fundamental changes in the ruling
elite, be it through democratization, or through revolution brings to power a set of foreign
policy elites that have different political incentives and, consequently, different levels of
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satisfaction with international order. For example, China’s peaceful disposition could
disappear with the introduction of democratization; the process of becoming a democracy
is generally more conducive to belligerent behavior.331 Similarly, revolutions and
revolutionary actors constitute significant forces that can replace elites, empower new
actors and possibly undermine the entire established property rights in an international
system.332 Nevertheless, these types of dramatic transformations are comparatively rare in
international politics. Transformative shifts need not necessarily come about unless new
elites, or newly empowered coalitions, find it expedient to challenge international order.
Whatever the regime type and whatever the nature of the decision-makers, therefore, the
crucial element remains: the need to understand elites, their decision-making environment,
and priorities.
2. 3. 3. Coalitions
Political coalitions, the play of power between interest groups, typify Innenpolitik
approaches thereby challenging conventional structural theories. Accordingly, there are
two broad perspectives in the literature on the operation of these domestic forces.333 The
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first assumes that decision-makers are arbiters of the national interest because they seek
not only to maximize the security of the state but also their grip on power. As in the case
of the Diversionary Theory of War, elites pursue policies that aim to unify society or break
their domestic opposition.334 The other perspective conceptualizes political actors as
“interest groups” articulating their own parochial interests at the expense of the broader
interests of the state. These parochial interests manifest as “imperialism,” either in terms
of organizational and bureaucratic interests of state agencies or as a specialized class and
economic interests. In the former way, decision-makers and various government
bureaucracies push for policies that expand their own power and prestige.335 In the second
sense, powerful political and economic elites articulate expansionistic foreign policies
because of their involvement in specific economic sectors. For instance, arms
manufacturers may favor pro-war and interventionist foreign policies, as may exporters
that rely on access to external markets. Domestically-oriented groups may, in contrast,
prefer to dampen such expansionist ambitions, especially in dire times.
Suffice it to say, Innenpolitik is no stranger to the revisionism and status-quo
debate, but concerns over international society, order, and norms operate to the extent that
they intersect the political-economic interests of the political coalitions. Jack Snyder, for
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example, is interested in the origins of expansionist grand strategies and why great power
states have chosen self-defeating foreign policies.336 Accordingly, interest groups
propagate imperial myths about the benefits of expansionism because they stand to make
economic gains. As different interest groups come into contact, they often engage in logrolling (exchanging favors) which not only helps to coalesce powerful political coalitions
but also inculcates strategic myths. Consequently, great power states, particularly those
with cartelized political systems, are more likely to pursue expansionist foreign policy
projects and become entrapped by the rhetoric of imperial myths.337 Wilhelmine and, later,
Nazi Germany, as well as Japan in the 1930-40s displayed over expansionist foreign
policies because their cartelized political structures led to the formation of powerful proexpansionist coalitions. Meanwhile, the U.K. and U.S. were less susceptible to this
affliction in part thanks to their pluralistic political structures and liberal economies, all of
which prevented the triumph of expansionistic myths and the formation of political cartels.
Kevin Narizny, on the other hand, argues that a coalition of sectoral interest groups
constitutes the government. At any given time, foreign policy is most likely to reflect the
economic interests of the most influential sector, which affects a state’s level of
assertiveness, geographic locus, and willingness to use force. States can choose between
isolationist, internationalist, Realpolitik/Interventionist, and Supremacist/Imperialist,
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grand strategies depending on which coalition prevails and, consequently, which strategic
beliefs unite a partisan coalition.338 For example, in times of economic depression, the need
for austerity may dampen the appeal of imperialist and interventionist policies and vice
versa. On this basis, Narizny concludes that while the rising U.S. exercised restraint at a
time when it could have afforded to be even more expansionistic, a declining U.K. pursued
an imperialist foreign policy on the precipice of World War I, More recently, Peter
Trubowitz has sought to explain American grand strategy in terms of “geopolitical slack”
and the preferences of the incumbent parties over “guns” or “butter.”339 These determine
the scope and level of commitment of a state’s grand strategy. As also argued in the present
study, the permissiveness of the strategic environment determines the extent to which
decision-makers can pursue their goals. For Trubowitz, the coincidence of a secure
international environment and a pro-militarist partisan bloc will pursue expansionistic
policies, while a dearth of security and prioritization of domestic spending will more likely
result in status-quo or “underachieving” grand strategies.340
The domestic political approach provides solid foundations for examining grand
strategy more generally, as well as status-quo versus revisionist tendencies more
specifically. Superlative as these analyses are, the economic and class-based foci of this
research program precludes any satisfactory consideration of important non-material
factors (see Table 2. 3. for a summary). Granted, a confluence of international norms and
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domestic pressures may influence political coalitions, but these are underexplored.341 All
of these studies, particularly Snyder’s excellent opus emphasize a similar need to
thoroughly examine the ideas that decision-makers employ in their quest to reinforce their
power since ideas shape preferences. Ideational and discursive elements are significant
because they serve as the basis with which leaders and partisan coalitions garner support,
undermine their opposition, influence other states, and signal to the international
community.
Table 2. 3. Summary of Innenpolitik Approaches
INNENPOLITIK

POWER STRUCTURE

REGIME TYPE

COALITIONAL POLITICS

Major “Variable”

State-capacity;
Nation-state balance

Regime type; regime
process

Domestic political/economic
coalitions; elite strategies

Sources of
Revisionism

Elite strategies;
Insecurity;
Revanchism

Autocracies, regime
changes (revolution or
democratization)

Sources of
Status Quo

Elite strategies

Stable, liberal
democracy

“Butter” over “Guns”

Sources of
Reformism (if
applicable)

N/A

N/A

N/A

Explains Cases

Partially

No

Partially

Problems with
approach

REV-SQ Binary
approach; high
capacity states also
undermine order

REV-SQ Binary

Elite preferences are irreducible
to guns and butter; frameworks
often too U.S.-centric; no notion
of international social forces

“Guns”
over
expansionist myths;
coalitions

“Butter;
imperial

2. 4. COGNITIVE EXPLANATIONS
Much of the subject material of IR concerns the role of individual decision-makers and the
consequences of their policies. Unsurprisingly, leaders like Napoleon and Hitler cannot be
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divorced from our broader discussion of international order since international order is the
product of choices enacted by powerful decision-makers at pivotal moments in history.
Studying individual psychology and the impact of specific leaders on major foreign policy
decisions is an attractive option and an excellent way to contextual broader theoretical
inquiries.342 Our final consideration, therefore, is the role of cognition at the decisionmaking level. The discipline has dealt with individual decision-makers and their
aggregations in a multitude of ways. Various cognitive approaches to foreign policy
originate from the need to specify and enrich standard decision-making models based on
rationality and economic behavior.343 In fact, the notion of the state as a unitary and rational
monolith is the starting point for some of the earliest and most prominent theories of
decision-making. Accordingly, decision-makers are utility-maximizers that choose the
most optimum policies based on available information. This process is not straightforward
since a variety of cognitive and perceptual biases impinge on the process.
Two prominent cognitive biases are especially helpful in understanding revisionism
and status-quo behavior, which are subsumed under the header of Prospect Theory.344
Prospect theory improves on the classical idea of expected utility, arguing that rational
actors have different propensities for risk-taking based on whether decisions are being
taken to maximize gains or minimize losses. Humans have a compulsion to over-value
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what they currently possess.345 Two propositions emerge. Rational decision-makers are
more likely to be risk-averse with respect to gains and risk-acceptant regarding losses.346
The status-quo bias, therefore, is relevant decision-making dynamic.347 This also explains
why established great powers might be more willing to gamble and engage in risky and
order-conforming policies, especially if they have already invested (i.e., sunk-costs) in the
course of action. Prominent PPT and Neoclassical Realist studies have examined the
consequences of these biases as they relate to hegemonic transitions as well as risky great
power interventions in the periphery. Taliaferro’s balance-of-risk theory is apropos
because it combines Prospect Theory and a Neoclassical Realist framework to elucidate
how leaders’ fears over perceived losses in relative power and prestige impel great-power
states to intervene in peripheral regions, persist in failing strategies, and thereby accepting
further risks to compensate for sunk costs.348
Prospect Theory, potentially, tells us that a hegemon is likely to choose risky
strategies as compared to rising “challenger.” The falling dominos analogy has animated
U.S. foreign policy during and after the Cold War as it has undertaken costly military
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interventions with expanding sunk-costs. The Vietnam and Gulf (II) Wars are quite telling.
America’s risk-acceptant behavior, for instance, may simply be a form of revising the
international order with increasingly costly interventions and signalizing to China so as to
preserve primacy. Chinese restraint could be associated with the reverse logic. Pursuing
expansionist foreign policies and seeking to establish greater influence may prove to be
supremely beneficial, but also carries the risk of a global backlash that could hurt its rise.
Here is the crux of the matter: Actors’ utility calculations and ranking of policy
choices depend on heuristics such as framing and cognitive misers. By combining rational
and cognitive approaches Poliheuristic Theory, for instance, argues that when confronted
with a multitude of policy options, decision-makers will first eliminate politically
unacceptable options before evaluating the remaining options.349 Even if a course of action
could be advantageous for the state, the fact that it is not politically expedient would impel
decision-makers to choose an otherwise suboptimal policy. This process is entirely contextdependent, save for the fact that decision-makers focus on domestic expediency.350 We can
judge that if expected losses resonate more with decision-makers, then a domesticallyoriented and insecure FPE will elect to follow riskier and order-challenging strategies.351
Where does this leave our analysis? A brief survey of prominent cognitive
approaches corroborates earlier concerns: The need to understand decision-makers and
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their narratives, and thereby inferring their preferences with respect to the national interest.
We can infer that decision-makers are more likely to maintain an existing course unless
they are confronted with a stimulus that requires them to act. If a particular course of action
will not provide tremendous gains either for the state of the decision-makers themselves,
there is no reason to assume that they would change course in this instance either.
Confronted with the potential of making major gains or suffering losses, the former will
not elicit as dramatic a reaction. The latter scenario will very likely induce a risk-acceptant
attitude that may encourage more ambitious grand strategies. The key is to determine which
domain decision-makers harbor greater anxiety and what strategies they have chosen to
address it. That is, elites in some states may feel greater domestic insecurity rather than fret
over minor changes in the international system, focusing instead on domestic strategies. It
is also possible that where domestic factors present a greater challenge to a state, the more
likely it is that elites will pursue riskier strategies, to the extent of their capabilities allow
it, to enhance their power and prestige enough to pacify perceived domestic rivals.
By recasting cognitive theories with the language of international order and society,
something which is notably absent in the literature, conforming to the existing international
order and working to preserve it appears as the “default” modus operandi for most states.
Recalling that order-reforming means that a state changes international arrangements, a
state would deign to spend greater resources to “reform” international order under two
conditions. If a state’s elites expect to make even greater gains than before, or, secondly, if
reforming confers legitimacy and prestige, domestically and internationally, that may
assuage elite anxieties about losing power in the face of domestic challenges. In this
respect, changing aspects of an international order while upholding the overall logic of its
135

rules is a bold signal to other states of one’s power, benign intent, and potential for future
cooperation.
Bearing all of this in mind, order-challenging would manifest itself in a situation
where elites’ insecurity cannot be resolved through reforming strategies since respecting
international society’s norms are unlikely to resolve their insecurity. Facing an expected
fatal challenge to their domestic power and legitimacy, and to the extent that their power
allows, elites may choose risky, costly, policies to stabilize their power. The crucial matter
here is thus knowing why states prefer reinforcing or changing international order versus
challenging it.
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3

GRAND STRATEGY IN INTERNATONAL SOCIETY

Grand strategy is a controversial research program because it has been mobilized towards
explaining too many things on some occasions, or underexploited on others.352 The former
approach, comprised primarily of rich historically-informed research that illuminates the
military aspects of strategy in combination with many other variables.353 Scholars working
from an explicit social science perspective, in the meantime, are more concerned with
developing and testing theories of long-term and broad-scope state behavior with
generalizable findings.354 Respectively, these approaches endeavor to describe or explain
state behavior. Another group of research also provides an additional prescriptive
element.355 There is no consensus on what constitutes grand strategy since its meanings
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vary across the literature. The literature is confused, overall, about what is the most
appropriate conceptualization of grand strategy and has suggested, among other things, that
grand strategy is tantamount to a plan, ideational framework, process, or totality of policy
output.356 This dissertation also calls into question the alleged temporal and spatial
uniqueness of grand strategy, arguing that grand strategy can be viewed along a broad range
of actions and behaviors and may change over time. Grand strategy affords the
conceptualization of the long-term structure that defines a state’s overall tendencies in
statecraft. It, moreover, reflects the purposeful designs of decision-makers. Yet, it is
possible also to examine a broader set of output in statecraft as part of a brief episode or
cycle in a broader continuum. That is, grand-strategic orientations capture a broader set of
policy concerns and functions in a more temporary way since short-term fluctuations in the
conjuncture may encourage top decision-makers to respond to both domestic and
international developments.357 Finally, few scholars have grappled with the interdependent
nature of grand strategy. Interdependent, in this sense, refers to the role of recognized
mutual interests among top decision-makers to pursue restraint and cooperation with
respect to international order.
Grand strategy, in general, is a long-term process and a state’s capabilities, place in
the international structure, and a host of other elements may influence this. Two important

See Nina Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of ‘Grand Strategy’,” Security Studies Vol.
27, No. 1 (2017), pp. 27–57; Hal Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American
Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), p. 4.
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dimensions receive treatment here: the costliness of individual strategies in terms of how
ambitious they are and how much resources a state would need to commit, and the foreign
policy executives’ orientation. Are FPEs more inwardly-oriented and therefore interested
in maximizing a national interest masking parochial interests? Or do they recognize that
sometimes one’s best interest is served by upholding the broader interests of the
international community? Simply, do FPEs recognize the importance of solving
international problems in cooperation with others? Perhaps we can understand this
distinction as a juxtapositioning of a notion of “exceptionalism” versus “internationalism,”
but the major thrust of the argument is emphasizing the importance of international order
as compared to more parochial domestic interests and sensitivity towards avoiding losses
for the principles of international order. This vital notion, so embedded in the international
society perspective has so far eluded examination; a point that receives scrutiny here
through an examination of foreign policy elites and narratives about international order.358
Having delineated the IR literature on revisionism, status quo, and reformism in
world politics, we can now revisit the main argument of this dissertation in full. On the
basis of the theoretical lacunae, the dissertation advances six sets of assumptions on which
to found a theory of grand-strategic orientations.

3.1. ASSEMBLING THE THEORY: ASSUMPTIONS
3. 1. 1. Grand Strategy
Grand strategy is the long-term process of how statespeople select, or reject, national ends

One notable exception is Etel Solingen. See Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn: Global and Domestic
Influence on Grand Strategy (Princeton University Press, 1998).
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and means within the material and ideational parameters of their environment, as reflected
in national policy. Grand Strategy has temporal, spatial, and issue-specific dimensions.
Grand-strategic orientations, on the other hand, are brief cycles, specific policy equilibria
that may obtain at some time, within a country’s overall framework of statecraft. As idealtypes of behavioral orientation, states have a choice between seeking conforming,
challenging, or reforming strategies, or isolation. International politics and domestic
politics operate on a continuum of material and social constraints, which we distinguish as
being permissive or not permissive for states.
3. 1. 2. Strategies
Based on empirical puzzles, theoretical appraisals, available literature, and the tenet of
preserving parsimony, the dissertation borrows from the English School three sets of
observable and measurable state behaviors: the use of force and alliance disposition,
relations with great powers, and a state’s attitude with respect to international law. Each
strategy reflects a state’s ability and willingness to exert effort to engage with international
society (see Table 3.1. below). While none of these strategies are necessarily mutually
exclusive, an ambitious state is likelier to pursue costlier strategies along multiple
dimensions and vice versa. With these caveats concluded, the dimensions of the strategies
are as follows.
First, to what extent does a state use force, and how does it interact with allies? The
way great-power states build alliances and use force is very important because having allies
distributes costs and may bestow legitimacy for the post-war settlement. To this end,
arranged by descending level of costs are unilateralism, wherein a dominant state uses force
illegitimately and without regard to allies or international rules, multilateralism, leadership,
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and isolationism. “Leadership” is simply a reference to the type of behavior one can expect
from an enterprising great power that generally observes multilateralism but prefers to use
force, or not, primarily by assuming global responsibilities through its own alliance bloc
rather than the official organs of the UN. It is a via media between unilateralism and
multilateralism since the great power assumes the most responsibilities, but largely
operates through the consent of allies and empowered through other international
institutions. Multilateralism, meanwhile, is the attitude of the good global citizen. A
multilateralist state would be unlikely to have aggressive posturing and will invariably
prefer to use force only through formal authorization by the UN. Finally, some states may
be so incapable, or the conjuncture may be so unsuitable that a state may choose to
“withdraw” and shirk from responsibilities like using force consistent with maintaining
international order.
Somewhat similar, and an important determinant for international order, is how
states act towards (other) great powers. A militarily and economically incapable state is
most likely to pick the path of least resistance and appease great powers, and other states,
which threaten it. Soft-balancing, a popular concept discussed earlier, is the most sensible
approximation of how the balance of power would operate in an asymmetric balance of
power systems. Soft-balancing means that states may resist superpower states on some
issues if it is not in their interest but nevertheless cannot actively take violent action to
resist them. “Expansionism,” meanwhile refers to various policies that more-powerful
states may choose to expand their power and influence. Expansionist strategies involve
expanding one’s alliance network or sphere of influence, which may require displays of
force and significant diplomatic activism. Thus, a state that is assertive towards other great
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powers and undercuts their influence through non-violent means is applying expansionist
policies. Finally, imperialist strategies signal all-out hostility and contempt towards other
states and great powers, wars of conquest and other unsanctioned uses of force are
extremely ambitious and costly. One would expect only capable and motivated orderchallenging states to display such policies
A state’s attitude towards legal practices is also of consequence. Is a state likely to
adhere to the existing international legal/normative framework or change it, and in what
ways? A state pursuing conservativism will not be likely to assert new international norms,
nor would it be likely to accept them. Conservativism simply means that a state will prefer
to interpret rules and norms in a traditional and parochial, without necessarily flaunting
them. China’s attitudes about human rights, for instance, is consistent with this strategy.
This strategy is consistent with order-retrenching. Meanwhile, some states may accept
prevailing norms but may not be so inclined to change them. Rather they may focus on
their effective dissemination. This is a perfect example of “enmeshment,” wherein a state’s
mission is to promote compliance. Meanwhile, some states, especially rising ones are likely
to renounce or ignore some international legal institutions but display a disposition to work
within these structures. The goal is often replacing an existing rule or norm with a more
favorable one for one’s self. This “reformist,” approach best approximates to orderreforming. Finally, we can also observe some states engaging in a “radical” flaunting of
international law. They challenge international order by calling into question the very
legitimacy of legal practice or an aspect of international law, such as undermining
sovereignty. Next, we discuss how some of these strategies become “more likely” than
others.
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Table 3. 1. Fundamental Institutions and State Strategies
Fundamental
Institutions
Observable
Categories and
Costs

War

Diplomacy

Use of
Force/Alliances

Balance
of Power

Great
Power
Management

Relations Towards Other
Powers

International Law

Attitude towards
Norms and Rules

Less Costly

Withdrawal

Appeasement

Conservativism

-

Multilateralism

Restraint

Enmeshment

+

Leadership

Expansionism

Reformism

More Costly

Unilateralism

Imperialism

Radicalism

3. 1. 3. Foreign Policy Executives
Navigating the material and ideational continuum of grand strategy is the prerogative of
the highest echelon of decision-makers that exercise the greatest influence in foreign policy
(i.e. foreign policy executives, or FPE), and who therefore define the national interest and
consequently pursue appropriate policies. FPEs include heads of state, government, and
other powerful members of the executive branch, and their advisors, in charge of foreign
policy, or prominent members of the foreign policy establishment, however defined
according to a given case.359
Many instances of imperialist and unilateral foreign policy actions stem from
foreign policy establishments’ lack of interest in voluntary restraint but also due to internal
dynamics. Considering domestic and international audience costs, and other parochial
interests, it is hard to tell what matters most. It may be expedient for FPEs to favor
discourses and policies aimed at consolidating and legitimating FPEs hold on domestic
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For example, the Chinese Premier Xi Jiping, U.S. National Security Council Advisor Henry A. Kissinger,
President George W. Bush, or the Senate Committee on the Council on Foreign Relations.
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power or external security (if such an expediency exists). Perceived trends about one’s
political fortunes, in conjunction with FPEs attitude towards international order, influences
the type of strategies, grand-strategic orientation, a state will more likely pursue in the
short-term.
3. 1. 4. National Interest: Raison d’État vs. Raison de Systéme
While FPE’s have a diverse portfolio of interests –the most important being to stay in
power– they are also a repository of domestic and international values as acquired through
iterated interactions with their counterparts at various institutional levels. Consistent with
the assumption of most traditional IR understandings of grand strategy, therefore, it is
argued states generally have long-term designs that lead them to accept international order.
Elites’ primary objective is to satisfice between domestic political expediency and the
broader interests of international society. As with many arguments about revolutions,
domestic coalitions, there is a strong reason to think that the extent to which FPEs are likely
to uphold international order is contingent on how they view their circumstances and
construct the national interest.
The national interest or raison d’état is a notoriously elusive concept in IR. For the
purposes of this research, this concept refers to the domestically-informed national interest
of a state. In the meantime, raison de systéme, a fundamentally important concept of the
English School serves as an alternative locus of elite interests.360 According to this concept,
states in an international society have a fundamental interest in restraining themselves and

See Watson, “Systems of States.” Also see Barry Buzan, “The English School: A Neglected Approach to
International Security Studies,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 46, No. 2 (2015), pp. 126-143.
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foregoing gains if needs be, so as to promote the general welfare of the system.361 This
recognition of mutual interests by states is a general tendency learned from a deep history
of engagement with other states. States sometimes need to restrain themselves or forego
attainable gains, to preserve the legitimacy and functioning of international order because
a legitimate and functioning international society can more easily restrain would-be
aggressors, more effectively prevent armed conflict, and, ultimately, better serve the
interests of all its constituent members. If the subtext is that it pays to make the system
work, operating within the framework of an existing international order is the normal state
of affairs. As Watson explains,
Order is further promoted by general agreements and rules that restrain
and benefit all members of the system, and make it into a society. That
is an aspect of raison de système, the belief that it pays to make the
system work.362

The two concepts help to frame the present discussion. The reasons why either of
these orientations may prevail among the FPE varies from context because one is dealing
with how decision-makers frame abstract communal notions. The overall security
environment of a state, its historical relationship to international society, elite beliefs, issue
salience, and elite expectations all play a part. The last of these, that of expectations is

By analogy, this English School concept is akin to the Stag Hunt. In Game Theory the “Stag Hunt” is a
scenario in which players need to satisfy their hunger by hunting either stags or rabbits. Hunting the former
is difficult and requires cooperation (C) but the payoff is more substantial. Hunting the latter, or defecting
(D), meanwhile is much easier and does not require cooperation since players can hunt them on their own.
Of course, the logic of raison de systéme reminds us that sometimes the players may need to agree to avoid
hunting altogether to preserve the stags and rabbits. See Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,”;
Oye, Cooperation Under Anarchy, p. 6.
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particularly noteworthy because FPEs decision-making horizon, their willingness to
cooperate and their international modus operandi depends on what they and the state can
expect to gain within a limited time horizon. By choosing to uphold the values of
international society, playing by the rules, one expects that upholding existing rules serves
the best interest of the state. Not all states and not all FPEs operate under such long
timeframes. Sometimes, decisive, risky, and self-serving action is needed to alleviate an
unfolding situation.
3. 1. 5. A Rational Foundation for Raison de System: Expected Gains vs. Losses
FPEs’ external strategies depend on their attitude towards international order. Accordingly,
FPEs are likely to adopt foreign policy strategies corresponding to 1) their preferences
regarding the attainability of desired outcomes through orderly participation in
international politics, 2) their orientation vis-à-vis international order, 3) their projected
gains or losses arising from international developments, and 4) their freedom of action to
implement policies aimed at exploiting said developments (see figure 3.1 below).363
International security imperatives notwithstanding, FPEs will always want to avoid
situations they judge will deliver suboptimal outcomes with respect to their domestic
power. Combining FPEs’ order-related preferences with insights from prospect theory
renders the following insights.

Derived from Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahnemann, “Loss-Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference
Dependent Model,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, No. 4 (November, 1991), p. 1040. N.B.
A= Analytical anchor (the starting position to which gains, and losses are compared). The closer the expected
utility of a certain move is to this anchor point, the more likely that states will prefer order-conforming.
B= The overall area in which order-reforming is most likely.
C= The overall area in which order-challenging is most likely.
363
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FPEs that have a raison de systéme orientation will be more sensitive to
international developments and overall more likely to prioritize multilateral solutions.
Conversely, FPEs that have a raison d’état orientation are more sensitive to domestic
political concerns; moreover, they will be more willing to act unilaterally if needed. Based
on the insights of Prospect Theory, FPEs’ policy choices for preserving altering
international order depends on whether they stand to benefit or expect to make losses (see
Figure 3.1.). If upholding a certain international norm or arrangement does not alter the
calculus, a state is not likely to act. States that stand to gain from appending an aspect of
international order, be it flaunting or reforming an existing rule or changing an arrangement
such that it brings greater benefits, a state is likely to expend resources conservatively to
avoid risks.364
Figure 3. 1. A typical value function v. endowment effect
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This researcher would argue that initial American restraint in pushing for NATO expansion after the Cold
the expansion could be an example of this. Similarly, China’s reformism, limited generally to seeking greater
influence and overall prestige and authority-enhancing strategies evidences a desire not to upset favorable
arrangements.
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Expected losses, meanwhile, resonate the strongest with FPEs and induce them to
adopt riskier strategies.365 FPEs that are more animated by concerns over their domestic
power were presented with the opportunity of gaining or losing power; we may have a full
picture of how and the extent to which they would be willing to exert national resources in
reaction. To this end, one can hypothesize that expected gains, regardless of FPEs domain
of locus, will engender less-risky, while expected losses will illicit greater propensity for
risk-taking.366 Of course, strategic choices also depend on the state’s capabilities. Figure
3. 1. 6 Permissive and Restrictive Environments: Freedom of Action
All foreign policy is limited by the resources available to states. The reason why the
international system constrains states is that they do not possess power enough in relation
to other states to get what they want. Beyond this simplistic and materialist notion,
however, is also the notion that a considerable number of perceptional, ideational, and even
institutional factors play into determining a state’s freedom of action. In the latter sense,
the Neoclassical Realist understanding of “permissive” versus “restrictive” conditions, as
well as Trubowitz’s concept of “geopolitical slack” are particularly useful because these
are different ways of conceptualizing the essence of decision-makers’ beliefs about the
international security environment.367 Simply, based on a consideration of available
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American involvement in costly peripheral wars like the Vietnam War, for instance, is text-book example
of the “Domino Theory” heuristic which not only made U.S. FPEs overvalue the strategic value of a nonCommunist Vietnam but the endowment effect prompted further U.S. investment into the conflict when it
proved unsuccessful. See Snyder, Myths of Empire, pp. 9, 12, 28.
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Note that the approach nevertheless remains distinct from diversionary war and scapegoat theories. Firstly,
it considers the possibility that FPEs may distinguish between raison de systéme and raison d’état interest
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See Taliaferro, Ripsman, Lobell, The Challenge of Grand Strategy, pp. 23-25; Trubowitz, Partisan
Ambition, pp. 5-6. The former argue that clear threats are not manifest in permissive environments and states
have the freedom to engage in adventurist foreign policies rather than balancing the real threat. The latter,
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resources, potential threats (or lack thereof), external-balancing options, and relative
impunity, do decision-makers possess freedom of action to incur the costs of pursuing some
policies as opposed to others? Costs of various policies, in conjunction with
decisionmakers’ propensity to change order, result in strategic preferences (see table 3. 2.)
Table 3. 2. State strategies arranged by costs and elite’s order orientations
COST OF GRAND STRATEGY

DE RAISON D’ÉTAT
RAISON
SYSTÈME

ORDER-ORIENTATION

LOW

HIGH

•
•
•

Isolationism
Appeasement
Limited
Engagement

•
•
•

Unilateralism
Imperialism
Radicalism

•
•
•

Multilateralism
Restraint
Enmeshment

•
•
•

Leadership
Expansionism
Reformism

3.2. CAUSAL MECHANISM
Upholding international order is most often profitable for FPEs. For the dominant state, it
confers legitimacy and authority. This is true for lesser-great powers too, especially for
ones that derive great benefit from simultaneously cooperating with the dominant state

meanwhile, similarly considers “slack” as a function of how secure a state is vis-a-vis potential threats in the
international system.
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without the burden of exercising the management responsibilities that great-power states
must to preserve international order. Rising states also benefit from upholding international
order because the conditions work in their favor all the while greater conformity to the
normative framework of international society further enhances their status within that
community. The only truly dissatisfied states/groups would have to be at the global
periphery, as non-state actors (but we know that even these types of actors aspire to
statehood and all that entails), and extreme isolationist states, which are just that:
isolationist. There are a variety of reasons for more powerful states to be dissatisfied, such
as irredentism or representational issues, but by in large these cannot be considered as being
revisionist apart from the politically motivated binary of the status quo revisionism. These
types of grievances do not aim to undermine international order or flaunt (self-imposed)
rules. If anything, material and representational dissatisfaction can manifest as a reformist
attitude and a positive engagement with the architecture of international order.368
The only viable source of state dissatisfaction that can lead to order-challenging
behavior must originate from within the state, be interjected into the national agenda by
FPEs, and have a finite scope lest it risk severe international backlash. The argument then
is simply that FPEs have to balance the competing and often contradictory demands of
upholding international order, their domestic constituents, and their own parochial interests
(i.e. political survival). Between these three demands, the last one will invariably prevail;
the other two are ranked so as to serve the prime directive. FPEs freedom of action is
relative within and without the state. Thus, between political survival and serving the

Newman and Zala, “Rising Powers and Order Contestation.” Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising
Powers, pp. 22-23.
368
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“standard national interest” and political survival and the “enlightened national interest”
FPEs tend to choose the most expedient ones at a given time to the extent that they have
sufficient capabilities. FPEs often find themselves hindered even when an opportunity may
present itself, to change aspects of international order due either to the nature of the
expected gains/losses and the resources required.
Thus, we are confronted with four scenarios (see Table 3. 3.):
1) Order-Reforming: FPEs expect to make gains and have freedom of action.
2) Order-Conforming: FPEs expect to make gains but have limited freedom of
action.
3) Order-Challenging: FPEs expect to make losses and have freedom of action.
4) Order-Retrenching: FPEs expect to make losses and have limited freedom of
action.
Table 3.3. Grand-Strategic Orientations, Expected Utility and Freedom of Action

LOSSES

ORDER-RETRENCHING
•
•
•

ORDER-CHALLENGING

Isolationism
Appeasement
Conservatism

•
•
•

ORDER-CONFORMING

GAINS

EXPECTED TRENDS

FREEDOM OF ACTION
RESTRICTIVE
PERMISSIVE

•
•
•

Unilateralism
Imperialism
Radicalism

ORDER-REFORMING

Multilateralism
Restraint
Enmeshment

•
•
•
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Leadership
Expansionism
Reformism

Figure 3.2. Causal Argument

The following chapter define the operationalization of the theory and define the
research strategy. Chapters 5 and 6 will respectively examine U.S. and Chinese foreign
policy in the post-Cold War.
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4

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter lays forth the methodological principles underpinning the dissertation. The
formal theoretical argument, to reiterate here, is that when states are confronted with a
strategic opportunity, their behavior will be shaped by their relative freedom of action in
conjunction with their FPEs’ orientation towards international order and risk-propensities.
Each of these concepts receives formal operationalization below. Since the matters of case
selection and conceptualization have received extensive treatment elsewhere, the present
chapter focuses on the task of explicating the research design, justifying methodological
choices and specific data selection, and discussing the limitations of the inquiry. The
dissertation employs multiple methods consisting of content and, subsequently, discourse
analyses of a selection of texts and speeches. Methodologically, the analysis uses
qualitative methods, specifically congruence procedures, to infer the validity of the
theoretical contribution.
4.1. RESEARCH DESIGN
While there is no formal methodological approach to status quo and revisionism in the
discipline, most studies of foreign policy are conducted via qualitative case study
analyses.369 The high specificity of each case and the unique circumstances of states often
preclude the possibility of parsimonious research designs and generalizable findings.
Nevertheless, exemplary studies of state behavior are amenable to rigorous analysis and to
deductive-hypothesis testing procedures. The stated goal of this project is to add a nuance
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See Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), esp. Chapter 9; Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Process
Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines (Ann Arbor, IL: The University of Michigan Press, 2013) p.
4.

153

to the debate on status-quo and revisionist behavior by incorporating a notion of
“reformism” and examining under what circumstances we can observe such dispositions.
As the literature suggests, there is not a clear-cut relationship between the intrinsic qualities
of states or decision-makers and the policies they implement. There are some research
strategies. However, that can help us to infer relevant causal processes.
4.1.1. Philosophical Assumptions
The first step to justifying one’s research preferences begins with fundamental issues about
the philosophy of science; about the nature of reality and what we know about it. This
dissertation proceeds from the ontological assumption that there is a “real” world,
independent of the human mind.370 In the philosophy of science, this ontological position
is broadly associated with Neopositivism and Critical Realism.371 It is the issue of
epistemology, or what we can come to know about this world, that presents real challenges
to research. Here, the two approaches differ. Neopositivists argue that it is possible to
accumulate objective knowledge about the world through the implementation of
appropriate methods and instruments. Through our imperfect instruments, we can adduce
quite a bit of knowledge about the world. For this reason, Neopositivism focuses on the
accumulation of knowledge via scrutinizing established theories. If a new theory better
explains the causal relationships between phenomena it consigns the incumbent theory into
the dustbin. Since the new theory is more accurate or parsimonious, it results in the
advancement of science.
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See Patrick T. Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its
Implications for the Study of World Politics (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013).
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See Ibid.; Joseph A. Maxwell, A Realist Approach for Qualitative Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications Inc., 2011), p. 4.
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This dissertation follows the latter, Critical Realist, stance. This means that as far
as our present inquiry is concerned, the researcher is not convinced that it is possible for
us to know truly objective facts about world politics. What we can know can only be
mediated through abstract concepts and categories that yield highly subjective verdicts
depending on the context of the research, such as one’s assumptions and research design.
In practical terms, a Critical Realist approach borrows from an interpretation of science
that considers the accumulation of knowledge not as a gradual and incremental process,
but within the framework of paradigms.372 In this interpretation, scientific inquiries are
problematized and addressed through established traditions and assumptions as “normal
science.”373 When “normal science” fails to address anomalies, or simply a better set of
foundational assumptions and theories manifest themselves, it transforms the entire
intellectual landscape. Accumulation until a major shift and the abandonment of traditional
ideas, rather than falsification of existing theories, advances science.
Consider, for example, the debate on the termination of the Cold War. Using similar
assumptions and data, scholars have been able to demonstrate the efficacy of not only
materialist but also ideational variables.374 To wit, the collapse of the Soviet Union can be
considered an instance of a declining power submitting to economic realities, or as a
rejuvenating power (after Perestroika) unable to keep up with the unfolding ideational
circumstances of liberalization. Conversely, it is possible for theories with significantly
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See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions [Second Edition] (Chicago, IL: The
University of Chicago Press, 1970).
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See Ibid., pp. 5-6.

This is the starting premise of, for example, William C. Wohlforth, “Realism and the End of the Cold
War,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter, 1994-1995), pp. 91-129.
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different axioms to reach similar verdicts, building upon each other in creative ways, to
explain the emergence of highly unique outcomes.375
In practical terms, the caveat is simply that this dissertation does not seek to, and
cannot, invalidate existing theories of grand strategy. Doing so would not only run counter
to the purposes of this project, it would also be ill-suited to address a broad analytical
referent like grand strategy. The goal is to develop a typology of state behaviors and
extrapolate thereupon a model to explain how it can usefully be operationalized. Grand
strategy, being an all-encompassing analytical referent, is ill-suited for precise
measurement of causation. Endogenous processes may impinge on decision-making at any
level to produce specific policy outputs at odds with the wider process of grand strategy.
4.1.2. Methodology
Since this researcher seeks to develop a typology of strategies and a model to explain why
states choose them, but cannot study every observation in detail, a sensible way to develop
a forward-looking research agenda is by laying out the model first, then examining the
congruence between the predictions of the hypotheses and observable outcomes thereafter.
This research deliberately eschews the oft-invoked process-tracing method in favor of
congruence procedures. The reason is simple: process tracing is ideally suited for cases in
which the researcher seeks to uncover in detail the operation of causal mechanisms and
attempts to explain outcomes, thereby tracing in exhaustive detail the various steps along
the way that traces a specific outcome.

An emblematic example of this is Graham Allison’s classical study of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Where
the standard “Rational Actor Model” fails to deliver a comprehensive explanation of idiosyncrasies by Soviet
forces, Organizational Theory and Governmental Politics are offered as syncretic and complementary
additions. Even in foreign policy analysis, there is more than one way to skin a cat. See Allison and Zelikow,
Essence of Decision.
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Congruence, meanwhile, refers to the identification of correlations between causes
and outcomes. This method is not as robust as process tracing since the coincidence of a
hypothesized cause and outcome does not validate a theory or causal mechanism. With this
seemingly minimalist ambition, congruence procedures seem to have a bad reputation as a
weak tool for inference as compared to process tracing.376 Be that as it may, congruence
approaches do in fact hypothesize causal mechanisms.377 In fact, the primary differences
between the two methods concern the extent to which they explicitly trace causal
mechanisms and the level of detail in terms of evidence provided. The differences were
minimal, there is a discernable tendency among scholars to conflate the two methods, as
process tracing becomes the standard methodological designation for even the most
minimalist research designs.378 Unsurprisingly, many scholars use process tracing when
they mean congruence procedures.379
Is congruence then simply a fancy appellation used to justify an a-theoretical and
flimsy research design? No. Congruence is an extremely useful method. It is an excellent
first-step to thinking about causal relationships. Among other things, this enables the
researcher to engage in theory-building with which to craft hypotheses. This is also a valid
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ambition for the Neoclassical Realist research program.380 Broadly defined, this research
presents four hypotheses about grand strategy that explain some facets of American and
Chinese behavior in the post-Cold War period. What is problematic, however, is that even
the comparatively modest goal of expounding grand-strategic orientations for a brief span
of time dictates the foregoing of complete mechanistic precision. A theory of grand strategy
must simultaneously create and frame broad categories of behavior in service of a broader
theoretical point while simultaneously making sense of longer-term trends in the behavior
of states. Instead of uncovering a unique outcome such as the unfolding of the Cuban
Missile Crisis or even a longue durée analysis of why the Anglo-Portuguese alliance
endures, the approach to grand strategy as articulated in this volume contends that some
types of policies become more likely within specific contexts.
Another drawback is that the framework under development cannot have valid rival
theories or hypotheses. Chapter 3 lays out a comprehensive set of alternative explanations
to derive as many implicit but testable hypotheses against which to sharpen the present
theory. Only a handful of them, however, is comprehensive or helpful and many lack
explicit unit-level theorizing against which to test the propositions of the framework.
Supposing, however, that the analysis covered a very specific issue, such as explaining
American multilateralism during U.S.-led interventions of the 1990s, one could naturally
adduce alternative hypotheses; whether the present elite responsibility approach is
instructive or whether rival theories like Defensive Realism or Innenpolitik prevail. Given
the scope of this project, we would need to replicate the process tracing for every different

Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,”; Ratbun, “A Rose by Any Other Name; Ripsman, Taliaferror, Lobell,
Neoclassical Realist Theory.
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grand-strategic disposition under scrutiny in this research. Thus, a detailed analysis of this
nature is untenable. Given the period under consideration, and depending on the level of
detail, such a project would require an unfathomable amount of time and data to execute.
Compounding the data quantity problem is the type of data. Empirical problems and
theoretical deficiencies from contemporary cases inform the typology and model. To get
to the heart of contemporary American and Chinese decision-making requires access to
materials that are likely to remain classified for decades, although there are ways around
this problem as discussed below.
Before we scrap the project entirely, however, it is also noteworthy that congruence
approaches are not mutually exclusive with comparative studies and process tracing.
Firstly, the theory and its hypotheses engender the examination of a broader set of limitedcase studies that probe the validity of multiple hypotheses. In practice, we are helping the
inference process by providing conditions for variations in the causes and outcomes, both
longitudinally and comparatively. Observing and explaining, in other words, similar grandstrategic orientations under similar situations and causal processes improve inference.
Secondly, there are observable implications of the hypothesized mechanisms. A
circumscribed process tracing is therefore mandatory to provide evidence for decisionmaking processes. Thirdly, for the purposes of research beyond the present undertaking, a
congruence approach is a “forward-thinking” approach for a sustained and comprehensive
analysis of grand strategy and state behaviors because it sets the stage for future
theorizing.381 As the framework is applied to more cases, it can increase our confidence in
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the model, justify in-depth process tracing studies for detailed analysis, and, ultimately
improve its analytical leverage. In the meantime, the following section operationalizes the
theory and specifies the kind of data that would evidence the proposed causal mechanism.
4. 1. 3. Method
The framework (see Table 4. 1. below) engenders the examination of four propositions via
congruence procedure. Namely,
•

P1: Under permissive international environments, dissatisfied FPEs
will prefer order-challenging strategies.

•

P2: Under permissive international environments, satisfied FPEs
will prefer order-reforming strategies.

•

P3: Under restrictive international environments, satisfied FPEs
will prefer order-conforming strategies.

•

P4: Under restrictive international environments, dissatisfied FPEs
will prefer order-retrenching strategies.

Firstly, we need to establish whether the international environment is restrictive or
permissive at a given conjuncture. Our primary cause, therefore, is a permutation of factors
at the level of the international system. This we can measure on the bases of two
considerations. The first is the capacity of a state to act. This refers to the state’s relative
material capabilities, or its capacity to act in international politics which is measured on
the basis of relative capabilities, which is potentially comprised of military-economic
capabilities and the availability of willing allies. The foundational idea of Structural
Realism is that material capabilities has an independent effect on decision-making calculus.
Beyond this, FPEs’ subjective notions of threats, opportunities, and even ambiguity
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however defined can serve as the catalyst of state behavior. This “underlying cause” forms
the backdrop of the drama unfolding at the level of FPE decision-making.
The type of evidence we would need to produce is straightforward. Materially, any
cursory glance at the military-economic capabilities of U.S. and China in the period of
investigation should sufficiently reveal their relative-freedom of action so far as material
capabilities are concerned. The Correlates of War (Version 5.0, 2012) project, among other
sources, can readily illuminate capacity-related issues.382 Ascertaining threats and
available allies is trickier. It is difficult to avoid the “prescription trap” that plagues Realist
and many rationalist analyses of IR. By any measure of material capabilities, the U.S.
cannot have any credible rivals apart from other great powers, but most of them are in fact
U.S. allies, or simply do not confront the U.S. For China, vice versa applies. One need not
also forget the salience of domestic and non-state sources of threats for these states, which
is always a concern for China in particular. It is therefore impossible to label an
international system as being restrictive or permissive for a state independent of subjective
and perceptional elements. While there is abundant evidence on the threat perceptions of
our cases based on primary and secondary sources, we can nevertheless conclude that both
U.S. and China enjoy a degree of detachment from other states and are not in immediate
danger of existential threats. They have greater freedom to pursue foreign policies that may
differ from the prescribed ideals of structural theory. For both states, uses of force in the
period under investigation seems limited to wars in the periphery, conducted through the
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official mandate of multilateral international organizations. Any evidence we find about
relative power and threat perceptions is therefore useful.
Wherever we find permissive environments, we are similarly likelier to observe
grand-strategic orientations that are more ambitious in scale. For example, order
challenging (P1) and reforming (P2) are orientations of this kind. Both sufficient material
preponderance or absence of credible external threats could account for the pursuit of
ambitious strategies. Absent favorable distribution capabilities and allies, and in the
presence of salient threats, decision-makers cannot enjoy such latitude and will prefer lessambitious strategies such as order-conforming (P3) and retrenchment (P4).
Obtaining data on the cause and outcome is an exercise in accumulating the best
possible primary sources and secondary literature to evaluate the historical development of
the cases. Data procurement for the proposed causal mechanism requires lengthier
elaboration and is the subject of the following section. While there is likely to be a
significant variation in the policy dispositions of states across these categories of behavior,
the dissertation nevertheless advances the modest claim that in the short-term, foreign
policy executives will exercise greater influence and policy is more likely to reflect their
preferences.383 As far as state policy is concerned, it makes sense that the prevailing
discourses reflect the political consensus at the apex of the political structure.384 By
reflecting on these narratives and the strategies states employ across different categories of

Such an approach is consistent with the international society approach. See Cornelia Navari, “English
School Methodology,” in Cornelia Navari and Daniel M. Green (eds.), Guide to the English School in
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statecraft, we can reasonably conjecture about temporary tendencies, i.e., grand-strategic
orientations, and how these diverge from the longer-term tendency of pursuing raison de
système or raison d’état.
Figure 4. 1. Causal Mechanism and Observable Implications

4.2. MEASURING “ELITE RESPONSIBILITY”
This section concerns the complications surrounding what decision-makers say, or believe,
and what they consequently do. How do the ruling elites of a state give meaning to their
state in world politics, and how can we begin to think about their preferences? Theories of
foreign policy invoke elite beliefs or, minimally, preferences to explain state behavioral
outcomes.385 For most materially-driven theories, the national interest is the byproduct of
FPEs’ consequentialist and utility-maximizing modus operandi. Additionally, the inclusion
of social factors like international society, which is unavoidable once iterative relations
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form between proximate states, also necessitates an examination of FPEs. In this latter
interpretation, FPEs internalize deeper cultural and normative principles of reciprocity,
coexistence, and pursuit of common interest much akin to the logic of appropriateness.
Their notion of the national interest is, therefore, that which also serves the broader
interests of the international society. Since international society is an abstract idea, we can
only infer through the institutional manifestation of states’ behaviors and the discourses of
public officials.386 Since governments are comprised of people socialized within national
and international institutional contexts, they are more likely to follow established rules and
standard operating procedures. In the long-term, grand strategy impels states towards the
preservation of international order. Attempting to measure the existence of this abstract
notion, or the degree to which it is manifest is best achieved through an analysis of officials’
discourses and their coincidence international outcomes.
The causal mechanism under scrutiny here treats discourses not as prima facie
evidence of a functioning international society but as an imperfect mirror into the FPEs’
thought processes with respect to why anyone would want these commodious arrangements
in the first place. Expressed differently, what FPEs say is not automatically proof of a
functioning international society, but that words may be evidence for preferences,
collectively held by FPEs, that make qualities we associate with international society
possible in the first place.
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4.2.1. On Strategic Narratives
Strategic narratives may be an appropriate phenomenon to study. These are discursive
constructions of “shared meaning of the past, present, and future of international politics
to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors.”387 In a sense, they are “stories
with political purpose.”388 In this research, strategic narratives are employed as an
analytical frame that potentially reveals what FPEs think about international order. Similar
to institutions, Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle argue that strategic narratives about
international actors “structure expectations about international relations.”389
Recalling that the general idea of “Elite Responsibility” is related to FPEs
subjective assessment of projected trends in their gains or losses, the strategic narrative
perspective can reveal much about FPEs satisfaction with international order and their
overall willingness to uphold international order. Satisfaction, or not, with a given
international arrangement may, in fact, originate from ideas or identity-based
dissatisfaction that in no way relates to rational and utility-based explanations. This
dissertation cannot solve the problem of whether abstractions of decision-makers ought to
be studied as acting based on the logic of consequences or logic of appropriateness.390 The
very notion of a raison de systéme suggests that what is appropriate in international

See Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin, and Laura Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication
Power and the New World Order (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), p. 3.
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relations can sometimes be useful too; restrain, and self-negation can serve dual purposes.
Without taking a definitive position, studying what actors say it is nevertheless helpful
because there is an unavoidable relationship between speech, thought, and action, and it is
possible to make inferences about this relationship at least in very circumscribed ways.
Much can be inferred by FPEs narratives and their likelihood of preferring restraint
and international collaboration to the naked pursuit of self-interest even at the cost of
undermining order. We would expect FPEs to disseminate discourses consistent with their
material interests and values. So long a state has sufficient resources and does not face vital
threats, elites are less constrained to engage in policies designed for short-term selfaggrandizement. Elites are likely to be more cooperative internationally if they identify
their state within the international architecture; that their state belongs to the international
order. FPEs attitudes are of paramount importance because their words carry weight even
when uttered with hypocrisy and deceit. In the all too matter of preserving international
order, it is inconceivable that even the most hawkish foreign policy actors would betray
anything more than a dovish disposition. One can safely bet that even the most brazen acts
of national self-aggrandizement will be couched in the innocuous language of international
law, rights, and legitimacy. There will be a disjuncture in the stated goals elites and the
behavioral outcomes of states. Does this mean that any scholarly enterprise that examines
the speech-acts of leaders is fundamentally flawed?
Firstly, and contrary to the previous assertion, the fact that decision-makers employ
sanitary language or attempt to justify their policies and agendas suggest that there is a
normative component to international politics. By studying the coincidence of a given
discourse in the run-up to, and duration of, a significant event helps to reveal how decision166

makers think about world politics. We can extrapolate from leaders’ compulsive need to
justify, both domestically and internationally, their behavior tangible evidence for the
abstract notions of international society, international order, legitimacy, and common
interest.
Secondly, and more significantly, speech-acts often create expediencies and
sensitivities that can trap their wielders. The dissonance created from contradictions in
what is preached and practiced cannot be maintained indefinitely unless a favorable
strategic and material context can sustain it. Strategic narratives matter to the extent that
they reveal how FPEs think about international order and legitimacy in international
society. Most importantly, strategic narratives frame FPEs policy justifications and helps
to infer their utility function with respect to preserving, reforming, or challenging
international order. To underscore the importance of strategic narratives, one need also
remember that narratives also serve an instrumental function. They may not necessarily
reflect the real beliefs of FPEs. Narratives, however, serve a purpose because they are
deliberative. Verbal and codified communication in international politics is the product of
a collective effort by and represents the interests of, many agencies, actors, and powerful
decision-makers. As alluring as it may be to attempt a detailed analysis of the multitude of
organizations and bureaucracies that make up a state, it is impractical to penetrate the
morass of decision-making.391
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Just because decisionmakers declare something does not mean that this will
immediately and of necessity translate into policy action at every echelon of government.
As Bureaucratic and Organizational Theory approaches have noted, politics within the state
impedes the efficient translation of ever elastic national interest into coherent policy.392
Standard operating procedures, organizational cultures, and intra/inter-departmental
competition, among a host of factors, impede policy implementation. Attempting to link
the policy discourses and interests (declared or not) of the highest echelons of foreign
policy executives is, therefore, a fruitless task. Nevertheless, this does not mean that foreign
policy executives are not decisive, particularly in the cases of the U.S. and China. Top
decision-makers are hardly helpless bystanders. Most importantly, the scope of our analysis
concerns the creation of ideal-type grand-strategic orientations, which itself is
conceptualized as an overall tendency of a state’s behavior albeit in a briefer time period
as compared to grand strategy.
4.2.2. Content Analysis of Strategic Narratives
There is no formal way to study strategic narratives. Depending on the researcher’s
assumptions, textual analysis can be achieved in a circumscribed way that highlights
instrumental rationality on the one hand, and a rich poststructural analysis on the other.393
While a discourse analysis is highly useful to ascertain the presence of certain invocations,
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it would be difficult to demonstrate variations overtime without ways to depict them. To
this end, the study employs a simple content analysis.
Krippendorff describes content analysis as “a research technique for making
replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of
their use,” while, Nuendorf defines content analysis as “the systematic, objective,
quantitative analysis of message characteristics.”394 The purpose of content analysis is to
analyze otherwise non-quantitative empirical data such as speeches, interviews, and social
media posts, and other types of texts. When doing content analysis, the researcher applies
a theoretical framework to create a codebook, code a textual data with a defined unit of
analysis, reach empirical findings, and analyze their meanings. In this research, the goal of
the content analysis will be to ascertain FPEs’ disposition towards international order in a
given period, and its variation over time, which will then be compared with the coincidence
of our main cause and effects in a given period. Using further primary evidence and
secondary sources can help to trace the causal processes.
There are two categories of narratives that are of interest to this analysis.
Narratives that relate to FPEs’ 1) expected utility with respect to gains and losses and 2)
their satisfaction with international order. Overtime changes (1990-2016) in these two
“variables” in the foreign policy speeches of U.S. and Chinese FPEs form the crux of the
investigation. In addition to a simple word count of FPEs utterances relating to satisfaction
(or lack thereof) and framing of expected utility, a more detailed analysis is conducted at
the sentence level to identify dominant narratives.
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The dictionary developed in this research fleshes out satisfaction-related as well as
expected-utility related narratives. The first group of words conveys narratives about losses
and gains; narratives about the positive or negative consequences of actions (or lack
thereof). The second cluster of words was selected based on FPEs’ sentiments and the use
of words that may signify cooperative intent, satisfaction or, conversely, hostile intent or
dissatisfaction. Through a simple analysis conducted by NVIVO 12, it was possible to
obtain a year-by-year understanding of the frequency of usage of clusters of words relating
to the two dimensions of elite narratives.
To better measure the possible link between grand-strategic orientations and the
distillation of FPEs’ preferences into narratives at the UN a degree of context and
discursive interpretation is mandatory. This was possible through a sentence-level analysis.
Based on the dictionary, the researcher developed a codebook (see Table 4.1.) and
identified each sentence as relating to perceptions of (1) gains OR (2) losses, AND (3)
dissatisfaction (raison d’état) OR (4) satisfaction (raison de systéme) or left (0) un-coded.
Each of these discourses are therefore present each year. By noting the percentages of the
text dedicated to certain discourses, i.e., changes in the incidence of certain discourses, it
was possible to examine discursive trends among FPEs at the UN. The coding ignored
topics such as health, the environment, and economics (with the exception of narratives
concerning the global economic order).
Intercoder reliability was achieved by the voluntary contributions of two graduate
students with social science training. To complement this researcher’s analysis, both were
asked to code a total of seven speeches, chosen at random, making sure to examine at least
three speeches from both U.S. and Chinese Speeches at the UNGA. It is often more
170

appropriate to report intercoder reliability to with a Cohen’s Kappa in order to control for
randomness, i.e., coders may reach an agreement by chance. In this case, however, there
are enough possible narratives (nodes) to select from, rendering such randomness
calculation unnecessary. Since NVIVO 12 offers the possibility of conducting an
intercoder reliability analysis based on a percentage of agreement on the selected text, this
was selected as the more appropriate one. The analysis yielded a respectable 71% similarity
for seven U.S. speeches, while the seven Chinese speeches yielded an excellent 87%
similarity.
Table 4.1. Coding Rule Book
“Discourse”

Description

EXPECTED UTILITY
Gains

Code if FPE elicits positive framing, reveals expectations
of gains, highlights projected positive consequences of
actions, utters "hopeful" messages. E.g., “We hope that
these purposes and objectives will be observed and
carried out effectively in the interest of the security of all
countries.” Qichen 1992

Losses

Code if FPE engages in negative framing, references to
dire consequences of actions (or lack thereof),
highlighting
of
negative
outcomes,
negative
forecasting/returns,
uses
language
indicating
ambivalence and uncertainty. E.g. “On the contrary, the
world remains uneasy, with new problems added to the
old ones and armed conflicts erupting one after another
as a result of disrupted equilibrium.” Qichen, 1992

ORDER NARRATIVE
Dissatisfaction
Criticize
Previous Policy

Code if FPE expresses dissatisfaction towards previous
or existing policy by UN, UN member, or about
international order in general. E.g. “No one can deny
that the old international economic order, being
irrational and inequitable, is an important external cause
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“Discourse”

Description
of the poverty and backwardness
countries.” Qichen 1992

of

developing

Exceptionalism

Code if FPE refers to domestic politics, praises self or
administration, or elicits populist rhetoric. E.g. “Since my
election, we’ve added $10 trillion in wealth.” Trump,
2018

Justice Demand

Code if FPE uses language to indicate dissatisfaction over
lack of representation or asymmetric power relations. Do
not code if specifically referring to U.S., E.g. “A new
international order should be based on the universal
observance of the five principles of mutual respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, non-interference in each other's internal
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful
coexistence.” Qichen 1992

JustificationPretext

Code if FPE is providing a reasoning/justification for a
policy that might be considered as being controversial.
E.g. “For this reason, we are systematically
renegotiating broken and bad trade deals. Last month,
we announced a ground-breaking U.S.-Mexico trade
agreement.” Trump, 2018

Negative
Relations
with
Peer
Competitors

Code if FPE utters negative comments about other great
and superpower states. i.e., China, USSR/Russia, U.S.A.
E.g., “China’s market distortions and the way they deal
cannot be tolerated.” Trump, 2018

Sovereignty

Code if FPE highlights sovereignty (and other related
themes of nationalism) and problematizes violations of
its sovereignty. E.g., “Secondly, all countries, and
especially the big Powers, must strictly abide by the
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of
other countries.” Qichen 1990

Satisfaction
Commend
Existing Policy

Code if FPE praises a past or ongoing policy by the UN,
or member of the UN. E.g. “The United States and the
former Soviet Union or Russia have reached some new
agreements on nuclear-arms reduction in recent years.
These agreements have been well-received by the
international community, which hopes that they will be
earnestly implemented by the countries concerned.”
Qichen 1992
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“Discourse”

Description

Common
Interest

Code if FPE invokes common interests of all states,
especially statements affirming that national and
international interests are mutually inclusive. E.g.,
“Stability and development in China not only benefit the
Chinese people but also contribute to peace in Asia and
the world as a whole, China needs stability and the world
needs a stable China.” Qichen, 1990

Internationalism

Code if FPE utters anything positive about diplomacy,
free trade, open borders, benefits of cooperation etc. Do
not code if the reference is made to multilateralism or
collective action. E.g. “It has always been a shared
aspiration and objective of the people of all countries to
work for world peace, national stability, social progress,
economic growth, and a better life.” Qichen, 1992

Legally
grounded
rebuke

Code if FPE: Rebukes/insults justified by UN resolutions
and other international laws and treaty obligations. I.E.,
"Iraq has failed to comply with UNSC Resolution 763.
and continues to illegally occupy Kuwait."

Positive
Relations
with
Peer
Competitors

Code if FPE makes positive/supportive comments about
China, USSR/Russia, U.S.A. E.g. “So we will defend
these principles while encouraging China and other
claimants to resolve their differences peacefully.”
Obama, 2015

Reform

Code if FPE (probably Chinese) speaks of reforming
international order or specific aspects like the UN. E.g.
“The reform of the United Nations is now on the agenda,
and its success depends on sound principles and on
choosing the right direction. We should like to offer for
consideration the following thoughts, which we think
conform to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations Charter. The reform should contribute to
maintaining the sovereignty of the Member States”
Qichen, 1992
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4. 3. ON DATA SELECTION
The content analysis was conducted on a selection of UNGA speeches by American and
Chinese FPEs in the 1990-2016 period.395 A selection of other context-related speeches
and documents from similar international fora was also included to produce the year by
year changes. Other primary and secondary sources provide evidence for the congruence
procedures to narrate the linkages between strategic environment, FPEs, and strategies
employed by both states throughout the stated period. This subsection briefly discusses the
rationale for the selected data.
In what sense is the selected data appropriate for this dissertation’s intended
contribution? Limiting one’s sources to UNGA speeches, samples of other publicly
available official documents, and foreign policy speeches seem too simple. There is,
however, a method to this seeming lapse of judgment. The first issue is a practical one
about the nature of our interlocutors. This research defines FPEs as an aggregate albeit an
exclusive group of decision-makers who exercise disproportionately-high influence over
national security and foreign policy. Thus, heads of state, government, and chief cabinet
officials from foreign and defense ministries, as well as their immediate advisors constitute
this exclusive group. Limiting the inquiry in this way is certainly a disservice to other
echelons of the relevant state bureaucracies whose functionaries plan and execute policy.
The same applies to interest groups and other networks such as policy-making communities
that influence FPEs.
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Secondly, what FPEs say at the UN or other important international fora often
reflect deliberation and attention to detail on the part of FPEs, their advisors, and relevant
officials from the foreign policy bureaucracy. Examining speeches and documents at the
level of the UN, therefore, is an excellent way to assess what designs FPEs wish to advance
with respect to international order; whether it is to draw support for rebuking certain
countries, making palatable the use of force, or signaling willingness to cooperate. In
contrast to traditional operational code as well as leader-specific content analyses where
intimate and unstructured interviews or speeches may yield stronger inferences about the
beliefs and thought processes of one’s subject, the formality of UN speeches and other
major foreign policy speeches are more useful to infer FPEs’ preferences.396
Thirdly, since all states receive formal representation through speeches delivered
either by heads of state, government, or other FPEs, we can construe speeches and debates
from the UNGA Plenary Sessions as a common denominator across the cases serving as a
referent conducive for comparisons. The target audience, the format, and length of
speeches, their availability in English, and their general accessibility, make these speeches
ideal for cross-country analysis. Speeches delivered by American and Chinese FPEs in the
period from 1990-2016 can reveal much about foreign policy priorities, the issues that
decision-makers seek to legitimate, as well as the type of policies states intend to pursue.
This is a major discursive arena in which raison d’état and raison de systéme are formally
articulated and justified.

396

See Goddard and Krebs, “Rhetoric, Legitimation, and Grand Strategy,” p. 11.

175

Fourthly, examining speeches and documents, especially those with broad global
audiences, is eminently sensible because FPEs deploy strategic narratives as tools of
legitimation as well as framing devices for desired policy ends that can help to mobilize
one’s population, while also signaling intent to other countries. When American and
Chinese FPEs communicate to the world, they signal their policy designs, cooperative
intent, and convey threats. The broader the audience, therefore, the more powerful the
intended the message.
Fifthly, using speeches from the UNGA rather than UNSC is critically important,
especially in the case of China. As Ferdinand as well as Shambaugh note, China’s voting
patterns and policy dispositions vary between UNGA and UNSC.397 In the latter, China is
infinitely more pragmatic as its voting behavior is virtually the same as most other
permanent members, including the U.S. In contrast, China is more likely to follow an
assertive path at the UNGA where its voting patterns differ significantly from that of the
U.S. In this sense, subjecting UNGA speeches to a rigorous analysis is likelier to produce
a more honest interpretation of Chinese strategic narratives.
Finally, the UN is the lynchpin of the Liberal International Order due to its role in
global governance and conflict management. Moreover, in the “post-war” era, decisions
concerning the major and sustained use of force often pass through the UNGA and UNSC.
Critics may rightly point to the inefficacy of the UN, its failure to prevent or preempt
conflict or even criticize its lack of independent capabilities, or that the UN is a shackle to
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Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), esp. chapter 5.
397

176

decisive action. This, however, misses a major point about the UN. It is a tool to legitimate
state policy and to change or reinforce aspects of international order. In fact, more often
than not, U.S. Presidents have sought UN (and NATO) approval to complement the
Presidential War Powers Act to circumvent domestic restrictions on the use of force.398
With all due respect to Winston Churchill and Harold MacMillan, then, the UN System is
where “jaw-jaw” is inexorably linked to “war-war.”399

4. 4. CASES
As discussed earlier, the empirical chapters respectively provide an overview of American
and Chinese grand strategy in the post-Cold War period. Both chapters proceed
chronologically, breaking down the period under review based on their incumbent heads
of state. While grand-strategic orientations transcend top executives due to various sources
of continuity, heads of state nevertheless serve as a convenient temporal referent that can
be linked to the strategies of statecraft under scrutiny (see chapter 3). These “mini” or
“within” case provide a historically-grounded analysis that addresses the following points
of inquiry:
1. What type of observable strategies did the state elicit in this period along the three
dimensions under scrutiny (i.e., use of force and attitude towards allies, attitude
towards other great powers, and attitude towards international law)?
2. Were there any foreign policy outcomes that the literature would consider as
constituting a challenge to international order?
3. What was the material context of the international system in this period?
Permissive or Restrictive?
4. How do FPE discourses at the UN, and other applicable fora, characterize their
attitude towards international order?
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See, most prominently, Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power [Third Edition] (Lawrence, KA: University
Press of Kansas, 2013).
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Winston Churchill quoted in Strobe Talbott, The Great Experiment: The Story of Ancient Empires, Modern
States, and the Quest for A Global Nation (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2008), p. 3.

177

Based on the available data, several outcomes are outlined tables 4. 2. And 4. 3., and
elaborated upon in the empirical chapters (5 and 6) of this study.

Table 4. 2. U.S. Grand-Strategic Orientations in the Post-Cold War
Years

Permissive
Environment

Risk
Propensity

Satisfaction

Predicted
Order
Orientation
CONFORM/
REFORM

Bush I

1989-1993

RESTRICTIVE400

LOW

HIGH

Clinton

1993-2001

PERMISSIVE

MODERATE

HIGH

REFORM

Bush II

2001-2009

PERMISSIVE401

HIGH

LOW

CHALLENGE

Obama

2009-2017

RESTRICTIVE

MODERATE

MODERATE

RETRENCH

Primary
Observable
Strategies
Multilateralism
Restraint
Enmeshment
Leadership
Expansionism
Reformism
Unilateralism
Imperialism
Radicalism
Withdrawal
Appeasement
Conservatism

Table 4 .3. Chinese Grand-Strategic Orientations in the Post-Cold War
Years

Permissive
Environment

Prospect
Framing

Satisfaction
Framing
LOW

Predicted
Order
Orientation
RETRENCH

Primary
Observable
Strategies
Withdrawal
Appeasement
Conservativism

ShangKun
&
Zemin

19882001

RESTRICTIVE

MODERATE

Zemin &
Jintao

20012010

RESTRICTIVE

HIGH

HIGH

CONFORM

Multilateralism
Restraint
Enmeshment

Jiping

2010Present

PERMISSIVE

HIGH

HIGH

REFORM

Leadership
Expansionism
Reformism

400

The immediate aftermath of the Cold War is somewhat of an exception due to continuities inherent to the
quick transition process. The restrictive environment of bipolarity quickly gave way. Nevertheless, attaining
unipolarity midway into his presidency could not have translated into dramatic foreign change under George
H. W. Bush.
401

Note that under the period of study, the international environment for U.S. is always permissive as far as
capabilities are concerned, but ambiguities over threats, opportunities, and the relative availability of allied
support appears to matter the most.
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4. 5. LIMITATIONS
As a purely-theory driven enterprise on the nature of grand strategy and order, this
dissertation is culpable due to its obvious case-selection bias. It focuses on the present
international system and the foreign policy of the “unipole” and the rising challenger. The
theory, and research design could benefit from casting a wider net and subjecting the theory
to further tests by exploring non-superpower cases (which would provide a greater
variation in terms of “freedom of action)” as well as different historical periods. Due to
considerable constraints, the researcher professes that these topics are best left for future
projects.
Another obvious issue with this research is, on one hand, its desire to provide an
alternative framing to a particularly interesting phenomenon of America’s predilection for
“revisionism,” and, on the other, the non-event that is Chinese restraint. Bringing to bear
the contextual and discursive evidence upon behavioral outcomes is easier to manage when
there is a clear and dramatic shift in the national agenda, as in the case of America’s orderreforming and order-challenging. America’s peripheral wars in the 1990s and 2000s depict
similar phenomena but differ in their build-up and outcome; or as argued in Chapter IV,
the U.S. went from primarily order-reforming to order-challenging.
The use of strategic narratives and content analysis in such a way so as to reduce
them to a secondary role in the research design is also questionable. This researcher is
nevertheless adamant that this design affords a comparatively robust way to glean crucial
elements about foreign policy executives based on a content analysis driven analysis. A
simple provision of secondary sources or discourse analysis would not have sufficed to
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reveal the aspirations and insecurities of FPEs and their carefully constructed narrative
about international order.
As a standalone theory of grand strategy, the present approach evinces similarities
to prominent foreign policy theories, such as those offered by coalitional theories and
diversionary war theories as well as balance-of-risk theory. Different from these theories,
the present approach nevertheless explains restraint as well. Moreover, the inclusion by
way of elite preferences of international society is a unique contribution worth further
consideration.
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5

THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE TO INTERNATIONAL ORDER

5.1. INTRODUCTION
Our original puzzle was the unexpected “revisionist” tendencies of the one state that ought
to be most satisfied (U.S.A.) with international order. The puzzling foreign policy of the
U.S. has had a deleterious effect in recent decades on the international order it had worked
so hard to create. As we are attempting to reform this vocabulary, it would be incorrect to
label the U.S. as a revisionist state, though it acts comparable to one. It is not, moreover,
inevitable that a great-power state of the U.S.’ caliber is preordained to undermine
international order since it acted with utmost restraint when structural factors least
constrained it.402 Nor does the idea of an otherwise-consistent U.S. grand strategy,
punctuated by occasional interjections of endogenous variables, do justice to the full gamut
of behaviors. American efforts to construct, reinforce, and, at times, undermine
international order is a variegated process that requires elaboration in this chapter.
To find the underlying cause of order-challenging behavior, we also need to
examine the circumstances in which the U.S. employed other types of strategies. To this
end, this chapter offers a stylized history of the post-Cold War U.S. grand strategy to
illustrate the grand-strategic orientations of the U.S. over time-based on existing material
and discursive forces, as well as the strategic dispositions of succeeding U.S.
administrations. Each of the subsections follows the standard formula elaborated in

402

For example, some argue that unilateralism is the standard modus operandi of America and
multilateralism, especially during the unipolar moment, was nothing more than an aberration. See Skidmore,
The Unilateralist Temptation; Bradley F. Podliska, Acting Alone: The Scientific Study of U.S. Hegemony and
the Unilateral Use-of-Force Decision Making (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010).
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Chapter 4, inquiring as to the type of strategies exhibited in U.S. grand strategy. Thus, each
period under study addresses the matter of how and in what manner did U.S. use force in
this period, how it comported its relations with other great powers, and to what extent its
conduct conformed to norms and international law. The subsections also highlight
legitimacy issues and consequences of U.S. conduct on international order at appropriate
junctures. Before anything else, however, it is useful to revisit important debates on U.S.
grand strategy.
5.2. U.S. GRAND STRATEGY IN THE POST-COLD WAR
While the literature review in Chapter 2 sought comprehensive answers to the problem of
state behavior towards international order more broadly, understanding the controversy of
American grand strategy requires an examination of false dichotomies surrounding the
origins and ambitions of American foreign policy. This section, therefore, briefly considers
the literature on American grand strategy in the post-Cold War. U.S. grand strategy is
subject rife with much controversy and abounds in critiques dedicated to its many
failures.403 The overarching question concerning U.S. grand strategy is, does the U.S. have
a consistent grand strategy? A common argument is that since the early days of the Cold
War, U.S. has not only reacted to the structural threat posed by the Soviet Union, but also
consistently pursued a grand strategy based around several important security-based
principles such as ensuring U.S. preponderance, but also promoting a liberal world order.404
For critiques of American grand strategy, see John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Case for
Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy.” See, also, Graham Slater, “Foreign Policy Evaluation
and the Utility of Intervention,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Florida International University, 2017).
403

Partick Porter, “Why America’s Grand Strategy Has Not Changed Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign
Policy Establishment,” International Security, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Spring, 2018), pp. 9–46; Walt, The Hell of
Good Intentions; Layne, Peace of Illusions; Paul D. Miller, “Five Pillars of American Grand Strategy,”
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 54, No. 4 (2012), pp. 7-44.
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Despite possessing overwhelming military capabilities, American FPEs viewed the
Soviet Union as a credible and existential threat. The restrictive environment of bipolarity
disciplined American and allied FPEs towards the common purpose of containing the
Soviet Union. Even when changing material circumstances allowed for alternative
approaches, such as when the restrictive conditions of the 1960s and 70s made Détente an
attractive alternative, the overall intellectual framework remained the same. The U.S.
continued to build up the institutional architecture of the Liberal International Order to
further cement the Western alliance and showed a willingness to act as an anchor by
providing free security and paying the costs of maintaining an open trading system as
hegemons are apt to do.405
Some have also argued that the U.S. has consistently pursued a grand strategy
aimed at global domination (aka primacy) due either to the dictates of the international
system or, per Realist parlance, domestic maladaptations that fuel unnecessary
expansionism or activism. If the latter, then by what mechanism? It is possible to trace
exuberances to any number of unique qualities to the U.S., from materially grounded
factors such as domestic economic and class interests (i.e., imperial coalitions) to ideational
and cultural factors, or a combination of them.406 Some of these popular prescriptive grand

Arthur L. Stein, “The Hegemon’s Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International
Economic Order,” International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring, 1984), p. 386.
405

Dueck, Reluctant Crusader; Layne, The Peace of Illusions; Benjamin Miller, “Explaining Changes in U.S.
Grand Strategy: 9/11, the Rise of Offensive Liberalism, and the War in Iraq,” Security Studies, Vol. 19, No.
1 (2010), pp. 26–65, especially pp. 28–32; Trubowitz, Politics and Strategy; Andrew J. Bacevich, The New
American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) John J.
Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and American Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Farrar,
Straus, and Giroux, 2007); Walt, Hell of Good Intentions. For the effects of domestic politics more generally,
see, Richard N. Rosecrance and Arthur A. Sein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1993); Benjamin O. Fordham, "Domestic Politics, International Pressure, and the
406
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strategies are explored in Table 5. 1. below and matched to their corresponding grandstrategic orientions.
Table 5.1. Prescriptive U.S. Grand Strategies407
Theory

Neo-Isolationism

Approximate
OrderOrientation
Retrenching

Use of Force
Style

Great Powers

International Law

Withdrawal/
Minimalism
Minimalism/
Multilateral
Multilateral

Appeasement

Conservatism

Off-Shore
Balancing
Restraint

Retrenching/
Conforming
Conforming

Restraint
Restraint

Conservatism/
Enmeshment
Enmeshment

Selective
Engagement
Cooperative
Security
Primacy

Conforming/
Reforming
Reforming

Leadership
Leadership

Restraint/
Expansionism
Expansionism

Enmeshment/
Reformism
Reformism

Challenging

Unilateralism

Imperialism

Radicalism

The fundamental issue presently is an apparent absence of purpose as the
geopolitical ennui of the Post-Cold War left the U.S. without a comprehensive vision for a
grand strategy that proved to be an adequate replacement for Containment. The U.S., in
other words, lacks a security referent around which to construct an intellectual framework
for policy because only an existential threat on the same level as the Soviet Union could
provide that kind of discipline.408 Despite this, many argue that the U.S. grand strategy has
remained consistently expansionist even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The U.S.’

Allocation of American Cold War Military Spending," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 64, No. 1 (February,
2002), pp. 63-88.
407

See Robert Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Posen and
Ross, “Competing Visions”; Layne, Peace of Illusions; Walt and Mearsheimer, “The Case For Offshore
Balancing.”
Jean Davidson, “UCI Scientists Told Moscow's Aim Is to Deprive U.S. of Foe,” Los Angeles Times
(December 12, 1988).
408
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sustained, ambitious and far-reaching policies have prompted a plethora of scholarly
arguments in favor of moderating American grand strategy, promoting instead, restraint
and multilateralism among other things. 409
Regarding the empirical implications of this study, and on the matter of continuity
of U.S. grand strategy, this chapter positions itself among works arguing in favor of
continuity in U.S. behavior but that there were periods of limited deviation within
something akin to a cycle. There were periods during the Cold War when the U.S. was
more willing to antagonize the Soviet Union, and periods, like Détente when the U.S.
reverted to a balance of power dynamic. The Post-Cold War also follows a similar logic,
as explained below. This idea is also apropos today when it has become commonplace to
talk about the “Blob,” the unflattering title referring to the American foreign policy elite.
They reside in a sort of intellectual bubble where each member possesses a strong
internationalist vocation and touts the virtues of “Liberal Hegemony,” which according to
Walt has become the default grand strategy of the U.S. after the collapse of the Soviet
Union. The main issue for such an argument would be that it is difficult to ascribe to the
blob all of the problems and excesses of U.S. foreign policy since it was, technically,
successful during the Cold War and demonstrated a credible commitment to a well-
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See Table 5.1. below for an overview of how different prescriptive approaches to U.S. grand strategy fit
into this dissertation overall framework. Art, A New Grand Strategy for America; Posen, Restraint;
Mearsheimer, Case for Offshore Balancing; Layne, Peace of Illusions; Walt, Hell of Good Intentions Cf.
Dueck, Reluctant Crusader, esp. chapter 5; Wohlforth and Brooks; Hal Brands and Peter D. Feaver, “Should
America Retrench?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 95, No. 6 (November/December 2016), pp. 164–172, at pp. 168–
169. Also implied by Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment, pp. 339; Tudor Onea, “Immoderate Greatness
Is Great Power Restraint a Practical Grand Strategy? “European Journal of International Security, Vol. 2,
No. 1 (February, 2017), pp. 111-132.
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functioning international order.410 Even if the fundamental goal of the blob is to promote
U.S. primacy, then why does U.S. grand strategy sometimes prefers multilateralism and
international cooperation as a vehicle to promote primacy and other times jeopardizes not
only international order but its preeminent position as well?
The solution lies in assessing how decision-makers think about international order
(as measured by their words) because regardless of values or other interests, decisionmakers have limited ways to think about their situation: are they satisfied, or not, and how
much resources are they likely to commit?

5.3. MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND DISCURSIVE CONTEXT
This section deliberates on the material circumstances of the U.S. in the post-Cold War and
how succeeding U.S. Presidents (and other FPEs) have advanced certain narratives about
international order. The previous inquiry, achieved through an examination of U.S. military
spending and its latent capabilities measured according to the Composite Index of National
Capabilities, will illustrate the overall potential freedom of action U.S. potentially enjoyed.
The latter analysis, meanwhile, illustrates the analysis developed in Chapter 4 as it applies
to the U.S. case.

5.3.1. Material Capabilities
Military-Economic capabilities are a decisive factor in world politics and determine not
only a state’s ambitions but also the freedom of action to pursue them. In this research, the

Stephen Wertheim raises this point in response to Stephen Walt. See Idem. “The Hell of Good Intentions,”
(Speech Washington DC: CATO Institute, October 17, 2018). See, also, Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, pp.
66-68.
410
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primary cause for grand-strategic orientations is a variation in the international
environment: whether it is restrictive or permissive. Thus, while material preponderance is
worth exploring as it engenders ambitious grand strategies, contingent factors such as
emergent threats (potentially, something that FPEs assess subjectively) and opportunities
need an introduction at appropriate junctures in the analysis (below). The Composite Index
of National Capabilities (CINC), has consistently ranked the U.S. as either the top or
second-ranked power in the past decades.411 CINC uses indicators such as military
expenditure, military personnel, various economic indicators such as energy and steel
production, and population to rank all nations over time between 1816 and, as of its most
recent iteration, 2012.
Figure 5.1. U.S. Military Expenditure Compared to China, 1990-2017
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All figures based on Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major
Power War, 1820-1965,” 19-48 and augmented by World Bank Open Data. URL:
https://data.worldbank.org/, Last Accessed: November 11, 2018.
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Figure 5.2. U.S. Military Spending % of GDP, Compared to China, 1990-2017
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Figure 5.3. U.S. vs. China CINC Scores, 1990-2012

CINC falls short in various ways due to its overdetermination of 19th and 20thcentury metrics of military-economic power and overemphasizing national population,
which skews rankings for populous states like India, Indonesia, and China especially which
often ranks higher than the U.S. despite being dwarfed by its military expenditure.
Furthermore, by ignoring significant force multipliers such as technological prowess, troop
quality, doctrine, and deployment, CINC provides only a rough sketch. Nevertheless, it has
proven to be a venerable means to illustrate the overall distribution of military capabilities
globally.
Figure 5.4. below illustrates the military prowess of the U.S. recently (2014) by the
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global percentage of power projection systems/platforms it possesses. The data
unambiguously shows that the U.S. spends more on defense, not only in absolute terms but
also as a proportion of GDP as compared to China. Furthermore, between 1990-2018, U.S.
military spending fluctuated only slightly with minor dips after the Gulf War, i.e.,
reductions during the first Clinton term, and notably again after 2011 until the Trump
presidency, at which point U.S. military spending reached its peak.
Figure 5.4. Comparing the Distribution of Power Between Major Powers in 2014412

412

Brooks and Wohlforth, America Abroad., p. 20.
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Posen, as well as Brooks and Wohlforth, points to the importance of material
capabilities in conjunction with consideration of the command of the commons, the
availability of weapons system as well as platforms capable of power projection beyond its
hemisphere.413

When considered holistically, the metrics point to an overwhelming

American material edge over the next five most capable states. Figure 5.4., for instance,
quantifies the overwhelming material advantage that the U.S. presently enjoys, which
demonstrates how the present international system is permissive for the U.S. regarding its
freedom of action to pursue ambitious grand strategies. The international system in the
period under study has virtually always been permissive for the U.S. by metrics of power.
Matters of permissiveness and restrictiveness as a perceptual constraint is a different
matter. In the case of the former, the absence of clear rivals and predictable threats militate
against cohesive policy formation and empower less-than-grand strategies. System-level
permissiveness can facilitate risk-acceptance in situations of uncertainty, especially when
decision-makers perceive themselves to be in the domain of losses, or when dissatisfaction
with international order is, overall, high.
5.3.2. Content Analysis of Narratives
For this research, U.S. FPEs represent the most influential decision-makers, and the
immediate officials and advisors responsible for foreign policy. These include U.S.
Presidents, NSC Advisors, Secretaries of State, and other officials as dictated by the
context. The content analysis focuses primarily on U.S. Presidents and their speeches. Of
thirty-five speeches by U.S. FPEs at the UNGA Plenary Sessions between 1990-2018,

413

See Posen, “Command of the Commons”; Brooks and Wohlforth, America Abroad.
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reveals several key ideas about what the U.S. communicated to the world, within the halls
of the top international public forum in the past three decades.
The first implication is the commonsensical observation, albeit an important one
since it validates the overall theoretical and methodological premise of the study. There is
a degree of overlap between narratives suggesting satisfaction and dissatisfaction with
positive versus negative framings respectively. That is dissatisfaction narratives and lossframing, and satisfaction narratives and gains-framing overlap despite their mutually
exclusive coding. When plotted on charts (see figures 5.5 and 5.6 below), the overtime
trends in the data showcase this tendency with greater clarity within the circumscribed
parameters of the present analysis.414
The trendline (figure 5. 5.) suggests that in the post-Cold War period, U.S. FPEs
have increasingly made more references to expected losses, uttered more sentences
denoting uncertainty, more frequently drawn attention to the negative consequences of
unfolding international drama, and, overall, expressed greater ambivalence about
America’s fortunes. American FPEs have increasingly made more references that would
denote dissatisfaction with international order. References to American exceptionalism and
the U.S. national interest (but not also broader global interests), utterances signaling intent
for unilateral action, purely ideological and moralistic criticisms of UN members, and
criticism of other great powers increases over time. It is worth noting that while individual
narratives that reference some aspect of dissatisfaction remain low overall, spiking during
the Bush II administration and, later, with the Trump administrations, the overall trend does

414

See appendix for percentages of coding of individual documents.
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not change even when speeches from 2017 and 2018 are omitted to account for the dramatic
shift in narrative.
Conversely, U.S. FPEs have overtime made fewer references to potential benefits
or possible gains from multilateralism and collective action, professed less certainty about
the international system, and are less likely to underscore positive developments (see figure
5. 6. below). Furthermore, American FPEs made slightly-fewer references overtime
denoting satisfaction with international order. There is an overall decrease in
internationalist narratives as well as instances when global common interests feature ahead
of U.S. interests.
The second implication for the analysis is that the content of the speeches seem to
reflect prevailing developments in the international system, which vindicates the
theoretical of this research: that there is a relationship between what FPEs say and
international outcomes. With the benefit of hindsight, we can surmise that FPEs articulate
narratives in response to the evolving conjuncture, and to issues that matter to them, which
explains some of the variations in the speeches. The analysis does not suggest that
American FPEs purposefully choose certain words or narratives to communicate their
relative satisfaction with international order and thereby signal their full intentions to the
international community. The fact, however, that U.S. Presidents would bring up certain
narratives indicates that some issues are more salient than others, reflecting even if
imperfectly some of the sentiments, beliefs, and psychological dispositions of a group of
decision-makers with sufficient influence over the formulation and communication of
U.S.’ interests to the international community. We can conjecture, therefore, that American
FPEs might have felt greater satisfaction/dissatisfaction in certain periods and may have
192

had varying levels of risk-propensity accordingly. This research also corroborates an
essential finding on the use of force and risk propensities of U.S. presidents: use of force
to protect existing commitments is widely seen in the public as a popular move for
presidents while perceived “expansion” does not curry favors with voters and can be
considered as risk-taking.415

See Miroslav Nincic, “Loss Aversion and the Domestic Context of Military Intervention,” Political
Research Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 1 (March, 1997), pp. 97-120.
415
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Figure 5.5. U.S. FPEs’ narratives about satisfaction with international order416
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5.4. U.S. GRAND STRATEGY IN THE POST-COLD WAR REDUX
There are significant continuities in U.S. grand strategy during and after the Cold War. The
superimposition, under the auspices of the U.S., of a Liberal International Order upon the
traditional Westphalian international system in the second half of the twentieth century
shaped global patterns of amity and enmity on the bases of regimes’ loyalty to one
superpower patron or the other. This arrangement helped to secure peace among great
power states at the cost of fomenting debilitating proxy wars in the periphery, regime
changes, and a decline in the political pluralism that was a hallmark of traditional
international society. Nevertheless, bipolarity seems to have promoted much-needed
certainty, stability, and alliance cohesion. The end of the Cold War, however,
fundamentally altered the calculus by elevating the U.S. to the status of a unipole, thereby
placing the U.S. in a position to create a “new world order.”418
To reiterate the main argument, the Elite Responsibility Approach conjectures that
a favorable international environment and psychological proclivities towards positive
thinking vis-à-vis international order and FPEs’ perceived prospects initially encouraged
them to pursue, multilaterally, more ambitious policies abroad. As FPEs’ satisfaction with
international order dipped due to deteriorating circumstances, so too did U.S. grand
strategy become more unilateral.
What is important to note is that the unipolar moment did not translate into
unrestrained use of force by the unipole. Far from actively recreating a new world order by

See George H. W. Bush, “September 11, 1990: Address Before a Joint Session of
Congress,” (Washington DC: Congress of the United States of America, September 11,
1990).
418
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force, American conduct of foreign policy on distant regions unfolded with at least a
scintilla of deference to international society. Why would an ascendant unipole deign to
appease a significantly weaker foe like Iraq, carefully operate within a UN mandate, and
resist, after the operations, the opportunity to displace an autocratic leader?419 In fact, even
in the run-up to the operations in Iraq, U.S. FPEs were reluctant to use force and sought
diplomatic options, going so far as to appease Saddam.420 Beyond the matter of the use of
force, the U.S. also relinquished a historic opportunity to expand its power into the former
sphere of the collapsing Soviet Union.421 American restraint was also evident in
international law as the U.S. continued the trend of buttressing arms limitations regimes
while advocating a form of strategic enmeshment. Counterintuitively, then, the unipolar
moment coincided with an order-conforming grand-strategic orientation for the U.S.
American grand strategy evolved from less-ambitious order-conforming strategies
under George H. W. Bush (Bush I, hereafter) to a reforming disposition under the Clinton
administration as systemic developments not only enabled but also necessitated a more
significant investment of resources. The power vacuum and uncertainty left by the collapse
of the Soviet Union appears to have made American decision-makers think of themselves
as being solely responsible for the management of the international system. Absent a
superpower rival, and with the emergence of so many conflicts in the periphery, American

419

Especially considering that the same administration had no qualms about doing exactly that in Panama a
year earlier.
420

See Yetiv, Absence of Grand Strategy, pp. 5, 70, 170.

421

This appears to be a minor increment to the overall situation in the emerging post-Cold War security
structure. Cf. Shifrinson, Rising Titans, p. 147.

197

FPEs felt they had more to lose should they fail to respond to rising challenges. Pushing
for a more liberal and internationalist agenda, extensive humanitarian interventions, and
democracy promotion, therefore, become endemic to this period.422 While the U.S.
invested greater capital into the use of force, much of these materialized as multilateral
interventions spearheaded by significant American investment and leadership. The U.S.
also began to throw its weight around as it sought to reinvent NATO and promote its
expansion into the former Soviet Union. Finally, America adopted an ambitious human
rights agenda designed to inject military power into humanitarian interventions. All these
features evoke the idea of reforming international order through expansive policies while
promoting international legitimacy through multilateralism.423
The trend of American interventionism that appeared during the Clinton
administration reached its apogee under George W. Bush (Bush II, hereafter). There were
significant differences between the two regarding style and ambition. The so-called “Bush
Revolution” in foreign policy, resulted in a foreign policy that was unabashedly
unilateralist along a litany of global issues at various theaters of operations. Indeed, Bush
II-era FPEs heralded a period of what this research typifies as order-challenging behavior.
Since past U.S. administrations tipped their hats to some form of multilateralism and
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deference to rules back when American unipolarity seemed more indomitable, the
unipolarity argument cannot account for this change alone. With the blowback from 9/11
and the introduction of a Global War on Terror, a U.S.-led coalition intervened in
Afghanistan and, much more controversially, invaded Iraq in 2003. The latter is especially
noteworthy because it failed to garner sufficient support by the international community as
the U.S. had to resort to an ad-hoc coalition rather than through traditional mechanisms
such as the UN or NATO. The U.S. became subject to several other international-legal
controversies concerning the human rights regime and the convention on torture.
The following Obama administration showcased greater deference to the raison de
système as it reversed some of the excesses and unilateralism of U.S. foreign policy. The
freedom of action, both regarding material preponderance and social influence, bestowed
by unipolarity, led the U.S. to attempt at shaping international order by way of reinforcing
its liberal order. In this period American grand strategy appears more temperate, eliciting
on the surface level elements of retrenchment to significant environmental restrictions on
grand strategies, such as a stagnating resource base and the burdens of existing
commitments. While many have noted the contrary that the Obama presidency marks a
notable shift in tone and rhetoric in U.S. foreign policy, away from Bush II-era
unilateralism, these assertions seemed dubious even in earlier years of Obama’s tenure.424
Using the framework of this dissertation, one could also argue that Obama extricated the
U.S. from significant commitments by preferring to “lead from behind,” which was
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detrimental to international order since principled activism and reliability are hallmarks of
preserving an international order. With the rise of anti-establishment figures in the liberal
West, most importantly the election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States,
scholars thought more seriously about how the U.S. is undermining its position. Since
existing approaches either focus too much on China or single out a specific maladaptation
in U.S. domestic politics, they do not seem to provide an adequate account of U.S.’
particular brand of “great-state autism.”425 The chapter elaborates on these arguments, as
depicted in Table 5. 2. below, in the following sections.
Table 5. 2. U.S. Grand-Strategic Orientations in the Post-Cold War
Years

Permissive
Environment

Risk
Propensity

Satisfaction

Predicted
Order
Orientation
CONFORM/
REFORM

Bush I

1989-1993

RESTRICTIVE426

LOW

HIGH

Clinton

1993-2001

PERMISSIVE

MODERATE

HIGH

REFORM

Bush II

2001-2009

PERMISSIVE427

HIGH

LOW

CHALLENGE

Obama

2009-2017

RESTRICTIVE

MODERATE

MODERATE

RETRENCH

Primary
Observable
Strategies
Multilateralism
Restraint
Enmeshment
Leadership
Expansionism
Reformism
Unilateralism
Imperialism
Radicalism
Withdrawal
Appeasement
Conservatism
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5.4.1. Order-Conforming, 1989-1994
Presidents Bush I and, initially, William J. Clinton presided over a highly order-conforming
U.S. wherein multilateralism and restraint prevailed, which presents a kind of paradox. The
data analysis reveals that conditions were ripe for this type of orientation. From the purview
of military capabilities, U.S. power was unmatched as it attained formal primacy in the
international system. The U.S. also had the freedom of action to pursue an ambitious grand
strategy, but it did not need to. Stephen Walt perfectly encapsulates the dilemma:
This position of primacy was the permissive condition that allowed
Washington to pursue a highly ambitious foreign policy—to “shape the
world”—without having to worry very much about the consequences.
Because the United States was already wealthy, powerful, and secure, there
was little need to “go abroad in search of monsters to destroy” and little to
gain even if these efforts succeeded. The result was a paradox: U.S. primacy
made an ambitious grand strategy possible, but it also made it less
necessary.428
Where threat perceptions and systemic opportunities mattered, however, Iraq’s
unreasonable contestation of the Middle Eastern regional order had a disciplining effect.429
Given the broader objectives of the Cold War, the primary American strategy was always
to deny the Soviet Union any influence in the region and to ensure that oil could safely
flow from the region to world markets. U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East did
not reflect a set of enunciated principles that would consistently serve as guidelines for
broader U.S. objectives. Instead, the U.S. appears to have vacillated between various
balancing strategies, alternatingly opting to balance either power or threats—what Steve
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Yetiv calls “reactive engagement.”430 In this transitional period, neither balancing against
power nor threat was vital. It is therefore surprising that the U.S. far from adopting some
form of preponderance chose to pursue a policy of constructive engagement per NSDs 10
and 26.431
The threat that Iraq posed to international society was all too apparent to the
international community as Saddam’s illegal activities provided a much-needed security
referent around which U.S. FPEs and the international community could unite.432
Furthermore, there was a strong sense that U.S. FPEs constructed the national agenda
around the notion that Iraq was primarily a global threat to energy security first, which was
then a threat to U.S. interests —raison de systéme prevailed.433 Thus, in correlation with a
highly favorable international environment, we find evidence that American strategic
narratives at the UN reflect a substantial degree of satisfaction with international order,
apart from Iraq’s conduct, and numerous references to certainty, gains, and America’s
430

See Steve A. Yativ, The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf 1972-2005
(Baltimore MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), pp. 11-13. Note, also, that there is a significant
overlap between the general findings of this research and Yativ’s findings on U.S. grand strategy vis-à-vis
the Middle East. For him, U.S. lacked a formal and consistent grand strategy as each succeeding
administration appears to have striven for different balance of power options in earlier years while eventually
succumbing to pursuing primacy.
431

See The White House, National Security Directive 26: U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf (Washington
DC: The White House, October 2, 1989).
432

Importantly, but neglected in the present study, is the importance of legitimacy not just as a measure of
conformity to order, but as a quality that enables certain ambitions in World politics. In an excellent
comparative study of the Two Gulf Wars, Lamina Lee shows that legitimacy, played an important role in
determining the way the conflicts unfolded. In the case of the First Gulf War, for example, much of the
international community condemned Saddam’s actions as being illegitimate and U.S. was able to responsibly
exercise legitimate power to build a coalition and overturn the occupation of Kuwait. Idem., US Hegemony
and International Legitimacy: Norms Power and Followership in the Wars on Iraq (New York, NY:
Routledge, 2010), esp. Chapter 2.
433

See Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 491.

202

favorable prospects. If the present theory is correct, there should be ample evidence in the
conduct of U.S. foreign policy that exhibits a preference for multilateralism, restraint
towards other great powers, and a disposition towards following international norms.
Finding this evidence in conjunction with FPE discourses about international order that
affirm their overall satisfaction with the existing arrangements would further enhance the
validity of the framework.
5.4.1.1. Use of Force
In this period, it is difficult to assess U.S.’ strategy vis-à-vis style of use of force and
disposition towards international order because multilateral operations realistically require
some level of leadership. Pure unilateralism, absent any allied assistance and consent, is
virtually unheard of in modern history. At most, both dispositions feature within a
continuum from perfect collective security on one hand and hegemonic dominance on the
other.434 It is, of course, counterintuitive to argue that force-use is evidence for restraint,
much less at the hands of an ascendant unipolar state. This researcher would nevertheless
like to convince the reader that where the use of force and alliance relations mattered, U.S.
strategy most closely falls under the rubric of multilateralism.435 To wit, the Bush I
Presidency oversaw significant military operations beyond U.S. borders. The U.S. invasion
of Panama in December 1989, and the First Gulf War (August 1991) are the most
prominent examples in this period. In both cases, the Bush I administration is culpable for
harming international order by causing instability through military intervention. The

434

See Onea, U.S. Foreign Policy, pp. 91-92.

435

See Lee, US Hegemony, pp. 26-28.

203

former operation is nothing short of a unilateral exercise of power against a client state
within the hegemon’s hemisphere, which resulted in an externally imposed regime change.
The latter, meanwhile, succeeded in reversing Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait but further
destabilized both the region and caused untold misery in Iraq by frustrating Saddam
Hussein’s ambitions and harming the Iraqi economy through extended sanctions. Both
episodes, nevertheless, showcase elements of America’s order-conforming orientation in
this period.
The Gulf War is an exemplar of multilateralism, and out of other possible
alternatives, the U.S. chose the least risky, least ambitious, and order-abiding approach.
The literature has a well-established record in explicating the causes and execution of the
Gulf Conflict.436 The stalemate of the Iran-Iraq War left both countries in tatters. The latter
had to reckon with an extensive $80-100 billion in debt, but Iraq had also received
extensive military aid from the U.S. during the war and amassed a powerful military.437
Saddam had failed to achieve his primary objective of annexing Shat-el Arab. Feeling
indignant that the Arab world owed him for fighting Shiite Iran, and displeased that OPEC
countries in the Gulf had snubbed him by refusing to lower production and raise global oil
prices, Saddam would go on to use this considerable military to pursue irredentist claims
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over the oil-rich State of Kuwait.438 All of this precipitated in Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in
August 1990, which set the stage for the Gulf War.
Bush I was initially indecisive about using force but seemed willing to use force.439
Only after realizing, on October 30, that intervention would be costly did Bush I opt to
create a broader coalition to maximize success.440 In other words, Bush wanted to guarantee
while minimizing risks through multilateralism.441 Content with the developments in the
post-Cold War, U.S. FPEs were risk averse. These factors, combined with allied
reassurances, such as UN endorsement as well as guarantees of aid by Margaret Thatcher,
seems to have made multilateralism the option. As Podliska argues, it was a simple utility
calculation.442
Within months of Saddam Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait, the international
community mobilized not only to demand Iraq’s unconditional withdrawal but also
authorized the UN to use of force for achieving compliance.443 Rather than rebuking Iraq
outright, the Bush I administration acted patiently. In the run-up to this event, the U.S. was
hard at work to assuage Iraqi hostility and cajole Saddam with financial opportunities.444
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After the occupation, both Bush I and his NSC Advisor Brent Scowcroft elected to reverse
the situation and deny Saddam a fait accompli.445 Not only were they willing to use force,
but they were prepared to resort to extra measures to destabilize Iraq to topple Saddam.446
Once again, the U.S. had the capabilities, and its FPEs even preferred to pursue an
ambitious agenda. The Gulf War unfolded as the “perfect” war not only its execution and
success but also the way the final decision received the mandate from formal channels of
the UN.447 Instead of unilateral intervention, U.S. spearheaded diplomatic efforts at the UN
to authorize, first, sanctions against Iraq and then assembled a U.S.-led coalition that would
act under the mandate of the UN, which was to enforce by any means the stipulations of
UNSC Resolution 678.448 Impressively, the process of building this UN coalition required
the U.S. to earn the approval of adversaries like the Soviet Union and China.449
Naturally, American FPEs were all too cognizant of a favorable shift in the
international system; one that they believed granted them the “rarest opportunity to reshape
world order.”450 There was no urgency to do so as the Bush I administration was content
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to reinforce a very favorable status quo. To the extent that U.S. speeches at the Plenary
Sessions of UNGA reflect the broad consensus of the administration, one can observe a
palpable optimism about America’s prospects. The U.S. was very satisfied with an
international order, believing that promoting amicable relations with other great powers
and acting through collective security would best serve international order and then
American interests.451 There is thus an emphasis on the collective interests of the
international community.
Before exploring other aspects of American order-conforming behavior, however,
we must also consider the exceptions. The U.S. decision to intervene in Panama and
remove Noriega from power is a shadow study of sorts. U.S. did not act multilaterally, nor
pursue any form of international arbitration through formal international organizations like
the UN System. Despite Noriega’s illegitimacy and penchant for facilitating illicit activities
like drug trafficking, most Latin American countries subjected the Reagan and Bush I
administrations to opprobrium due to their violation of the principle of non-intervention.452
The fact that Noriega was an official installed by the U.S. only adds to the controversy.
American modus operandi in this earlier affair seems to have set a precedent for the latter
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Gulf War.453 The intervention in Panama took place against a regime that the U.S. had
empowered (like Iraq), and the operation took place as a final resort after diplomatic and
other efforts had failed.
5.4.1.2. Great Power Relations
In this period the U.S. exhibited a mixed strategy towards other great powers, particularly
the Soviet Union. Aspects of U.S. foreign policy showcased a more ambitious treatment of
a declining foe but based on U.S.-Soviet relations, U.S. strategy showcases a conservative
strategy of restraint. Evidence for this can be found in U.S.’ treatment of the Soviet
Union/Russia, as well as China, both at the UN and the broader geopolitical landscape.
This “restraint” towards other great powers is even more surprising given not only the
imbalance of power between the U.S. and the rest but also to the qualities of the actors. For
a long time, the U.S. relied on the enmity of its venerable foil, the Soviet Union, to
formulate its grand strategy. Following a period of renewed hostilities with the Soviet
Union and a period extended military spending, combined with the fallout of domestic
liberalization, and diminishing commodity prices left the latter unable to compete. As the
Soviet Union was disintegrating, the U.S. was selective in pressing its advantage and
overall limited antagonizing the Soviet Union.
German reunification and NATO expansion was one major area where the U.S.
pursued an ambitious and “reformist” agenda. As Soviet power waned in Eastern Europe
and its former satellites demanded the withdrawal of Soviet forces, U.S. and the Soviet
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Union also began to negotiate the status of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and
the future contours of European security. The final bout of negotiations in February-March
1990 resulted in an implicit agreement along the lines that the Soviet Union would accept
the reunification of Germany and that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) would
remain in NATO but that former GDR territories would remain demilitarized. All parties
agreed to the terms, but the U.S. ended up reneging on this agreement as it pushed for
NATO expansion into the former GDR, to the chagrin of Helmut Kohl.454
Meanwhile, the U.S. showed restrained towards the Soviet Union during the latter’s
dissolution phase. Instead of opting to support the independence movements against
Moscow, or further antagonize its moribund foe, the U.S. left its antagonist to its own
devices. The U.S. explored, moreover, the possibility of providing the Soviet regime with
much needed economic assistance and thereby to promote its “moderate behavior.”455 Said
aid did materialize but only after the collapse of the Soviet Union became imminent. In the
meantime, U.S. also actively supported a settlement by which the successor states of the
Soviet Union would relinquish control over, and transfer, all present WMDs to Moscow,
as a precondition to their recognition as sovereign, independent states once this outcome
proved to be inevitable. The U.S. may have preferred a weaker Soviet Union, but one that
the U.S. would ultimately trust to guard its nuclear arsenals against proliferation and
capture by rogue elements, all the while disarmament efforts would continue.
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None of this, of course, meant that the U.S. had a benign attitude towards other
great powers. What has become an oft-cited NSC document, the Defense Planning
Guidance (DPG, hereafter), illustrates the defense establishment’s receptiveness to
primacy.456 Accordingly, the document envisaged that the U.S. “must maintain the
mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or
global role.”457 The document confirms what an orthodox understanding of world politics
would predict: that the most dominant state should be satisfied with the status quo and
should work to preserve it. The statement that the U.S. ought to prevent the emergence of
rivals is a challenge to a normative understanding of world politics, but not necessarily to
the preservation of an existing international order.
Far more importantly, however, is that the Bush I administration seems to have
moderated their stance on this document. After a public backlash, the administration
revised the DPG on April 16, 1992, adding a sanitary language that downplays American
exceptionalism while highlighting the imperative for collective security and multilateral
action with Allied states. Tudor Onea notes further notes that the administration, sans Dick
Cheney, shunned the possibility of antagonizing the U.S. public, but also decided that the
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DPG contradicted their core beliefs about the new world order.458 They concluded that
maintaining U.S. preponderance necessitated a multilateral modus operandi, as presiding
over a rules-based world would better serve U.S. interest in the long-run.459 Naturally, U.S.
FPEs seem content with international order and acting through formal institutions, as also
evidenced by the high-levels of satisfaction garnered from the President’s speeches at this
time, and general prevalence of positive framing of expected utility.460 The possibility, and
perceived necessity, of unilateralism, remained a looming possibility.461

5.4.1.3. Norms
Regarding the Bush I administration’s approach to the legal and normative fabric of
international society, the U.S. appears to have adopted a strategy of enmeshment. As a
“responsible citizen” of international society, it adopted an overall conservative strategy
that encouraged rivals to adapt to the norms of the prevailing international status quo on
matters of high politics. With varying levels of ambition and success, U.S. sought to expand
on arms limitations with the Soviet Union, pursue a limitation on chemical and other
WMDs, and a seek a general limitation on conventional weapons. The Bush I
administration featured Realist-minded FPEs that did not, arguably, take enough of a
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principled stand against the collapsing Soviet Union, nor condemn China appropriately in
the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square Massacre.462 The American track-record regarding
international legal conduct was nothing short of ambivalent. The U.S. violated principles
such as sovereignty and non-intervention in its hemisphere. The U.S. leadership desired a
similar outcome in Iraq as well, but the Coalition did not exceed the operational freedom
beyond what the UNSC decreed. Overall, this was an ambivalent record that nevertheless
was moderate in comparison to U.S. conduct in other periods.

5.4.2. Order-Reforming Under Clinton
Whatever global designs the Bush I administration had, it would not be able to pursue them
for very long. Belittled by Clinton for lacking a foreign policy vision, Bush I lost the 1992
election. It has become customary in the literature to point out that Clinton also lacked a
foreign policy vision as the Presidency was “less interested in international affairs than at
any time in the previous six decades combined.”463 So while Clinton found it convenient
to blame Bush I for, allegedly, coddling China after Tiananmen Square or Saddam by
letting him stay in power, Clinton did not seem to offer anything different.464 Clinton
instead found it convenient to talking about the economy and adopting a tougher stance on
non-democratic forces but did little to improve upon his predecessor’s policies.465 Clinton’s
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prevarication was all the more surprising since, as Porter suggests, he had a historic
opportunity to change the course of American grand strategy.466 While the previous
administration came to power when structural forces still exerted a more-disciplining
influence on U.S. foreign policy (i.e., the continued existence of the Soviet Union), the
Clinton administration enjoyed the most clement international system. This configuration
afforded the most possibility of choices for the least incursion of costs for Clinton, who
thus had the luxury of reducing American military commitments. Walt’s dilemma was,
therefore, most acute under the Clinton administration.
What transpired was a shift, first, towards a unique blend of circumscribed activism
that this dissertation calls order-reforming, and gradually towards order-challenging
approaching the end of the millennium. It is difficult to pin down a working label for the
Clinton presidency vis-à-vis its disposition towards international order because there
appears to be much controversy concerning the extent to which U.S. grand strategy
deviated from previous periods, or evinced unilateralism in this period. For instance,
Trubowitz argues that due to overall lack of geopolitical slack, the Clinton presidency
downsized military spending, shifted to butter, avoided costly military interventions but all
the while avoiding full-blown retrenchment since the U.S. did increase its security
commitments.467 The problem, as Trubowitz recognizes, is that while his theory predicts
strategic underreach, U.S. foreign policy appears more ambitious in this period. Still, some
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others note that Clinton wanted to pursue multilateralism and internationalism, but
Congress and other domestic forces stymied his efforts. Skidmore, in particular, argues that
like his successor, Clinton’s grand strategy ultimately came to exude unilateralism,
especially in his later years.468 Posen and Ross call the Clinton approach “selective (but
cooperative) primacy,” which amounts to “multilateralism while promoting U.S.
leadership.”469 The Clinton administration itself preferred the appellation of “leadership”
and “assertive multilateralism.”
This section lends support to the view that Clinton era foreign policy was far more
ambitious as evidenced by the number of U.S. interventions as well as its the increasing
trend towards a more-unilateral disposition towards the use of force. Furthermore, the U.S.
decision not only to expand NATO but also invent a new role for its use abroad for the first
time ever, against Bosnia, is more consistent with a strategy of expansionism. Finally,
regarding norms, the U.S. shifted from enmeshment to an active promotion of global
humanitarian initiatives (and intervention) that could best have characterized as reformism,
while Clinton’s willingness to shirk from important internationalist treaties leave the
administration’s record in an ambiguous state.
The analysis suggests that while U.S. military spending declined in this period,
most allied nations and other great powers also displayed a similar trend. Moreover, the
budget reductions reflect the end of the Cold War more than anything since the cuts
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disproportionately reduced investment into ballistic weapons as well as personnel, while
keeping conventional forces the same and capable of global deployment.470 The U.S. had
freedom of action, without a doubt. The content analysis, meanwhile, corroborates their
relative satisfaction with international order. The narratives positively framed
developments. The exception, however, was in Clinton’s earlier years where he had to react
to unfolding international crises. UNGA speeches by Clinton, as well as Warren
Christopher and Madeleine Albright antecedent meetings, show that the U.S. was overall
satisfied with international order, although negative framing seems to tail unfolding
regional crises closely. For example:
On efforts from export controls to trade agreements to peace-keeping, we
will often work in partnership with others and through multilateral
institutions such as the United Nations. It is in our national interest to do
so. But we must not hesitate to act unilaterally when there is a threat to
our core interests or to those of our allies.471

Clinton’s 1993 speech affirms the U.S.’ commitment to multilateralism and
connects national interests with raison de systéme. This is expected from an
internationalist president and administration seeking to exercise benign leadership
for the world. What is also apparent is the unilateralist undertone of the speech.
This is no doubt a warning to the international community that the type of
embarrassing situations encountered in Somalia or the setbacks in the ongoing war
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in Yugoslavia will not deter the U.S. The same unilateralist attitude is present also
in the 1994 speech:
When our national security interests are threatened, we will act with others
when we can, but alone if we must. We will use diplomacy when we can,
but force if we must.472
Clinton’s earlier speeches included more instances of dissatisfaction and negative
framing.473 One reason for this, as Onea argues, could be disgruntlement as Clinton felt his
reputation was under challenge because both domestic and international opponents had
snubbed his earlier efforts at promoting multilateral with minimum commitment.474 It is
hardly surprising that the Clinton era policy, and UN speeches, had more frequent negativeframing and more references to anticipated losses due to failure to act. What follows is an
overview of Clinton era order-reforming strategies.

5.4.2.1. Use of Force
The overall U.S. strategy of force-use in this period falls under the category of
“Leadership,” which in all fairness is how the Clinton administration FPEs thought of their
overall approach.475 This dissertation conceptualizes “Leadership” as a designation for a
special kind of approach to the use of force. It refers to a situation in which a state has the
wherewithal to use of force unilaterally but actively works to promote ad hoc multilateral
See Idem.., “Speech Delivered by William J. Clinton at the United Nations General Assembly Plenary
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coalitions rather than operating strictly under the UN aegis, all the while retaining the
exclusive right to exercise, or not, force independently from the coalition. It is a via media
between a pure form of unilateralism and multilateralism through formal international
institutions. This type of “multilateralism-plus” focuses on exercising a leadership role to
get others to commit resources, which perfectly encapsulates the Clinton approach. At no
other time in modern history would such a concept be more needed than during the Clinton
administration given the frequency of the use of force. A shortlist of these interventions
includes Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Iraq, and Kosovo. It is beyond the scope of this research
to explore all these interventions in-depth chronologically and exhaustively, but the
discussion uncovers overarching themes that suggest a transition from less to more
assertive styles of use of force.
The first theme is how reluctant the Clinton administration was to use force despite
being so supportive of international humanitarian interventions, but how the U.S. gradually
accepted investing more resources into interventions. The second theme is how
inconsequential these regions were to the interests of major powers, particularly the ones
undertaken for humanitarian purposes.476 The third theme is that the Clinton era FPEs
invoked multilateralism and international commitments to organizations like the UN and
NATO so that the President could bypass domestic checks on power.477 Thus, these types
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of operations could have only taken place in an international environment that was pliable
to U.S. interests. The use of force, no matter how circumscribed, is risky for all states
including great powers; thus none of these actions are dismissible as minor, per se. While
Clinton era interventions were smaller compared to the First Gulf War, which necessitated
a greater distribution of risk, they were also less irrelevant for U.S.’ strategic interests. The
Gulf War was in a critical location for American energy and other security interests. Not
so for other regions. When combined, these themes point to the importance of how U.S.
FPEs perceived international order. The Clinton administration must have felt like a
colossus shackled by various domestic opposition groups as well as significantly weaker
opponents, prompting the Clinton administration to adopt a harder line against friend and
foe alike, so long it did not require the U.S. to commit ground troops.
Whether for failing to live up to expectations of ambitious goals or due to
recalcitrance by domestic actors, American FPEs became increasingly disillusioned with
each intervention. Initially, whenever multilateral initiatives fell or become unpopular
domestically, the Clinton administration either abandoned policies or even joined in the
invective, as was the case in Somalia and Bosnia. For example, under the Bush I
administration, U.S. had committed troops and resources under UNOSOM to provide
humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia, which chronically suffered from
warlordism.
As for the Clinton administration, the problem was that while it supported
multilateralism, it was also unwilling to commit more U.S. resources. There was a gap
between UN expectations and member countries to commit, which led to much acrimony
218

between the U.S. and the UN, forcing the former to settle for a symbolic force to provide
humanitarian assistance.478 In the events that transpired in Somalia between June 1993 to
October 3, 1993, 18 American soldiers died, another 74 wounded, and the U.S. lost critical
military assets. The administration promptly withdrew all American forces, save for token
forces to allay accusations of retreat.479
In the meantime, the Clinton administration, long dissatisfied with Bush-era
prevarications, sought a tougher stance on the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia too.480
It sought both UN and NATO support to pursue a war in Yugoslavia. It was not obvious
why the U.S. involved itself in the European theater when its allies were willing to take the
initiative regarding the dissolution of Yugoslavia, as was the case with major European
powers like Germany, which had already extended diplomatic and financial support to the
Bosnians, Croats, and Slovenians. Neither Realist principles nor concerns over
humanitarianism have forced the U.S. to undercut its European allies’ efforts to resolve the
conflict, one way or another. In sum, what therefore developed was a kind of
multilateralism in which the U.S. would require international cooperation in the name of
humanitarian interventionism, but only if willing allies would share the burden. US became
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involved in Yugoslavia not only as part of the UNPROFOR but also through independent
operations conducted with NATO allies.481
The developments in Mogadishu and Bosnia point to the same problem; that the
Clinton administration’s efforts were frustrated time and again. It is difficult to divine the
intentions of leaders, but we have strong reason to believe that Clinton and other FPEs
were dissatisfied not with international order or multilateralism per se, but their inability
to get results. There was a pervading notion that the U.S. was becoming a “punching bag
of the world.” Meanwhile, prominent administration officials like Albright pleaded that
more assertive action was necessary to avoid further humiliation.482 After the Srebrenica
Massacre in 1995, patience was wearing thin, deeming necessary to act soon and decisively
because the " [situation in Bosnia was] killing the U.S. position of strength in the world.”483
Clinton himself also had a pretext for quick and decisive action for he did not wish to drag
an already-unpopular conflict longer, which could jeopardize his upcoming bid for
reelection.484 All of this culminated in an intense aerial campaign against the Serbs under
Operation Deliberate Force. At the height of this campaign (August 30-September 20,
1995) Clinton’s UNGA speech from 1995 seems to reflect his concerns over America’s
role and lack of support for multilateralism:
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In the United States, some people ask: Why should we bother with the
United Nations? America is strong. We can go it alone. Well, we will act if
we have to, alone. But my fellow Americans should not forget that our
values and our interests are also served by working with the United Nations.
The United Nations helps the peacemakers, the care-providers, the
defenders of freedom and human rights, the architects of economic
prosperity and the protectors of our planet to spread the risk, share the
burden and increase the impact of our common efforts… Historically the
United States has been — and today it remains — the largest contributor to
the United Nations. But I am determined that we must fully meet our
obligations and I am working with our Congress on a plan to do so.485
Clinton was appealing both to the international community but also his domestic
constituents to get behind an interpretation of UN-mandated multilateralism that served
both U.S. and global interests.486 The ensuing Dayton Accords in December 1995 pacified
the situation. The lesson, however, was learned, as Clinton would employ the same kind
of assertiveness over Iraq without the need of prior authorization or deferral to international
bodies because, as Albright explained “we are America; we are the indispensable nation.
We stand tall, and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger
here to all of us.”487 The U.S. would similarly go on to strong-arm its NATO allies to
conduct another aerial campaign against the Serbs in 1999 without bothering to conferring
with the UNSC, likely because no authorization would have been granted absent acquiesce
of Russia and China, which the administration had alienated by this time. Perhaps no
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further approval was needed since only the U.S. “had the power to guarantee global
security: without [U.S.] presence or support, multilateral endeavors would fail.”488
The U.S. seemed to be transitioning from Leadership (or assertive multilateralism)
towards the Unilateralist end of the spectrum. Unsurprisingly, we also find narratives about
justifying increasing unilateralism expressed to the world public, mainly because NATO
did not have formal UNSC authorization.
We will work with our partners and the United Nations to continue to ensure
that such forces can deploy when they are needed. What is the role of the
United Nations in preventing mass slaughter and dislocation? Very large.
Even in Kosovo, NATO’s actions followed a clear consensus, expressed in
several Security Council resolutions, that the atrocities committed by Serb
forces were unacceptable and that the international community had a
compelling interest in seeing them end. Had we chosen to do nothing in the
face of this brutality, I do not believe we would have strengthened the
United Nations. Instead, we would have risked discrediting everything it
stands for. By acting as we did, we helped to vindicate the principles and
purposes of the United Nations Charter... In the real world, principles often
collide and tough choices must be made.489
The use of force during the Clinton presidency showcases how a group of FPEs
with an internationalist agenda and aversion to acting unilaterally, explored alternative
forms of multilateralism when potential risks increased.490 In this respect, 1995 was a
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watershed year because the administration, perturbed by policy failure, pushed for more
multilateralism in discourse but preferred to circumvent UN and assume leadership over
diplomatic efforts previously spearheaded by allies (as in the case of the Dayton Accords).
The use of NATO, alongside UN, is novel because U.S. took the lead in refiguring the role
and purpose of its alliance bloc, despite the “dual key” problem that reduced the efficacy
of NATO operations. This last point merits further attention in the next section because it
also evidences another aspect of order-reforming.

5. 4. 2. 2. Great Power Relations
If using NATO to project force outside of NATO territories for the first time was not
enough, the Clinton administration added insult to injury for Russia by approving what
became one of the most dramatic instances of an expansionist strategy in the unipolar
moment. In 1997, the administration formally invoked the policy of “enlargement and
engagement,” in which the U.S. would extend NATO membership to many of the newly
independent republics of the CIS.491 It is worth mentioning that this is something the
administration sought to do from the beginning, perhaps in keeping with the spirit of the
1992 DPG, but NATO enlargement was slow to materialize. What explains this initial
restraint?
First, while the U.S. suited to pursue expansionist strategies, the president was risk
averse at the start of his tenure. Instead of pursuing a more ambitious strategy, interim
solutions prevailed. Not only was NATO expansion unpopular domestically (with many
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Democrats and Republics alike), but also various agencies as well. Moreover, it was seen
as prudent to allay Russian fears that the U.S. was pursuing a Drang Nach Osten, the
administration initially exercised restraint and sought interim solutions to the problem.
Next, it was imperative for the U.S. to support the Yeltsin government and promote
democratic elements therein, although not at the cost of forsaking NATO enlargement. 492
Finally, antagonizing Russia could have militated against U.S. efforts both at the UN but
also for broader disarmament efforts. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994 was one such
measure because it was acceptable to the Pentagon and State Department, but also as helped
reassure former Soviet Republics.
Only after the shock of Bosnia did U.S. policy change. Following the resolution of
the Bosnian crisis, the U.S. adopted an assertive attitude towards the other powers because
this approach seemed to deliver better results.493 The events of 1995 also demonstrated that
the invocation of NATO was all too necessary. As NATO’s strategic importance grew for
the Clinton administration (and the UN became a shackle), it became necessary to push for
the growth of the organization while self-restraint to win Russian support no longer
mattered.494 The Madrid Summit in 1997 confirmed the expansion of NATO and in 1999
the Visegrad group, consisting of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, became
NATO members.

In short, while members of the Bush I administration may have
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articulated the notion that the U.S. ought to prevent the rise of peer-competitors, it was the
Clinton administration that put this expansionist strategy into practice for the first time in
the post-Cold War. U.S.’ dismissal of Russia’s formal complaint against NATO operations
in Kosovo also attests to its increasing assertiveness towards great powers.
5. 4. 2. 3. Norms
The Clinton administration was active in building on the liberal international order and
spearheading international legal developments, as predicted by the framework.
“Enmeshment” akin the Bush I administration would no longer suffice as the Clinton
administration recalibrated the way the U.S. deployed policy instruments more assertively.
The previous subsections sufficiently address the administration’s aggressive promotion of
humanitarian interventions around the world as a theoretical instance of order-reforming.
Assertive humanitarianism is logically consistent with a powerful state that is satisfied with
international order but may be willing to take risks, especially if allies can help to bear the
antecedent costs and risks.
During the Clinton presidency, U.S. signed several far-reaching international
treaties including the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban (1996), the Kyoto Protocol (1997),
and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998). Signature of a significant
global environmental legislature like the CNTB and Kyoto Protocol are commendable
steps towards building on existing international norms and a positive step towards
furthering the global raison de systéme. In a disheartening move, the administration also
failed not only to ratify but even deign to bring these documents to the attention of the U.S.
Legislature.
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Similarly, U.S. revulsion towards signing the ICC document also merits attention.
The Clinton administration had actively supported the creation of the ICC since the
organization fit into the broader framework of humanitarianism and was deemed all too
necessary in the aftermath of Rwanda and Bosnia.495 Once the treaty began to take shape,
the Clinton administration actively sought to change various aspects of the treaty to obtain
special privileges like veto rights and various other exemptions.496 Nevertheless, the
Clinton administration was not satisfied with the final result and refused to sign the treaty
until the final signature date of December 31, 2000.497 Ultimately, a commitment to the
ICC would likely require the U.S. to compromise its freedom of action in international
politics voluntarily.
One could interpret the U.S: failure to ratify important international documents as
a form of disengagement with international society. However, it is also true that this was
not the preferred outcome of FPEs like Clinton since these treaties would have likely died
at the hands of domestic opponents at the legislative level —that Clinton did not even bring
the treaties to Congress for ratification to avoid antagonizing the legislature is telling. This
ambivalence towards international treaties, however, further encapsulates the fundamental
argument of this dissertation, that of FPEs’ arbitrary tendencies and parochialism as they
value political power over international commitment. At the same time, the effort to steer
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treaties like the Rome Statute to their favor and Clinton’s decision to endorse the treaty,
even as a symbolic gesture, ultimately points to an order reforming orientation. Clinton’s
successor would see to the abnegation of this treaty.

5.4.3. Order-Challenging Under Bush II, 2001-2009
As early as the final year of the Clinton administration, U.S.’ grand-strategic orientation
showcased a shift towards challenging international order. The conduct of the Bush II
administration in its early years, especially in the runup to the Iraq War, as well U.S.
attitude towards international norms further cemented these tendencies. Popular arguments
abound. Structural explanations underscore the U.S.’ need to press its power in the face of
mounting challenges; only by expansion could the U.S. secure itself in an uncertain
world.498 While uncertainty is always problematic for decision-making and 9/11 was
indeed a shock, it is inconceivable that peripheral interventions could add to American
security, or deny advantages to potential rivals, is ludicrous. Various Innenpolitik
approaches could accurately point to the relevance of special interests, especially towards
the preservation of global access to oil, especially in the case of Iraq.499 Such an approach
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ignores the fact that there was no threat to the global production or distribution of oil.
Unless, of course, U.S.’ goal was to actively sabotage this industry, which could have
hindered potential rivals like China but would have amounted to shooting itself in the foot.
All of these are answers concerning the Iraq War. No overarching approach accounts for
U.S.’ declining deference to international society after 9/11.
The final answer is probably the most enduring ones: the confluence of a specific
set of individuals of the Neo-Conservative persuasion.500 One could dismiss these
exuberances as being unique to the idiosyncrasies of Bush II, or that revisionist Neocon
FPEs are entirely responsible for the vagaries in the behavior of a unipole.501 Noting that
Neocon made their presence felt in D.C. during earlier administrations (the so-called
Vulcans), this confluence of ideas and elites offers a logical framework for U.S.
exceptionalism and unilateralism. The Neocon influence assumption founders when one
considers the prevalence of non-Neocon decision-makers in the Bush II administration.502
While an intellectual dominance of Neocons was manifest as providing an intellectual
framework, they nevertheless could not act without the consent of other prominent groups.
Furthermore, this group is not unique in its rejection of restraint and eschewing of
multilateralism.
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This section argues that while the permissive environment of the unipolar moment
still held, U.S. FPEs’ satisfaction with the international order, their perceptions of common
interest, and expectations of gains reached their nadir. Bush II’s 2001, 2002, and 2003
UNGA speeches, understandably, showcase narratives of dissatisfaction towards many UN
members (and not directly linked to 9/11), but these also did not find expression through
legal justification but reflected, rather, moralistic discourse. A considerable portion of these
speeches also advanced pretexts for unilateral action while unilateralist and exceptionalism
narratives also featured prominently in these speeches. These all find expression in the
2002 speech. There seems to be a palpable frustration with the UN as an organization as
evidenced by the 2001 UNGA speech.
This struggle is a defining moment for the United Nations itself — and the
world needs its principled leadership… The United Nations depends, above
all, on its moral authority — and that authority must be preserved. The steps
I have described will not be easy. For all nations, they will require effort.
For some nations, they will require great courage. Yet the cost of inaction
is far greater. The only alternative to victory is a nightmare world where
every city is a potential killing field.503
Here, Bush is invoking a moral argument to change the status quo. More
importantly, we can also observe the urgency of the tone and a narration of the dire
consequences for a failure to act. Furthermore:
If we fail to act in the face of danger, the people of Iraq will continue to live
in brutal submission. The regime will have new power to bully, dominate
and conquer its neighbors, condemning the Middle East to more years of
bloodshed and fear. The region [Middle East] will remain unstable, with
little hope of freedom, and isolated from the progress of our times. With
George W. Bush, “Speech Delivered by George W. Bush at the United Nations General Assembly Plenary
Session,” (New York, NY: United Nations, November 10, 2001).
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every step, the Iraqi regime takes towards gaining and deploying the most
terrible weapons, our own options to confront that regime will narrow. And
if an emboldened regime were to supply these weapons to terrorist allies,
then the attacks of 11 September would be a prelude to far greater horrors.504
The most extreme challenges to international order took place in the context of a
U.S. confronting the losses and uncertainty of the post-9/11 international system. After the
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the declaration of the War on Terror, U.S.
FPEs were able to focus on these challenges, which eventually reduced the need for further
risky interventions. Moreover, while U.S. capabilities did not diminish, the legitimacy
blow to the U.S. seems to have reduced its freedom of action in other ways as it reverted
to less-ambitious retrenchment strategies.505

5. 4. 3. 1. Use of Force
In the early years of the Bush II administration, the U.S.’ strategy of use of force
approximated most to unilateralism. Inevitably, this section concerns the U.S. intervention
in Afghanistan in 2002 and the 2003 Iraq War. The circumstances by which the latest
intervention occurred is, of course, the subject of greatest controversy since the U.S.
bypassed all formal international organizations and fora, opting instead to assemble an ad
hoc coalition, justified itself under the pretense of Iraqi possession of WMDs, and invoked
the norm of preemptive war.
Following September 11, the Bush II administration went on to declare a global
War on Terror in which terrorist and other rogue actors, including states that aid or harbor
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terrorist groups, were placed on the crosshairs. What is surprising is that even when the
Bush II administration had the support of the international community, officials were
overall reluctant to accept help. For example, following 9/11, NATO members invoked for
the first time in history Article 5 of the Treaty, stipulating that an attack on one member is
an attack against all members of the alliance. Under previous administrations, such an
offer, one that would potentially contribute to the U.S. war effort, distribute costs and risks
for potential interventions, would have been met with enthusiasm. Undersecretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz went on to respond that “if we need collective action we will ask
for it. We do not anticipate that at the moment.”506 The U.S. also rejected a French offer of
troop deployment in Afghanistan. The U.S. also demanded that the Taliban regime
surrendered Osama bin Laden and declared that the U.S. “would not negotiate with
terrorists” when the Taliban prevaricated. Eventually, however, U.S. and allied forces
intervened in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, resulting in the collapse
of the Taliban regime but more than a decade of protracted and costly fighting as well as
national-building efforts on the part of the U.S. and its NATO allies. The first phase of the
War on Terror took place quickly, without much objection, and was overall successful in
its immediate goals.
In the meantime, the administration put forward the National Security Strategy
document of 2002, or what would come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. There were
echoes of previous defense documents arguing in favor of defeating rogue and non-state
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elements while sanitizing the language on primacy. Under the 1992 DPG, the Bush I
administration had supported a rules-based global framework to ensure U.S. primacy.
Under Bush II, unilateral action in defense of U.S. interests could be pursued unilaterally
because that is what leadership required; international institutions, like the ICC, were
considered to be shackled standing in the way of effective U.S. leadership.507 Indeed, while
declaring “we will respect the values, judgments, and interests of our friends and partners,”
the report emphasized that the United States “will be prepared to act apart when our
interests and unique responsibilities require.508 These guidelines seemed to have created a
vague notion of what constituted a threat for the U.S. but constituted the context in which
the Iraq War took place since the threat identification remained vague, encompassing “the
overlap between states that sponsored terrorism and those that pursue Weapon of mass
Destruction compels us to action.”509
While the present framework has tasked itself to uncovering general patterns rather
than causes for specific events, the fact that U.S. FPEs were operating in what had become
an extremely uncertain international system and were highly dissatisfied helps to
contextualize the underlying conditions. There is convincing evidence to support that a
high degree of risk-acceptance enabled the Iraq War.510 Not only was the American public
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feeling a palpable sense of fear and uncertainty after 9/11, but having invested in an
invasion of Afghanistan, provoked the need to pursue further action.511Indeed, coming off
the heels of an allied invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. began to press for war with the
Saddam regime. U.S. justifications for war range from the administration’s desire of
wanting to rebuke Saddam over his alleged possession of WMDs, his ties with terrorist
groups such as Al-Qaeda, desires to promote regime change and democratization in the
region, and even hopes of further consolidating global access to oil.
The point is that the U.S. had suffered losses and was on the warpath to recover,
whether materially or psychologically and that Iraq was the most viable target.512 The issue
of Iraqi possession of WMDs, however, appears in the official narrative and constituted the
main gravamen against Saddam, although actual Iraqi possession of WMDs remains hotly
contested to this day.513 What served as a trigger for the war was a series of diplomatic
obstructions at the UN where the U.S. sought to build international backing for an
intervention. The 2002 UNGA Speech, for instance, exclusively focuses on Iraq as Bush
II and the dire regional consequences for inaction against Saddam.514 The U.S. and UK
spearheaded further sanctions and called on the Saddam regime to cooperate with UN
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Inspectors on the matter. Saddam dragged his feet but begrudgingly complied; it seems to
have been too little too late.
Judging that Iraq had violated all previous Security Council Resolutions, including
the most recent Resolution 1441, the U.S. and UK wanted to push for a final resolution
along the lines of Resolution 678 (to justify the use of force), but the Security Council
would not pass it. U.S. allies and the UNSC were more or less unwaveringly supportive of
the U.S. until this point. Allies like France and Germany, and other great powers like China
and Russia, did not mind U.S. punishing Iraq but also did not want war, preferring instead
to prevent the U.S. from arbitrarily using force.515 Since the UN weapons inspectors failed
to turn up sufficient evidence, these countries would not back the U.S. The Bush II
administration nevertheless declared that there was sufficient justification for a preemptive
war against Iraq since it had failed to live up to the stipulations of previous UNSC
Resolutions fully.
On March 19, 2003, the U.S. launched Operation Iraqi Freedom with the support
of contingents from Australia, Poland, and the UK. Other states who formed the so-called
“Coalition of the Willing” (or “posse”) would later provide small military and financial
contributions, following U.S. coercive diplomacy. The Bush II administration’s risk
acceptance resulted in what was easily the most reckless and costliest (both in casualties
and costs) post-Cold War. Operation Iraqi Freedom brought to bear the fewest allies in an

See Elizabeth Pond, “The Dynamics of the Feud over Iraq,” In D. Andrews, ed., The Atlantic Alliance
Under Stress: U.S.- European Relations After Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 30.
515

234

ad-hoc coalition, had the least overall political support from the international community,
and represents the pinnacle of unilateralism.516

5. 4. 3. 2. Great Power Relations
It is difficult to assess the Bush II legacy towards great powers within the present
framework just because the cycle was too brief to examine properly. U.S.’ relations with
other great powers were already under stress during the Clinton administration, not least
because of his increasing assertive attitude and encroachment on Russia’s traditional sphere
of influence. Based purely on values, one would not predict cordial relations between the
U.S. and authoritarian China and Russia since Bush II FPEs promoted an exceptionalist
worldview that places the U.S. at the center of the international system and that American
values required propagation. It is also evident that considerations of domestic ideology and
regime type significantly affected the calculus of the Bush II administration.517 With these
considerations and U.S.’ circumvention of multilateral institutions and its final act of
defiance towards the Security Council, the framework should accurately predict disregard
towards other great powers, encroachments on other great powers’ spheres of influence,
and direct military confrontation. U.S. conduct in this period shows signs of these
tendencies although the Global War on Terror against a variety of global terrorist

See Michael Noonan and John Hillen, “The Promise of Decisive Action,” Orbis, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring,
2002), pp. 229-246.
516

See Robert Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 118, No. 3 (Fall,
2003), pp. 365-388.
517

235

organizations seem to have exercised a disciplining effect as a wide range of states found
a common enemy.
U.S. relations with the other great powers were less aggressive than predicted by
the model since U.S. relations with its closest peer-competitor, China was cordial.
Relations with Russia, on the other hand, were quite problematic despite the provisions of
the 2002 NSS, which identified “overlapping common interests” between the two
powers.518 The main problem was the “Western Alliance.” If Clinton’s reinvention in the
unipolar moment of NATO through new responsibilities and inclusion of more members,
then U.S.’ vocation to expand NATO membership, all the while promoting EU’s eastward
expansion, might have appeared as menacing.519 The first round of expansion in 2004
brought Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Baltic states to NATO’s fold.
Concomitant to this expansion, EU had also been expanding as it incorporated some of
these states in 2004, and later, 2009 rounds of expansion, to the chagrin of Putin. These
efforts extended to Georgia and Ukraine in 2008, against the protests of major NATO allies
like Germany and France. The results were disastrous.520
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As for China, the framework seems to be at a loss since the Bush II administration
pursued a surprisingly restrained relationship. There is a discernable tendency among
scholars to conflate all Bush II policies and accordingly criticize American foreign policy
in other regions, such as Asia, because of their gravamen with the Iraq War.521 China would
simultaneously be labeled as a strategic competitor but respected as a great power. Both
countries also found a common interest in the Global War on Terror, although cooperative
efforts on this front did not materialize. It was in this period that the U.S. began to develop
discourse around China as a responsible stakeholder.522 Some have argued that SinoAmerican relations were most stable under the Bush II administration and overall
uneventful.523 This clemency is easily understandable, however, in the context of the
administration’s focus on the Middle East. In a sense, Sino-American relations “emerged
stronger from the Global War on Terror.”524
5. 4. 3. 3. Norms
As predicted by the framework, U.S. strategy towards international norms exuded
radicalism since it overturned many existing rules conventions. These include principles
of multilateralism, preemptive war, and overall disengagement with international law.
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Bush II presided over a time when the U.S. largely divorced itself from multilateralism. 525
Superior power, risk-acceptance, and dissatisfaction led to an understanding of national
security that is willing to sacrifice the broader concerns of the international community, or
respect for international law, with short-term parochial national interests. The attitude of
the administration is as follows:
It is a big mistake for us to grant any validity to international law even when
it may seem in our short-term interest to do so because, over the long term,
the goal of those who think that international law means anything are those
who want to constrict the United States.526
The Bush II administration significantly undermined multilateralism by ignoring
institutions like UN, treaties like ICC, and norms like preemptive strikes. On the matter
of international treaties, the Bush II readily rejected the ICC and withdrew U.S.’ signature
from the Rome Statute. Not only did Bush II overturn Clinton’s symbolic gesture but
further sought bilateral treaties with states that were already members of the ICC. The
reason was so that parties to the ICC could not bring to bear the jurisdiction of the court
upon U.S. citizens. In the words of Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. “will regard as illegitimate
any attempt by the court or state parties to the [Rome Statute] to assert the ICC’s
jurisdiction over American citizens.”527 The implication would be that even when acting
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in a multilateral context, such as a peacekeeping operation, the ICC would not be able to
prosecute American contingents.
The Iraq War called into question the norm on preemptive attacks in international
law. Customary law allows preemptive war if there is indeed an imminent threat, and that
the preemptive action is commensurate and proportional to the threats. The UN System
also provides the possibility of empowering a preemptive strike under the self-defense
clause of Article 51 of the Charter, if states meet the stipulations of customary law. Failing
these, UNSC Resolutions can also empower a preemptive strike. In the runup to the Iraq
War, the U.S. did not satisfactorily fulfill these conditions. Enshrining the 2002 NSS
document with the imperative of transcending international legal constrictions, the Bush II
administration sought to circumvent this long-standing norm. There is a reason to suppose,
however, that the U.S. approach to this norm might not have been so radical. As Hurd
argues, while the U.S. acted as a legal revisionist, it also sought to justify its behavior to
the international community and replace the delegitimated norm with a new one. For
example, ambiguities of the international system encouraged the U.S. to justify itself
through the norm of self-defense. In this process, the U.S. presented itself as a proponent
of the status quo concerning international law.528
In addition to preemptive war, the administration sought to “reform” the
international legal order by abnegating the Geneva Convention or the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The treatment of prisoners
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of war from the U.S.’ Iraqi campaign and the War on Terror led to numerous human rights
violations in places like Abu Gharib and Guantanamo Bay. Thus, the U.S. not only failed
to conform to the broader rules and norms of international society but even failed in respect
to traditional liberal and “American” values, which will likely weaken future U.S. efforts
to provide effective global leadership.529
The U.S.’ disengagement with international organizations and multilateralism
would have an impact on the Bush II administration by reducing other states’ trust in the
U.S. thus reducing U.S.’ freedom action. Whatever the case, once the U.S. committed to
two wars and an ambitious region-transforming project in the Middle East, it did not have
any more resources to spend on other conflicts. Having committed to balancing certain
enemies and tasks, the systemic environment became less ambiguous and, therefore, more
“restrictive” for the U.S.
5. 4. 4. Order-Retrenchment: Fin de Siècle and Beyond
Starting with the latter part of the Bush II administration, the international system began to
exert a restrictive condition on the U.S. The onus of two costly wars, diminished
international legitimacy, the return of “great power politics,” and an economic recession
significantly reduced U.S. freedom of action. Simultaneously, American strategic
narratives, both in general but especially at the UNGA, show moderate signs of
dissatisfaction with international order, and negative framing. This trend surprisingly
continued under Obama because of the administration’s stated preferences towards
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internationalism and multilateralism —or “un-Bush.”530 It is interesting to note that Obama,
for example, devotes painstaking effort in his UNGA speeches to distance U.S. foreign
policy from the Bush II legacy and to respond to critics.
I am well aware of the expectations that accompany my presidency around
the world. These expectations… are rooted… in a discontent with a status
quo that has allowed us to be increasingly defined by our differences, and
outpaced by our problems. But they are also rooted in hope… that real
change is possible, and the hope that America will be a leader in bringing
about such change. I took office at a time when many around the world had
come to view America with skepticism and distrust. Part of this was due to
misperceptions and misinformation about my country. Part of this was due
to opposition to specific policies, and a belief that on certain critical issues,
America has acted unilaterally, without regard for the interests of others.
This has fed an almost reflexive anti-Americanism, which too often has
served as an excuse for our collective inaction.531
The United States is chastised for meddling in the region, accused of having a hand
in all manner of conspiracy; at the same time, the United States is blamed for failing to do
enough to solve the region’s problems and for showing indifference toward suffering
Muslim populations. I realize some of this is inevitable, given America’s role in the world.
But these contradictory attitudes have a practical impact on the American people’s support
for our involvement in the region, and allow leaders in the region, as well as the
international community sometimes, to avoid addressing difficult problems themselves.”532
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In a sense, then, even the leadership narratives revolved around a
complicated notion of declining global influence, so much so that a U.S. president
felt the need to bring this to the attention of the international community. No matter
the internationalist and multilateralist sentiments of the Obama administration,
there were obvious signs of dissatisfaction with the global response to the U.S.
Another important facet of the Obama administration was its concern for the
domestic economy (which often found its way into the UNGA speeches as well) and
genuinely believed in the merits of a grand strategy of retrenchment.533 This section argues
that while retaining many of the classical features of past U.S. administrations, we
can nevertheless identify under the Obama administration a grand-strategic
orientation is less ambitious, something which this researcher is not alone in
pointing out.534 The framework predicts that the final years of the Bush II and the
Obama administrations approximated to order-retrenchment as the use of force was
limited, that the U.S. acted with restraint towards other great powers (although it
did not simply appease them), and was overall ambivalent towards international
law.
Whereas order-conforming dictates principled activism towards preserving
international order, order-retrenchment is consistent with exceptionalist in that a
533
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state will more likely shirk such responsibilities. Thus, while we can credit Obama for
talking a different game as compared to his predecessor, the U.S.’ grand-strategic
orientation is similar to that of his predecessors. Even the former is questionable because
Obama’s strategic narratives from his UNGA speeches suggest some dissatisfaction with
international order. The primary change from the early Bush II era to the later-Bush/Obama
administrations is U.S.’ declining freedom of action due to its embroilment in two major
occupations, a severe recession, and the “return” of great-power politics following the
Russian invasion of Georgia (and semi-invasion of Ukraine) and the inescapable rise of
China.
5. 4. 4. 1. Use of Force
American force use in this period was negligible compared to previous periods and
logically corresponds to “withdrawal.” Both Bush II and Obama focused on stabilizing
existing conflicts rather than extending any new commitments. Furthermore, the Obama
administration was willing to participate in multilateral operations in limited ways. All of
these policies, even the U.S.’ very-limited participation in multilateral endeavors, make
sense under the rubric of a restrictive international environment, dissatisfaction with
international order, and moderate to low-risk acceptance. In the final years of his
administration, Bush II sought to stabilize the situation in Iraq due to failures in state and
peace-building in Iraq, and the inability of the occupying forces to pacify local sectarian,
and other, violence.535 Domestic losses might have played a role as well since the
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Republican Party had made significant losses in the 2006 Congressional Campaign and
concerns over his party’s future might have encouraged some action. Based on the findings
of the content analysis we can observe an upward trend in perceived losses and
dissatisfaction with international order in the 2007-2008 period. It may just be that Bush II
did not want to lose, and that failure to commit more troops to avoid further losses would
have translated into further problems down the line.536 Deploying additional troops to
increase local security and stabilize the Iraqi government was merely a means to preserve
something the U.S. had heavily invested. As of January 2007, the U.S. committed an extra
twenty thousand soldiers in the region, which at first escalated, but then reduced violence
in Iraq, much to the pleasure of the administration. In his final Speech to the UNGA in
2008, Bush II expressed great satisfaction on this front.537 Obama withdrew most of these
troops in 2011 under the previously agreed framework.
Obama sought to retrench U.S. power in another way by insisting on an
Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) first approach designed to clear out remnants of Al-Qaeda
and the Taliban in Afghanistan, which still bedeviled the region. In another way, however,
Obama’s push for a surge also meant that the U.S. would be committing to operations over
Pakistan as well where Al-Qaeda often found safe havens due to the inability and,
sometimes, the unwillingness of the Pakistani government to enforce sovereign control and
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security over its territories.538 Within a year, the U.S. had up to 100,000 troops stationed in
the area. Despite necessitating more resources, the Af-Pak Surge is in spirit a retrenchment
policy since it sought to stabilize an existing commitment. Moreover, the administration
began withdrawing these troops until 2016.
The U.S. was inactive during a tumultuous period in a region of critical importance.
That is, the U.S. seems to have pursued hedging strategies in the greater Middle East area
during the Arab Spring when several prominent regimes imploded. In the case of Libya,
the U.S. was loath to respond unilaterally.539 Only by UNSC mandate, and at the request
of prominent NATO allies like UK and France, did Obama assent to a formal U.S.
commitment to setting up a No-Fly-Zone over Libya in conjunction to the confusion
accompanying the toppling of Muammar Gaddafi.540 Libya was not of immediate concern
for the administration and thus preferred to take up the “lead from behind” approach of
minimal multilateralism.541
The lead from behind appears to have become a leitmotif for the administration. In
the context of a declining situation in the Middle East restrictive international conditions,
ambivalence towards international order, and risk-averseness seem to have necessitated a
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shifting of risk and responsibilities to regional allies and local affiliates.542 The Civil War
in Syria unfolded with various regional and external great powers backing local groups,
which deepened the conflict. For its part, the Obama administration avoided confrontation
but sought to provide humanitarian assistance as well as military aid to rebel groups. An
important milestone, however, was the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons. In the
early stages of the conflict, the Obama administration declared that it would consider the
use of chemical weapons as a red line.543 This ultimatum was put to the test in late 2013
after the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime. Just as the U.S. was
prepared to undertake limited airstrike operations against the Assad regime, Russia offered
a modus vivendi in Geneva whereby the Assad regime would assent to the disclosure and
destruction of its stockpile of chemical weapons under the supervision of the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Surprisingly, Obama deferred to the U.S.
Congress to decide on whether to enforce the red line.544 Assad got away with a proverbial
slap on the wrist. It might be fair to argue, based on developments in the Middle East, that
the U.S. showed signs of isolations and limited multilateralism.
Wherever U.S. operations materialized, it usually took the form of aerial
bombardment, provision of no-fly-zones, or direct assistance to local proxies, such as in
the conflict in Syria and the unfolding drama in Iraq following the emergence of the Islamic
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State (ISIL, hereafter). Since 2014, the U.S. has increased troop presence in key locations
in Iraq, both to strengthen its assets but also to assist the Iraq government. In sum, while
the U.S. actively used force around the world, these operations are small in scale and are
low-cost, often involving ad-hoc coalitions or local proxies, which is consistent with the
predictions of the model.
5. 4. 4. 2. Great Power Relations
The framework predicts that restrictive international environments and FPEs operating in
less-than-satisfactory international environments will more likely lead to appeasement of
other great-power states. This scenario was not the case for the U.S. relationship with
Russia since in 2007-2008, the Bush II administration sought to continue pushing for
NATO’s expansion to include Georgia and Ukraine. While formal membership had not
materialized, it was only a matter of time since “NATO” decided that the two countries
would become NATO members.545 In August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and deposed
its Pro-Western president, Saakashvili. Interestingly, despite its previous assertive attitude
towards Russia, the Bush II administration could only protest.
Obama, however, deescalated the tensions, which is something the framework
predicts. The so-called “reset” of U.S.-Russian relations in March 2009 was necessary
because Obama viewed askance the possibility of maintaining cooperative relations with
Russia if he were to follow his predecessor’s policies. The Obama administration,
therefore, sought to assuage Russian fears over further U.S. encroachments by putting on
hold Georgia and Ukraine’s NATO-membership bids. This has not in any way succeeded
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in improving U.S.-Russian relations. Responding to the removal from power of Viktor
Yanukovych, the president of Ukraine, Russia responded by encroaching on Ukrainian
territory and beginning the process of annexing the strategically important peninsula of
Crimea.546 The Obama administration’s response to Russian intransigence was merely to
introduce economic and political sanctions. Already sanctioning Russia under the
Maginsky Act (2012), the Obama administration introduced further sanctions on several
Russian business people and companies in a way to deny technology transfers and goods
for oil and gas exploration/extraction as well as bans on individuals associated with Putin.
In the meantime, the Obama administration seems to have a mixed relationship with Russia
as U.S. and Russia now find themselves at cross purposes, and yet seem able to cooperate
on some issues, in the Middle East. Obama’s approach to Russia, in short, approximates to
retrenchment and appeasement.547 The Obama administration’s approach to China has
typically been labeled under the labels of retrenchment.548 Primarily, Obama oversaw the
strategic reprioritization of U.S. capabilities, or what is called the “Pivot to Asia.”
Recognizing the emergence of China as a peer-competitor, the Obama administration has
prioritized strengthening the U.S. alliance network in Asia, sought to reassure allies, but
also positively engage with China. The U.S. has sought to decrease its commitments in the
Middle East in favor of Asia, but the seeming absence of a coherent strategy has rendered
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it difficult to reach a judgment on U.S. conduct towards China.
5. 4. 4. 3. Norms
Each of the past examinations of U.S. conduct towards international law and norms has
focused on U.S. accessions (or lack thereof) to various international treaties, or how the
U.S. has undermined various international conventions on issues concerning the raison de
systéme, like the environmental preservation or the use of force. Here might be a suitable
juncture to briefly explore the intersection of diminishing propensities for risk-taking, use
of force, international ethical issues, and technology. In other words, the rise of “targeted
killings” in international relations via Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs or drones).549
Drone warfare, in some ways, represents the pinnacle of low-risk, unconventional
warfare. Targets can be tracked, located, and destroyed with minimal risk, and therefore
have become a popular weapons system against terrorism and other forms of asymmetric
warfare. Based on publicly available data the U.S., along with Turkey and Israel, is one of
the major employers of this technology over several theaters of war, such as the Af-Pak
region, Yemen, and Iraq.550 The primary problem with this type of warfare is that at present
it challenges principles at the cornerstone of the Westphalian international order. These
include the principles on the legitimate right to the use of force and sovereignty, among
other things.551 While drone use may be a legitimate practice and many states seem to be

See Rosa Brooks, “Drones and the International Rule of Law,” Ethics & International Affairs, Vol 28, No.
1 (2014), pp. 83-103. See Inderjeet Parmar, Linda B. Miller and Mark Ledwidge, eds., Obama and the World:
New Directions in US Foreign Policy (London: Routledge 2014), pp. 188–193; Martin Senn and Jodok Troy,
The Transformation of Targeted Killing and International Order,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 38,
No. 2 (2017), pp. 175-211.
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pushing for this agenda, provided that sufficient legitimacy and authorization can be
obtained from bodies like the UNSC, the fact that the U.S. leads the global statistics in
targeted killings, including in territories where it has no formal mandate, is a destabilizing
practice for international order.
5.5. CONCLUSION
American grand strategy in the post-Cold War took shape in the most positive of
circumstances, as reflected in the order-narratives and psychological framing of U.S. FPEs.
Material preponderance afforded the U.S. a significant freedom of action to pursue
expansive military operations and ambitious promotion of liberal values abroad if it chose
to but the overall restrictiveness of the international environment disciplined policymaking
in a way that helped U.S. FPEs identify Iraq as an ambiguous threat not only to the U.S.
but also the broader international community. From the standpoint of procedure and
legitimacy, the First Gulf War was exceedingly successful. American restraint seems to
have had a blowback effect.
Conforming to international order by adhering to the UN mandate was unpopular,
especially by domestic political opponents like Clinton who harangued Bush I for his lack
of foreign policy vision. Moreover, critics may well argue that U.S. restraint in this affair
was nothing more than an insidious ploy by the Bush I administration to prop up American
unipolarity. His successor, Clinton, meanwhile supported a more expansive agenda. While
the Clinton administration’s internationalist tendencies reveal satisfaction with
international order, there was a marked increase in perceived losses and negative framing,
which is also evidenced by increasing risk-acceptance, and concomitantly unilateralism.
This trend continued under Bush II and the post-9/11 permissive international environment
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in which highly-dissatisfied FPEs pursued order-challenging strategies, but this was
unsustainable. Finally, under Obama, the American grand-strategic orientation closely
resembled retrenchment. While Obama seems more committed to international institutions
and internationalism than Bush II, U.S. grand strategy nevertheless retained much of its
exceptionalism but on a less ambitious scale. The rise of China and the reemergence of
Russia as proper competitors helped to discipline U.S. grand strategy.
In lieu of any further insights about the Trump presidency at this point, we can
certainly speculate that America’s perceived decline will continue to resonate the American
domestic political discourse and manifest as part of the strategic narrative. The unfortunate
consequence is that this will not simply lead to greater bombast in rhetoric. Instead, leaders
acting within the domain of losses will be more risk-acceptant and more willing, even if
only on a discursive level, to pursue assertive policies that might risk alienating allies or
aggravate cooperation.
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6

CHINESE GRAND STRATEGY IN THE POST-COLD WAR

6.1. INTRODUCTION
Before proceeding any further with the analysis, an important caveat is due. Many
prominent works in the literature stress that China is fundamentally a unique country that
is heir to a set of special geopolitical, historical, cultural circumstances.552 As such,
discussions on Chinese aspirations in world politics seem to range from its peaceful
intentions that underscore Chinese values and status-related aspirations, all the way to
Realist ambivalence about China’s true intentions.553 More likely than not, Chinese foreign
policy executives face similar challenges and limitations as do their counterparts
elsewhere.554
This chapter does not speculate the “true” intentions of Chinese FPEs. Instead, it
elaborates on trends in Chinese grand-strategic behavior in the post-Cold War period and
its prevailing strategies concerning the use of force and its attitude towards allies, its
relations with great powers, as well as its conduct in international law. It does so by tracing
the behaviors back to the specific permutations of permissiveness of the international
system and FPEs’ strategic narratives. It makes no attempts at predictions based on current
trends in Chinese grand-strategic behavior. The main goal, therefore, is to assess, with
available primary and secondary sources: a) the social and material constraints on China,
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See Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New
Global Order (New York, NY: Penguin, 2012).
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See Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm.”

Once again, Luttwak’s point concerning great-state autism may be apropos here. See Allison, Thucydides
Trap.
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b) the extent to which Chinese foreign policy executives construct narratives consistent
with the raison de systemè of international order, and c) whether or not China’s foreign
policy behavior bears any consistency with the proposed grand-strategic orientations.
This chapter argues that during the post-Cold War period, China’s overall
satisfaction with the international order gradually increased, which encouraged China to
pursue an order-conforming grand strategy. In conjunction with an increasingly permissive
environment, however, China soon adopted an order-reforming disposition.
6.2. APPROACHES TO CHINESE GRAND STRATEGY
The notion of Chinese grand strategy is subject to many controversies. 555 Some have
argued that China does not have a grand strategy so to speak or any coherent policy
design.556 Whatever continuities there are to Chinese behavior serves the sole purpose of
The literature on China’s grand strategy is rich. See, for example, Thomas J. Christensen, Useful
Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Idem., The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power
(New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2015); Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy
and International Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005); Bijian Zheng, “China’s
‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5 (September/October, 2005), pp. 18–
24; Ashley J. Tellis, “China’s Grand Strategy,” Claws Journal (Summer, 2010); Wang Jisi, “China's Search
for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 90, No. 2 (March/April,
2011), pp. 68-79; Zicheng Ye, Inside China’s Grand Strategy: The Perspective from the People’s Republic
(Lexington, KY: The University of Press of Kentucky, 2011); Stig Senslie, “Questioning the Reality of
China’s Grand Strategy,” China: An International Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2 (August, 2014), pp. 161-178; Feng
Zhang, Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions In East Asian History (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2015).; Flynt Leverett and Wu Bingbing, "The New Silk Road and China’s
Evolving Grand Strategy," The China Journal, No. 77 (January, 2017), pp. 110-132; Giovanni B. Andornino,
“The Belt and Road Initiative in China’s Emerging Grand Strategy of Connective Leadership,” China &
World Economy, Vol. 25, No. 5 (2017), pp. 4–22 Aaron L. Friedberg, “Globalisation and Chinese Grand
Strategy,” Survival, Vol. 60, No. 1 (2018), pp. 7-40; Lukas K. Danner, China’s Grand Strategy:
Contradictory Foreign Policy? (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
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Foreign Relations, No. 234 (October, 2017), p. 4.; Robert Sutter, China’s Foreign Relations: Power and
Policy Since the End of the Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2012), p. 140.
See, also, Shinju Yamaguchi, who argues that China’s grand strategy is beginning to coalesce under the
strong leadership of Xi Jiping. Idem., Strategies of China’s Maritime Actors in the South China Sea A
Coordinated Plan under the Leadership of Xi Jinping?” China Perspectives, China’s Policy in the China
Seas, Vol. 3 (2016), pp. 23-31.
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addressing China’s immediate needs and assuaging its weaknesses, which sometimes
requires China to pursue sub-optimal and contradictory foreign policies.557 These scholars
are skeptical about the possibility of a coherent intellectual framework guiding the foreign
policy of China, essentially arguing that pragmatic necessity trumps ideological
convictions.558 As often suggested in the literature on “Third World” balancing, developing
states, particularly ones with authoritarian regimes, are more sensitive to domestic
threats.559 It comes as no surprise that much of what China appears to be doing reflects the
deep-seated insecurity that Chinese elites feel about their grasp on power. Other scholars,
nevertheless, make the case that grand strategy involves an intellectual framework and long
time horizons that most states possess, unwittingly or otherwise.560 China, therefore, might
have a grand strategy. Here too, there is much controversy over the nature and sources of

Barry Buzan, “The Logic and Contradictions of ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’ as China’s Grand Strategy.”
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Winter, 2014), pp. 381–420; Christopher Layne,
“The Influence of Theory on Grand Strategy: The United States and a Rising China,” in Annette FreybergInan, Ewan Harrison, and Patrick James, eds., Rethinking Realism in International Relations: Between
Tradition and Innovation, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), pp. 103–135.
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Naval Ambition,” in William C. Wohlforth and Deborah Welch Larson, eds., Status in World Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 141.
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The Case of Egypt, 1962-73,” International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer, 1991), pp. 369-395. See,
also, Stephen R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January, 1991),
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Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall, 2005), pp. 46–83.
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Chinese grand strategy, as it straddles anywhere between Realpolitik, Communism, and
Confucianism.561
We find at the intersection of these debates the key discussion point that set of this
research: does China have revisionist aims, or is it a peaceful, status quo, power?562 Indeed,
the academic debate complements an impressive array of narratives from the policy world
about the true intentions of Chinese elites. Chinese elites, for their part, do their best to
counter these policy narratives by emphasizing principles they outlined in their long-term
plans, or what we can call prescriptive grand strategies.563 These efforts have prompted
some interesting prescriptive grand strategies such as “hide the light,” “peaceful rise,” also
known as “peaceful development,” “striving for achievement,” and “selective
leadership.”564 A spate of recent studies has noted the contradictory tendencies of Chinese
grand strategy, drawing attention to their FPEs’ diverging discourses and behaviors.565 In
particular, the Chinese prescriptive notion of “Peaceful Development” seems elicits
significant contradictions as China sometimes adopts assertive policies that aim to enhance
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Chinese honor (also traditional and rational goals such as military and economic power) in
order to cement domestic legitimacy. It is beyond the scope of this study to profess a
comprehensive and transcendental answer to this controversies. That China, and many
other states, seem to deviate from a broader notion of grand strategy –declared,
prescriptive, or inferred– is not exceptional. When the question of “wither grand strategy?”
is replaced with a “why” and “when” questions, the incoherence argument loses its raison
d’etre. For our purposes, therefore, neither a fixed Chinese grand strategy nor long-term
consistency is necessary for the analysis. This chapter, accordingly, examines Chinese
behavior and Chinese FPEs’ discourses over the post-Cold War period to corroborate
whether

there

were

reasonably

consistent

grand-strategic

orientations

and,

correspondingly, the employment of appropriate strategies in various domains of state
behavior.
6.3. MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND DISCURSIVE CONTEXT
6.3.1. Material Capabilities
Noting the primacy of a state’s freedom of action, as defined by its relative military
capabilities, the CINC reveals that for most of its history, China did not have a favorable
material environment. Despite its overwhelming demographic advantage, which skews the
data in favor of China, and its enormous economic potential, Chinese capabilities were
hardly level with the U.S.566 Arguably, a part of the reason for this was that China’s
enormous population base did not translate into military personnel due to China’s

Figures based on Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power
War, 1820-1965,” 19-48 and augmented by World Bank Open Data. URL: https://data.worldbank.org/, Last
Accessed: November 11, 2018.
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abandonment of “People’s Warfare” and other mass-based military doctrines in favor a
smaller and modernized force, for which reforms were already underway in the period of
study.567 According to the 2012 COW data, China’s position relative to the U.S. improved
gradually as China reached parity with the dominant state, the U.S., after 2001, and
gradually overtook it (See figures 6.1., 6. 2., and 6. 3. below). Economically too, China
went from being a backwater to a major economy in 2000, and then rose to the secondrank spot.
Beyond material capabilities as an accumulation of assets, however, one need also
consider other factors relating to how that power is possibly utilized. In other words,
freedom action also relates to a state’s ability to project force outwardly. In this category,
the U.S. retains an overwhelming edge over China, as well as other great-power states.568
While China lacks trans-oceanic power projection capabilities, it maintains a distinct local
advantage. Nevertheless, China has demonstrated throughout the Cold War its willingness
to use force in its immediate neighborhood in fulfillment of its core interests.569 More
importantly, China has undertaken significant military modernization since 1996 and has
significantly expanded its operational capabilities, which scholars link to a more assertive

See M. Taylor Fravel, “The Evolution of China’s Military Strategy: Comparing The 1987 And 1999
Editions of Zhanlüexue,” in James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein, eds., China's Revolution in Doctrinal
Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (Arlington VA,
Center for Naval Analyses, 2002), pp. 79-99, esp., pp. 84-86.
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foreign policy and force posturing the East and South China Seas.570 China shows signs of
significant signs of military modernization, such that it may be able to overwhelm the
militaries of neighboring states and possibly even U.S. forces deployed nearby.571 ,
Despite its incredible growth in the past decades, however, China remains a
developing country with a massive population that has the potential to threaten the regime.
No matter how much China modernizes its military and expands its capabilities, its FPEs
will be averse to taking on the kind of military operations that today only Russia and the
U.S. can achieve. China’s neighborhood is also considerably more hostile than, say, that of
the U.S. China is surrounded by three regional “great” powers. Russia is currently friendly
towards China but possesses power projection and WMD capabilities that surpasses
Chinese capabilities.
India, meanwhile, has abysmal relations with PRC due to outstanding historical and
territorial misgivings. Japan is also a great power, a U.S. ally and feels threatened. China
is flanked by several countries, like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, that are not only on
good terms with the U.S. but also possess considerable military assets. One of China’s few
allies is North Korea, which is essentially a liability for China since the North Korean
regime’s nuclear vocation has caused numerous problems because its conduct has forced
China to choose between obeying UN sanctions and aiding its ally. Considering the

See Aaron L. Friedberg, “Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics,” The National Interest, No. 114
(July/August, 2011), pp. 18-27, esp., p. 19.
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intersection of material capabilities and domestic vulnerabilities, Chinese “revisionism”
will be limited. The only exception to this may be if Chinese FPEs consciously attempt to
harness nationalist sentiments and mobilize public support through irredentist policies.
Even then, an authoritarian regime may be loath to harness nationalist energies that may
spiral out of control.

Figure 6.1. Chinese Military Expenditure Compared to the U.S., 1990-2017
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Figure 6.2. Chinese Mil. Spending, % of GDP Compared to the U.S., 1990-2017
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Figure 6.3. Chinese CINC Scores, Compared to the U.S., 1990-2017
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6.3.2. Content Analysis of Narratives
This chapter defines Chinese FPEs as the most influential decision-makers concerning the
formulation and execution of Chinese foreign policy, especially those responsible for
articulating the policies to the world public as well as those responsible for creating consent
(i.e., policy justifications). Chinese UN speeches have been delivered in the past by a
diverse portfolio of individuals, including presidents, premiers, as well as other top
executives such as ministers of foreign affairs.572 It is worth mentioning that the “cycles”
of orientations do not neatly fall under the tenures of specific heads of state. Given how
influential Presidents are in both political systems, attempting periodization based on
incumbent leaders’ tenures would have made sense. This arrangement is especially
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Li Keqiang.
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applicable for American presidents because they often introduce a unique strategic or
geopolitical vision with which to guide their foreign policy. Chinese presidents similarly
issue doctrinal papers that comprehensively lay forth their policy principles. Nevertheless,
the potential of Chinese presidents to have decade-long tenures, combined with the trends
in the data as well as China’s international conduct, made an exclusive, leader-based,
temporal division unnecessary.
There is a notable difficulty in attempting to divine Chinese narratives about world
order. An analysis of thirty-five UNGA (thirty-four addresses to the Assembly and six
statements) from 1990-2018 reveal that for a better part of this period the speeches elicit
very high-degrees of thematic and substantive similarities as compared to their U.S.
counterparts.573 Often, earlier speeches, especially in China’s order-retrenching period in
the 1990s much of the disagreements the speeches always invoke the same themes and
repeat the same ideas virtually verbatim. The differences in values across the years reflect
changing degrees of emphasis on certain narratives.574
Another critical element is that the Chinese speeches underscore dissatisfaction
narratives as they relate to issues of national sovereignty and international justice.
Especially in the 1990s, Chinese order narratives revolve around sovereignty concerns and
justice for the oppressed developing countries. Virtually, every speech references the
differences between “rich countries” and “small countries,” the need for the former to aid
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the latter, the need to move beyond the “Cold War mentality.”575 Meanwhile, the
significance of territorial sovereignty and, consequently, references to Taiwan and other
terra irredenta, were common features as well but such narratives declined in frequency
over time. One narrative, however, remained an ever-present feature of Chinese speeches:
that of sovereignty, from which we can reasonably estimate that Chinese preferences, and
willingness to pursue riskier strategies would be more inelastic.
In suggesting that China gradually adopted first an order-conforming and then an
order-reforming orientation, the analysis finds that earlier Chinese discussions mainly
revolve around developmental issues and procedural statements about China’s foreign
relations that do not automatically translate into order narratives. Even China’s earlier
satisfaction narratives reflect a high-degree of “revisionism.” Much of the coded narratives
are those dedicated to changing, reforming, the UN. This discourse may reflect
dissatisfaction or a desire on the part of Chinese decision-makers to enhance their influence
in world politics. Another way to read this tendency is to think about UN reform as a kind
of representational dissatisfaction.576 Since the narratives concern the functioning of a
long-standing and significant international organization, on that could be considered the
lynchpin of the liberal international order, reform narratives were coded as expressing
implicit consent for the functioning of the existing international order.
More promising for the framework is the overtime reduction in narratives around
UN reform, which again arguably reflects a parochial desire to obtain greater influence

In fact, such attitudes have not disappeared from the Chinese lexicon. See Ben Blanchard, “Senior Chinese
diplomat says China, U.S. Must Avoid Cold War Mentality,” Reuters (September 25, 2018).
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rather than upholding order per se. Despite this drop, Chinese satisfaction narratives
increased tremendously over time as references to common interests and internationalism
markedly increased.
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Figure 6. 4. Chinese FPEs’ framing of gains and losses577
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Figure 6.5. Chinese FPEs’ narratives about satisfaction and dissatisfaction578
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6.4. POST-COLD WAR CHINESE HISTORY
Between 2003-2010, Chinese grand strategy was order-conforming. Using 2003 as the cutoff period between order retrenchment and conforming orientations may seem arbitrary
since China was already starting to increase its participation in major global organizations
and expanding its diplomatic network. Increased participation in global institutions appears
to be the only metric. China’s use of force patterns, general ambivalence with regards to
its global responsibilities, and its relations with other great powers, all suggest that China
was not yet conforming to international order. Table 6. 1. summarizes the predictions of
the framework.
Table 6. 1. Chinese Grand-Strategic Orientations in the Post-Cold War
Years

Permissive
Environment

Prospect
Framing

Satisfaction
Framing
LOW

Predicted
Order
Orientation
RETRENCH

Primary
Observable
Strategies
Withdrawal
Appeasement
Conservativism

ShangKun
&
Zemin

19882001

RESTRICTIVE

MODERATE

Zemin &
Jintao

20012010

RESTRICTIVE

HIGH

HIGH

CONFORM

Multilateralism
Restraint
Enmeshment

Jiping

2010Present

PERMISSIVE

HIGH

HIGH

REFORM

Leadership
Expansionism
Reformism

The division also makes sense given the organization implanted in the previous
chapter whereby the tenure of U.S. presidents provided a sound basis for dividing different
eras. The reasoning was that while elites and decision-makers of lower echelons may have
remained the same, a change in administration invariably reshuffled the FPE deck.
Furthermore, in the U.S. system presidents are free to, often expected, to leave behind a
doctrinal legacy. This trend is even more pronounced in the Chinese case since each
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president articulates formal ideological positions and doctrines about their strategic
priorities.579 Finally, and most importantly, the data also helpfully demarcates specific
dates as being significant. For instance, 2002 coincides with both China formally eclipsing
the U.S. in terms of their CINC scores all the while Chinese narratives at the UN
experienced a sharp positive increase in terms of satisfaction narratives.
Chinese grand strategy in the post-Cold War was modest during the post-Cold War
as its restrictive international environment, constricted its ambitions. Moreover, its ordernarratives evinced dissatisfaction, while its FPEs were plagued with uncertainty and
insecurity. Material weaknesses denied China the significant freedom of action to pursue
expansive military operations and, moreover, impelled China to pursue accommodationist
strategies towards other great powers. Even when China had important points of
disagreement with the U.S., its displeasure only materialized as opprobrium; never as
concrete policies. As the decade went on, China gradually began to integrate into various
regional and multilateral institutions.
Moreover, its economy started to boom. In the turn of the new millennium, China’s
security environment had become a bit more pacific due to the numerous treaties it
established with neighbors. More importantly, Chinese FPEs expressed great satisfaction
towards international order and they elicit much greater certainty about their prospects, all
of which signaled a risk-averse and peaceable grand-strategic orientation. Finally, around
2010, China’s growing power and improving strategic circumstances not only enhanced its
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freedom of action but also made it more assertive. Still, Chinese FPEs’ were extremely
satisfied with international order and viewed positively their prospects, which culminated
in order-reforming strategies.
6. 4. 1. Order-Retrenching, 1990-2001
The framework predicts that during the 1990s, China’s grand-strategic orientation
amounted to order-retrenchment. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, China still
retained behavioral characteristics that while rejecting international order was nevertheless
reluctant to undermine it through pursuing risky and expansive strategies. What to the U.S.’
was the unipolar moment to China a period of relative weakness and instability. China
faced a restrictive international environment in three ways. Firstly, in terms of its
capabilities. As a still-developing nation, China’s economic base was relatively weak and
not capable yet of developing a world-class military that could match the U.S. and its allies
in the region. Chinese FPEs were acutely aware of their material incapacity to stand up to
the superpower states and thus opted to avoid confrontation.580
Secondly, the collapse of the Soviet Union proved to have a surprisingly negative
consequence for China. Normally, such a power vacuum ought to have enhanced Chinese
freedom of action. Yet, China was not able to exploit such a shift. Instead, its strategic
value for the West declined. This is because, counterintuitively, China’s main “enemy”
during the Cold War was not the bourgeois West but its Soviet neighbor. This conflict
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emanated from ideological differences and strategic interests. Chinese and Soviet
interpretations of Marxism seemed irreconcilable.581 Aggravating the problem was China’s
desire to lead the Third World as an alternative to the Western and Soviet blocs. China also
feared and resented the Soviet Union due to the latter’s imperial attitude towards other
socialist countries.582Most importantly, both countries failed to settle their long-standing
border disputes, culminating most notably in a clash along the Ussuri River. It was this gap
that the Nixon administration sought to exploit through Triangular Diplomacy and promote
China as a counter-balance to Soviet power, thus setting China on a path to normalizing
relations with the West, which paved the way for both economic and political support. The
problem was that absent the Soviet threat; the U.S. had fewer incentives to accommodate
China.583
Finally, improving relations with the West and opening its economy to the global
market kicked off a period of tremendous economic growth for China. It also exposed the
regime to the ill-effects of liberalization as opening up to the outside world fomented
domestic dissent. China’s domestic stability and international diplomatic reputation nadir
in the Post-Cold War period due to the events of Tiananmen Square.584 The loss of Western
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support manifested in an arms embargo on China and, additionally, risked China’s trading
relations with Western powers; particularly with the U.S.
China’s international environment was also restrictive in the sense that it did not
fundamentally alter Chinese threat perceptions nor create any maneuvering space to pursue
alternative policies. One key Chinese policy objective, as corroborated by the literature as
well as the FPEs’ accounts, is the fulfillment of China’s territorial ambitions. Specifically,
China aimed to reacquire some of its neighboring territories on which it has historical
claims. China had long-standing border disputes with virtually all its neighbors, which
during the Cold War culminated in confrontations with neighboring states, including the
use of force.
Additionally, the historical legacies of colonialism and China’s ruling ideology
made it necessary to expunge foreign presence from Chinese territory. To this end,
reacquiring Hong-Kong and Macau were important goals for the Chinese leadership. Most
importantly, however, China sought to decisively solve the Taiwan issue, which has both
domestic, strategic, and symbolic implications for the mainland. Domestically, the
continued existence of an alternative and hostile Chinese government threatened the
legitimacy of the Communist Party. Strategically, Taiwan served a similar purpose as West
Berlin did for American power projection. It provided at once a bastion for Western
ideology as well as military bases for the U.S. that could encircle and contain China.
Finally, Taiwan was historically a part of China, and its continued independence is a
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symbolic rebuke to Chinese aspirations. No matter how amiable China may seem in
discourse and disposition, Taiwan appears to represent a kind of red line for China.585
Chinese FPEs had an ambivalent attitude to international order. On the one hand,
both at the UN and in other fora, the emerging unipolar structure, including the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the reemergence of Germany as a regional actor, were interpreted as
signaling an end to rigid bipolarity and a decisive shift towards multipolarity. As Qichen
noted in his 1990 address to the UNGA:
Profound changes are taking place in the world today. German unification
will soon become a reality, co-operation between various regions of the
world is increasing. The trend towards multipolarization has grown
noticeably. However, power politics continue. Political, economic and
ethnic strains have become increasingly evident, and tensions and
complicated situations have emerged in some regions.586
The end of the Cold War also made China more vulnerable. In addition to the
diminishing strategic value of China as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, Chinese FPEs
anticipated a rise in regional conflicts and the risk of Western intervention also seemed to
be distinct possibilities.587 Even as the Gulf War unfolded, China’s leaders perceived that
they could be next as the next target of U.S.-led regime change.588 An examination of
discourses reveals that Chinese FPEs were dissatisfied with international order as
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evidenced by their frequent criticism of Western powers, narratives about building a new
international order, and overt concern for territorial sovereignty.589
If the framework is correct, we should be able to observe evidence in China’s
conduct a tendency to shirk from major international undertakings that could be risky. In
terms of the use of force and diplomatic disposition, we would expect that China would be
“withdrawn” or, simply, reluctant to use any force barring the defense of perceived core
interests. In terms of its attitude towards the balance of power and its relations with great
powers, the framework predicts that an order-retrenching China would more likely
“appease” other major powers. As for international legal conduct and normative
aspirations, an order-retrenching attitude would not outright break international norms and
laws but insist merely on “conservative” and parochial interpretations that negate their
applicability to their case.
6. 4. 1. 1. Use of Force
In this period, the model predicts that China would be unlikely to use force. Debilitating
domestic weaknesses and an unfavorable international context compromised China’s
ability to use sustained force. Nevertheless, the core Chinese interests provided an enduring
rationale, and pressing need, for China to exert military power even when it was arguably
least capable of attaining desirable political outcomes. An order-retrenching state may be
motivated to revise international order, but a combination of material weaknesses, risk
aversion, or inability to define core interests would militate against decisive use of force.
As indicated earlier, it is not surprising that there have been instances in recent decades in
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which China used force, but its use of force in the 1990s was limited in comparison to
previous decades. Even its participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions remained relatively
circumscribed until it adopted an order-conforming disposition in the 2000s. In fact, in
1990 China was contributing a mere two Peacekeepers as observing staff members to
UNTSO.590 China’s sole military contribution in this period was its contribution of
observers, as well as a small contingent of engineers and soldiers to the UN Transitional
Authority in Cambodia, a country virtually next door to China.
China’s reluctance to participate in UN Peacekeeping Missions was likely the
product of weakness rather than any inherent dissatisfaction with the international order
simply because Chinese military developments in this period were also lackluster and
highly reactive as compared to the proactive disposition of the PLA during the Cold War.591
Additionally, accepting international intervention against minor states would have
conflicted with China’s anti-imperialist aspirations. China was beginning to accept the
notion of conditional intervention against other states.592
As for the use of force elsewhere, whereas contemporary discussions of Chinese
conduct in the South and East China Seas draw attention Chinese assertiveness and
attempts to acquire greater control, such a narrative would have been harder to sustain in
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the 1990s when China’s ambitions were limited to maintaining a favorable presence. For
instance, in 1994 China seized Mischief (Meiji) Island, which was a part of the long
disputed Spratly Island chain and constructed a military base.593
Fravel notes that Chinese attitudes towards border-dispute settlement took on
different shapes based on the nature of the territory and the proximity of domestic threats.
For instance, areas like Hong-Kong, Macao, and Taiwan are considered part of the Chinese
“Homeland,” and Chinese willingness to compromise was inelastic no matter how secure,
or not, the Chinese government felt.594 By this interpretation, it is unlikely for China to
remain indifferent to developments in these vital areas regardless of its order-retrenching
orientation.
China nevertheless engaged in limited uses of force, mostly in the form of naval
exercises as a form of force posturing and coercive diplomacy. The most dramatic of these
instances in the post-Cold War period was its efforts to intimidate Taiwan in 1995-1996.
China considers Taiwan a core national interest and has demonstrated its resolve to use
force, if needed, on past occasions.595 In 1995-1996, China conducted missile tests as a
well as massive-scale military exercises, complete with live ammunition, near Taiwan.
This round of conflict was encouraged by U.S. support for the then Taiwanese president
Lee Teng-Hui, who advocated a pro-independence agenda. Despite their reassurances to
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the PRC, the U.S. government nevertheless facilitated Lee Teng-hui's visit to Cornell
University, his alma mater, to deliver a talk that featured overtones in support of Taiwanese
independence.596 This academic visit was perceived by the PRC as a violation of its official
“one China, two systems” policy and a direct challenge to its vocation of reunification with
Taiwan.597 China responded with a strong condemnation, declaring that PRC “will not sit
idle if foreign forces interfere in China's reunification and get involved in Taiwan
independence.”598 Aggravating the situation was the upcoming Legislative Yuan election
in Taiwan where pro-independence factions had been gaining momentum.
Both as a signal of resolve and as a form of coercive diplomacy, the PRC took
military measures, which manifested as a series of missile tests and military exercises too
close for Taiwanese comfort. In July 1995, the PLA launched multiple missiles on the sea
lanes between Taiwan and Japan. These were followed up by the PLA’s annual exercises
in November, which took place in Dongshan Island of the Chinese coast but also near
Taiwan. The exercises brought 160,000 soldiers, and all branches of the PLA in a combined
arms operation, to simulate an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, which made it the most
extensive military exercise ever conducted by the PLA.
To put these developments into perspective, the PRC was by no means a peaceful
state in the run-up to 1990s. For much of the Cold War, China was not seriously considered
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as a great-power state by any conceivable metric. Even in this period, it found itself
embroiled in nearby conflicts. It was involved in the Korean War and even sought to use
force against Formosa/Taiwan/U.S. Furthermore, it clashed with other neighboring states,
including sustained inter-state wars in Vietnam. China was part of twenty-one border
disputes in this period and used force in six of them. These include, among others, India
and Russia, which were formidable rivals to China. The clashes with Russia are worth
mentioning simply due to the scale of the conflict as fighting erupted over the Amur and
Ussuri Rivers along the two countries’ 4,300km long shared border; the clashes only ended
after a stern warning from the Soviet Union.
Why mention these examples from the Cold War? Because the experiences of the
Cold War serve as a baseline with which to measure Chinese patterns of the use of force.
Naturally, China pursued an order-challenging grand strategy during much of the Cold
War, until Détente. It was willing to use force preemptively, apply coercive diplomacy,
and was overall risk acceptant, even towards more powerful states.599 The experience of
force used in the 1990s, however, show an overall reduction in these tendencies. The
primary reason is a material deficiency. Of course, the military exercises over Taiwan were
staggering in scale considering the numerical and geographic scope of the operations.
Furthermore, PRC force posturing amounted to a thinly-veiled attempt to intimidate its
opponents such as the proponents of independence in Taiwan. China’s reluctance to follow
up on the initial operations after the favorable conclusion of the Taiwanese election and
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the deployment of the largest U.S. naval contingent in Taiwan since 1958 also depicts a
different pattern, however. While China was risk-acceptant and willing to invest in conflict
with more powerful rivals during the Cold War (including the U.S.) its reluctance in the
post-Cold War period can be explained by its lack of freedom of action attributable to
insufficient military capabilities to project power.600 One could nevertheless argue that the
exercises and tests over the Taiwan Strait in 1995-1996 possibly carried with it the risk of
retaliation by the U.S. In fact, the U.S. responded to Chinese maneuvers by deploying two
aircraft carrier battle groups as a show of support for Taiwan but for all intents and purposes
China did not outright clash with any foreign militaries. Moreover, the PRC quickly
followed up on these exercises with a sustained diplomatic engagement with the U.S to
control for damages to the relationship. On this point, China’s relations with other great
powers, namely Russia and the U.S., is worth exploring.
6.4.1.2. Relations with other Great Powers
China’s discursive insistence on an emerging multipolarity, emphasis on developmental
issues, and a low-profile international presence suggest that Chinese FPEs sought a nonideological and amicable foreign policy. Rather than doubling down on their position as
the sole socialist power and attempting to defy the Western alliance through seeking the
leadership of the Soviet successor states and the Third World, Chinese elites found it more
profitable to keep operating within the existing order. Chinese FPEs continued to
implement the policies articulated by Li Peng, who advocated a risk-free foreign policy
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and restraint.601 Thus, the framework predicts that in this period, Chinese foreign policy
pursued limited and risk-averse appeasement policies towards other great powers. We can
find evidence for this in China’s formal relations with the Soviet Union/Russia and the
U.S. In fact, Chinese FPEs appear to have accepted the new status quo produced by the
collapse of the Soviet Union and reshuffling of the former Soviet bloc. They also concluded
significant border settlements, pursued better relations with Russia and, to an extent, with
the U.S.
Firstly, China’s decision to pursue overall decent relations with the U.S. is
consistent with materialist explanations: the U.S. was simply more powerful and
threatening than before. China was also dependent on the U.S.’ renewal of the most favored
nation trading status, which was vital for the Chinese economy. Thus, despite frequent
invectives by Chinese FPEs, China made efforts to maintain decent relations with the U.S.,
even when Chinese FPE felt directly threatened by the U.S. over vital interests such as its
sovereignty and regime stability, Taiwan, as well as its unconstrained use of force.602 The
Chinese had adopted accommodation as the preferred way to interact with the U.S.603
China’s heavy-handed suppression of uprisings around the country, especially the
student occupation of Tiananmen Square in 1989, placed China on the crosshairs of global
public opinion. The American reaction greatly mattered because, since the end of Détente,
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human rights had become a cornerstone of its foreign policy towards the communist
world.604 Combined with the triumphalism of the unipolar moment, China was under great
pressure by the U.S. to democratize and improve its human rights record. U.S.
conservatives declared that they were right about China all along, liberals advocated regime
change, and both groups argued for the implementation of various sanctions to punish the
PRC.605
While China was reluctant to take dramatic action against the U.S., the relationship
suggests that it takes two to tango. That is, conflict avoidance was as much a product of
Chinese restraint as well as American sensibility.606 It was the U.S. Congress that pursued
punitive measures against China rather than presidents.607 For instance, while Bush I was
critical of China, he nevertheless avoided an escalation of tensions. The Clinton
administration, however, was unwilling to tolerate China’s reckless abandon and,
therefore, issued threats to the PRC by suggesting that China’s continued access to
international credit and U.S. markets, as well as the extension to China the status of Most
Favored Nation (MFN, hereafter), would be contingent on its human rights record. Despite
diplomatic tensions, however, the Chinese “backed down” and sought diplomatic
exchanges with the U.S. A similar pattern also applies to the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-
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1996 because although the U.S. deployed aircraft carrier groups to intimidate China,
neither side wanted to escalate the tensions.608 To deescalate the conflict President, Jiang
Zemin visited the U.S. in 1997. Relations were also tense in 1999 when U.S./NATO forces
erroneously bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during Operation Allied Force and
led to the death of three Chinese citizens. Here too, the Chinese limited themselves to
condemning the U.S., but relations quickly improved as the U.S. deescalated the conflict
and provided financial compensation to the families of the deceased and injured. By this
time, President Clinton removed restrictions on China placed by various U.S. agencies and
endorsed its entry into the World Trade Organization, thus ensuring that politics would no
longer prejudice China’s export-dependent economy.609
China’s relations with Russia also surprisingly improved in the 1990s because
Sino-Soviet relations were hostile during the Cold War. One would have expected China
to assert itself as the Soviet Union collapsed since the disorder brought about by dissolution
presented a suitable opportunity for China to solve to its advantage all outstanding
territorial problems with Russia. Sino-Soviet relations were already improving since the
two countries had elected to normalize their relations in 1989.China counterintuitively
demonstrated restraint and made notable concessions to a severely weakened Russia and
unstable Russia. For instance, in 1991 and 1994 China concluded two border agreements
with Russia and built on this framework with an additional border protocol in 1999.610 In
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China’s northern and eastern borders, the agreements equitably divided the disputed
territories between the two as China received 52% of the river islands along the Ussuri
River. As for Sino-Russian boundaries along China’s western frontier, the agreements
legitimized the territorial status quo. Here too, it is worth noting that China acted more
conciliatory than expected. When demarcating the territory, China willingly accepted the
provision that in various territories along the rivers (like Menkeseli and Ol’ginskii Island)
whereby Russian locals would be allowed to continue their local fishing and other
privileges despite the secession of these territories to China, which was under no legal
obligation to accept such a proposition.611
While Chinese FPEs supplied the international community with tirades about the
“Cold War mentality,” its behavior offers a different story. Both towards the unipole and
even towards a severely weakened neighbor, Russia, China’s foreign policy approach was
purely conciliatory and accommodationist, which is consistent with an order-retrenching
orientation.
6. 4. 1. 3. Norms
In this period, China’s conduct correlates with legal conservatism. That is to say; the model
predicts that order-retrenching is expressed through a limited engagement with
international institutions and a parochial interpretation of international norms that
undermine international order in limited ways. A conservative attitude towards
international order is that a state is unlikely to act as a responsible global citizen and help

See Knut Bolstad Jacobsen, “’Rising and Revising?’ China and the Territorial Status Quo” (MA Thesis,
Trondheim University of Science and Technology, Spring 2014), p. 26.
611

281

to adjudicate or resolve international problems. For instance, China’s primary concerns
were regime security and domestic stability, which translated into an excessive concern for
sovereignty; so much so that virtually all of China’s interactions with the rules of the
international order were subordinate to this principle.612
In practical terms, China was ambivalent towards the global human rights regime.
This is not a significant challenge to international order per se since the Chinese never
claimed to be a liberal democracy and always sought to rationalize their oppressive
measures through national necessity. This attitude did, however, translate into policy
preferences at the UN, for instance, where China leveraged its considerable influence not
only to hamper human rights-related legislature but also to block attempts by members to
condemn China on such accounts.613 Beyond avoiding criticism, the Chinese leadership
was also concerned that by enabling interventions and sanctions against human rights
abuses would also form a precedent for the West to meddle in their affairs. When combined
with regime insecurity and the need to keep a low profile, China ended up with shockingly
limited engagement with the UN Security Council where, as one of the five permanent
members, China had the right to veto resolutions. It did so very sparingly, however,
preferring instead to abstain from most resolutions as a way to avoid alienating other major
powers all the while signaling its political preferences. One of the few instances, when
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China was willing to enable UN efforts in this period, was empowering UNOSOM. Even
then, China went to great lengths to emphasize the exceptionalism of the situation.614
On the other hand, the PRC was beginning to display evidence of integration into
international institutions and much greater participation in the international order.
Continuing the discussion from the UN, Chinese FPEs frequently referred to the centrality
of the organization for global order and the need to adjudicate all disputes through the UN
System. The reform of the UN constituted significant portions of Chinese UN speeches,
signaling that China did want to empower the institution. In addition to its support of the
institutions UN System, China also began to accede to major international treaties towards
the end of the 1990s as it became a party to UNCLOS and a member of WTO.615 All of
these developments, of course, betray self-interest. Conducting a maritime/territorial treaty
like UNCLOS was naturally motivated by China’s desire to maximize its sovereignty
claims over its littoral.616 Acceding to UNCLOS also paved the way to a legitimate way to
exploit natural resources and thereby help to satiate its growing economy’s voracious
appetite; membership to WTO also served a similar function.617 It must be noted however
that as a risk-averse novice China acted more as a rule taker than a rule maker, which shows
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that the practical need to integrate and avoid antagonisms far outweighed other
considerations.618
It appears that while China adopted order-retrenching strategies vis-à-vis, it kept a
low profile and gradually improved its relations with great powers and integrated into
major international institutions. Where it would not budge, and use force only in the most
circumspect way, was on matters concerning sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thus,
China’s order retrenchment, starting in 1989, was neither too deep and nor did Chinese
FPEs want to sacrifice economic growth by pursuing inward-oriented, exceptionalist, and
ideological foreign policies that would challenge international order. The next section
discusses how these gains by China shifted it towards an order-conforming orientation.
6. 4. 2. Order-Conforming, 2001-2011
At the dawn of the new millennium, China’s grand-strategic orientation drifted towards
order-conforming as the country started to become more integrated within international
society. Though far from the “responsible global citizen” ideal-type suggested by the
theoretical framework, Chinese conduct appears to have shifted towards greater conformity
with international order.619 If the present theory is correct, there should be ample evidence
in the conduct of Chinese foreign policy that exhibits a preference for multilateralism,
acting through multilateral organizations, exhibiting restraint towards other great powers,
and generally complying with international norms. Finding this evidence in conjunction
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with FPE discourses about international order that affirm their overall satisfaction with the
existing arrangements would further enhance the validity of the framework.
In 2002, China’s CINC score passed that of the U.S. Having attained the status of
the 8th largest economy in the world and positioned itself favorably in WTO; China was
also poised to become a major global economy. China’s material environment thus began
to improve, which would, among other things, helped to propel its military modernization
program.620 Development nevertheless is a double-edged sword. Beginning with the late
1990s, other major powers also began to view China’s development as being potentially
dangerous. Chinese FPEs decision to label their prescriptive grand strategy with the label
of “peaceful rise” hardly dispelled the fears of Western powers and thus Chinese FPEs
sought to counter the narrative, which among other things necessitated improving relations
with neighboring countries.
Furthermore, despite the Bush II administration’s focus on the Middle East brought
U.S. and NATO forces to China’s doorstep.621 Although, China and the U.S. did have a
common enemy in the form of Islamic terrorism and both could agree on the need to act
against this global threat. Consequently, China’s strategic environment was restrictive and
Chinese FPEs saw the benefits in pursuing regional restraint and improved relations with
its neighbors.
Concomitantly, Chinese strategic narratives at the UNGA show a discernable turn
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towards satisfaction with an international order and a gradual decline in negative framing
of developments. Beyond the content analysis, however, there were also specific references
to ideas related to raison de systéme. For instance:
The principal task for the Chinese people in the new century is to press
ahead with the modernization programme, work towards the grand cause of
national reunification, safeguard world peace and promote common
development. Indeed, the purpose of China’s foreign policy is to safeguard
world peace and promote common development. China needs an
environment of friendship and good-neighbourliness and external
conditions of stability and prosperity. To achieve, and safeguard, such an
international environment serves China’s national interests. It is also
China’s duty as a member of the international community. We believe that
all civilizations and social systems in the world can, and should, exist side
by side on a long-term basis, complementing one another and making
progress together, in a spirit of seeking common ground while putting aside
differences.622
As indicated earlier, when contrasted with the speeches from the 1990s, UNGA
speeches from the order-conforming period do not show a significant increase in
satisfaction levels. At the same time, however, there is an overall decline in negative
framing and dissatisfaction narratives, which suggests that risk-acceptance would be
minimal unless it concerned China’s vital interests. More importantly, the percentage of
satisfaction narratives shift from narratives about reforming the UN towards common
interests. 623 An order-conforming China more frequently invoked raison de systéme than
on previous occasions. It was merely in the interest of Chinese FPEs to promote peace
and stability because “without a peaceful and stable international environment,
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development is out of the question for any country.”624
These developments manifested in doctrinal changes in China’s foreign policy as
well. The so-called “New Security Concept” had already been in use during the late 1990s,
which highlighted China’s commitment to peaceful development, the trend towards
multipolarization, and the need for international politics to move away from Cold War
“mentalities” and embrace developing countries and their needs.625 In the early 2000s,
Chinese FPEs formulated the prescriptive grand strategy of “peaceful rise,” which was later
rebranded as “peaceful development” since the former appellation invoked an ominous
sense that China was challenging international order.626 Simply, peace, stability, and
development became the defining (Chinese) narratives about order.627
Under these circumstances, the framework predicts that China would be less able
and less-likely to likely to use force overall. An order-conforming orientation, nevertheless,
is more consistent with the conduct of a good global citizen, or a responsible stakeholder.628
China clearly showed signs of reducing its military activities (although it did not recant its
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territorial claims) but, conversely, became a more active proponent of UN Peacekeeping
Missions. It also sought better relations with other great powers and neighbors alike and
did so through increased multilateral engagement like the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization and ASEAN.
6. 4. 2. 1. Use of Force
In terms of evidence corroborating the theoretical argument, this section arguably presents
the greatest challenge to the logic of the framework. A more capable and satisfied, in other
words, an order-conforming, China would by necessity take on greater international
responsibilities. While the extent to which China was enmeshed in the legal and normative
framework of international society in this period is debatable, its willingness to contribute
to UN Peacekeeping Missions is unmistakable. China, moreover, did not engage in any
local use of force worth mentioning in this period, opting instead for the multilateral use
of force under UN auspices.
We can assess China’s enhanced participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions in
three ways. Firstly, one needs to consider the burgeoning number of Peacekeepers
deployed. China’s troop participation, comprised of officers, observers, engineers, police,
and blue helmets increased from a negligible 56, in 2000, to a respectable 2038 by the year
2011.629 Compared to China’s demographic potential, these numbers are paltry.
Nevertheless, China was the most significant contributor of troops among any of the
permanent members of the UNSC. Secondly, financial contributions. By 2011, China was
contributing nearly 4% of the total peacekeeping budget at roughly $300 million; a figure
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surpassed only by other permanent members of the UNSC. Finally, in this period Chinese
peacekeepers were involved in a varied number, twenty-two in total, of UN Peacekeeping
Missions around the world.
There are critical voices that call into question the significance of China’s
contributions and the sincerity of its convictions since they are not commensurate with the
power and stature of China. These contributions have not dispelled the image of China as
a revisionist state, and China’s willingness to act as a responsible stakeholder is still under
discussion.630 Nevertheless, China’s use of force attitude and patterns betray a disposition
towards greater institutional participation whilst retaining a modest and risk-averse
disposition.
6. 4. 2. 2. Relations with Great Powers
In this period, China not only insisted on fostering better relations with other great powers,
including Russia and the U.S. Two qualities define Chinese behavior in this period. Firstly,
China’s discourses on multipolarity and peaceful development began to manifest as
increased participation in multilateral institutions. China’s expanding diplomatic network
and interactions with other great powers consolidated within the context of regional
international organizations rather than bilateral agreements only.

Secondly, China was

notably more assertive towards the U.S. in this period. One should not interpret these
strategies as a form of revisionism but rather a conscious desire to implement some form
of balance of power policies. Without overstating its willingness to invest significant
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resources for international interventions, China’s increasing presence in UN Peacekeeping
Missions, for instance, and its participation in UNSC resolutions, signals a more
responsible attitude towards international order. Thus, the strategy of appeasement gave
way to restraint.
China continued to improve is relations with Russia as well as much of its frontier
neighbors, which was a logical extension of China’s desire to promote multipolarity and
improving relations with Russia meant that both countries could provide a counterbalance
to U.S. power. Secondly, Chinese FPEs felt the need to further enhance their security by
pursuing regional peace, which also squared with the policy of peaceful development.
Finally, the impetus from recent border agreements appears to have initiated a virtuous
cycle where the relations of the two countries expanded both bilaterally and multilaterally.
Building on nascent multilateral efforts in the 1990s, especially the Shanghai Five
in 1994, China, Russian, and members of the Former Soviet Union (excluding Uzbekistan)
established the SCO in 2001. SCO provides a forum for member states to engage in
confidence-building and promote military coordination concerning mutual security
concerns and military deployments. The headquarters are not only located in Beijing, but
China has acted as a major financial donor for the continued operations of SCO.631 In the
case of this period, SCO’s primary function was to promote cooperation on terrorismrelated security issues. To this end, SCO members also cooperated with the U.S.-led
intervention in Afghanistan.
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Nevertheless, neither China nor Russia had much patience for the American
presence in the region. Robert Sutter mentions that both countries sought to extend SCO
membership, and observer status to regional states while denying a position for
extrarational powers, namely the U.S.632
Beyond Russia, China also conducted diplomatic relations with its great-power
neighbors through regional organizations like ASEAN. ASEAN originated in the 1960s
and comprised mainly of southeast Asian countries. In 1997, China, along with Japan and
South Korea, joined ASEA, forming the ASEAN Plus Three. Since ASEAN was economic
cooperation and free-trade organization, China quickly established itself as a major force
due to its much-larger economy.
Nevertheless, it exercised restraint in this organization as well as evidenced by its
initial reluctance to welcome, but eventually accept, the expansion of ASEAN to other
countries, including rivals like India. China, furthermore, went on to spearhead the
formation of a free trade area in the region. The key features of restraint, including
multilateralism and amicability with other great powers, are hallmarks of Chinese foreign
policy in this period.633
Diplomatic activism and multilateralism notwithstanding, one could still claim that
based on its willingness to make concessions, China’s grand-strategic orientation still
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resembled appeasement. An examination of China’s relationship with the U.S., especially
at the UNSC, would hastily dispel such a notion. For instance, China vetoed U.S. attempts
to pass a resolution to intervene in Iraq and topple the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003.
This is significant because it signaled a break from the traditional Chinese policy of
abstaining from UNSC votes if, and when, China did not want to pass a resolution but was
also loath to isolate itself from other great powers.634 For instance, the previous U.S.-led
intervention against Iraq was enabled due to China’s abstention at the Security Council.
Traditional PTTs and other conventional theories would ascribe China’s obstructionism to
an instance of a rising state attempting to defy the dominant state to enhance its prestige
and felt greater confidence to issue such a challenge. Certainly, the rare Chinese veto was
a sign of growing confidence, but one cannot infer that China was challenging the U.S. on
anti-hegemonial or revisionist grounds since even lesser and allied states opposed the
proposed operation. This interpretation overlooks the fact that China was overall
sympathetic with U.S. propositions calling for the disarmament of the Saddam regime.
More importantly, China was not the only permanent member of the UNSC to reject this
proposition.635
That said, this decision was hardly shocking since China has historically opposed
international and humanitarian interventions of all kinds. Aside from its “anti-hegemonic”
stance, China is often loath to endorse U.S. military interventions since these have the
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possibility of allowing the U.S. to encroach on its territories. For instance, the war against
the Taliban brought U.S. and NATO forces straight to China’s Western neighbor, which
was highly undesirable, but China not only voted in favor of the intervention in Afghanistan
but also, reluctantly, participated in U.S.-led operations with other SCO members.636
Arguably, the Chinese were also loath to accept any proposition that set a precedent for
interventions against authoritarian regimes as it found itself at odds with the U.S. over the
conflict in Uzbekistan. Finally, one could also make the case that China opposed the
invasion of Iraq on the grounds of its potentially destabilizing effect on the access to, and
prices of, commodities like oil, which China sorely needed to fuel its burgeoning economy.
In the meantime, the U.S.-led Global War on Terror moreover affected China’s
security environment in other ways too. The Bush II administration increased U.S.’ focus
on the Middle East, which gradually decreased the pressure on China to resist U.S. designs.
Nevertheless, the U.S. administration also began to improve relations with Asian countries,
most notably with India and paved the way to what would later be known as the pivot to
Asia, but this merely provided a further rationalization for China’s relationship with Russia
and their common interest in promoting “multipolarization.”637 China relations with the
great power states, therefore, were more assertive on the one hand but generally adhered
to the rules of international order. Multilateralism, diplomatic activism, and restraint
636

In fact, this was the first time ever that China endorsed the use of force at the UNSC. See Jianwei Wang,
“China’s Evolving Attitudes and Approaches Toward UN Collective Security,” in G. John Ikenberry, Wang
Jsi, and Zhu Feng, eds., American, China, and the Struggle for World Order: Ideas, Traditions, Historical
Legacies, and Global Visions (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 104-131, esp., p. 121.
Nathan Sears, “China, Russia, and the Long Unipolar Moment: How Balancing Failures are Actually
Extending US Hegemony,” The Diplomat (April 27, 2016). URL: https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/chinarussia-and-the-unipolar-moment/ Last Accessed: December 17, 2018.
637

293

formed the core of China’s attitude towards other great powers. Furthermore, China seems
to have accepted a global raison de systéme based on promoting multipolarity, resisting
external incursions into its region, and opposition to global terrorism.
6. 4. 2. 3. Norms
The model predicts that China ought to be integrating or pursuing a strategy of enmeshment
in this period. That is, we should expect to see greater Chinese participation international
institutions, accession to international treaties, and adoption of norms concerning essential
aspects of international order. Chinese multilateralism, restraint, increasing participation
in international organizations as well as UN Peacekeeping Missions have been addressed
above. This section, therefore, examines China’s evolving attitudes on important questions
of the norms guiding the use of force.
Chinese FPEs already had, since the 1990s, positive sentiments towards the UN
and its efficacy in solving disputes and other international problems.638 China had always
been reluctant to accept the premise of collective security since this was often invoked, or
so the Chinese felt, to the detriment of developing states.639 By this period, Chinese FPEs
came to accept the practice of international interventions in a highly circumscribed way.
That is, China was more than willing to support the use of force in the context of Chapter
6 of the UN Charter, i.e., self-defense, based on the consent of the subject state.
In contrast, China was more reluctant to accept modern peacekeeping operations
that required a more proactive response by the international community to prevent

See Stefan Stähle, “China's Shifting Attitude Towards United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” The
China Quarterly, No. 195 (September, 2008), pp. 631-655.
638

639

See Wang, “Evolving Chinese Attitudes,” pp. 106-110.

294

humanitarian crises, as well as a greater investment of resources. Humanitarian
interventions, which fall under the rubric of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but more
recently elaborated in the form of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine, has been a
challenge to Chinese FPEs. R2P is simply the idea that states cannot be bystanders to
humanitarian disasters and have a responsibility to act against the aggressor. Interestingly,
China promoted the doctrine and gave its blessing from the inception of the idea.640 Its
overall conduct has not caught up to the lofty standards. China’s reluctance to meaningfully
uphold R2P and interventions more generally has led to ridicule. Yet, it does little to
downplay China’s significant activism at the UN. Perhaps, Shambaugh explains the best:
By accepting R2P in principle, endorsing and generally enforcing sanctions,
contributing to UN peacekeeping missions, favoring Security Council
reform, holding to a “conformist” UNSC voting record, and being deeply
involved in all UN specialized agencies and commissions, China has
arguably taken on the image and role of “system maintainer” and
“responsible power” in the United Nations. Beijing has certainly come a
very long way from its aloof and often doctrinaire posture of the past and is
one of the most vocal champions of the United Nations.641

Another important issue is that of international sanctions. China has often been
criticized for its reluctance to honor UN sanctions. In this period, however, China has been
fairly rule-abiding in this respect as it has, begrudgingly, accepted to condemn both Iran
and North Korea due to their nuclear programs. In most cases, however, China resisted
imposing sanctions made efforts to reduce the overall damage of the sanctions.
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China may be a responsible stakeholder, or not.642 Its behavior in the 2001-2010
period, however, falls consistently within an order-conforming grand-strategic orientation.
6. 4. 3. Order-Reforming, 2010 and Beyond
Since 2010, China has ambiguously pursued a collection of ambitious strategies as part of
its order-reforming grand-strategic orientation. The scholarly debate on the rise and future
intentions of China truly took shape in this period. Driving the discussion was the perceived
decline of Western powers, particularly the U.S. in the aftermath of the 2008 global
financial crisis, from which China was spared. Combined with its entanglements in
Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. had to retreat from its onerous commitments and focus on
internal-balancing, which this research argues led to the adoption of an order-retrenching
grand-strategic orientation by the Obama administration.643 It was not just academics or
policymakers that perceived U.S. decline, but Chinese FPEs were also cognizant of these
developments, which spurred them to debate the need for greater assertiveness.644
There is little reason to think that China’s environment became more permissive
from the purview of military capabilities only. Materially, China consolidated its positions
as the second largest economy in the world and continued to build up its military
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capabilities in an equivalent way. In the meantime, between 2005 and 2017, China’s
military expenditure rose by 110% (U.S. spending fell by 17% in this period) to reach a
whopping $220 billion.645 Much of the investments in China’s military since 1996 focused
on modernizing weapon systems and improving military personnel.646 Beijing also
expanded its surface and submarine fleets while also obtaining the largest Arctic-capable
fleet in the world. As things stand, China now possesses not only a powerful navy but also
the most substantial coast guard in the world.647 With these capabilities, China is may be
able to contest the regional security order since it would have considerable leverage, i.e.,
local superiority, over distant rivals like the U.S.648 Nevertheless, China’s expanding
military capabilities was and, remains still, far behind that of the U.S. The latter’s military
expenditure dwarfs that of China and has been increasing, barring few exceptional years,
since the late 1990s.
If one enquires about perceptions of power, however, one could nevertheless make
the case that Chinese FPEs began calling into question U.S. preponderance with greater
conviction in this period. While Chinese FPEs made significant references to an expected
shift towards a multipolar international order in their UN speeches during the unipolar
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moment, this tendency virtually disappeared in the 2000s and picked up again in 2011.649
We can infer by triangulating these narratives from other sources that Chinese decisionmakers give considerable thought to these issues, that they perceive an unfolding power
shift to their advantage.650 Thus, while material and technological discrepancies still
present a formidable challenge to an unrestrained China, its decision-makers nevertheless
anticipate a favorable shift, all which suggest that China’s strategic environment has
become more permissive.651 That said, China’s growth has garnered concern from its
neighbors.652
China’s permissive strategic environment also coincides with high levels of
satisfaction with international order. Framing self-interest and the broader interests of the
international system remained a recurring feature of FPE narratives about satisfaction with
international order.
Furthermore, there is a consistent framing of gains while negative framing is
649

Virtually every Chinese UNGA speech since 2011 has referenced an irreversible trend towards
multipolarity, or a newly emerging international order. For Wang (2013 and 2017), “China [is] committed to
promoting democracy in international relations and the trend toward a multipolar world” and that “we live in
an era defined by deepening trends towards a multipolar world, the collective emergence of emerging markets
and developing countries, steady progress in globalization and the application of information technology, and
an exciting new phase in the scientific and technological revolution”; all the while Xi Jiping (2015) stated
that “The movement towards a multipolar world and the rise of emerging markets and developing countries
have become an irreversible historical trend.” See Yi Wang, “Speech Delivered by Yi Wang at the United
Nations General Assembly Plenary Session,” (speech, New York, NY: United Nations, September 27, 2013);
Xi Jiping, “Speech Delivered by Xi Jiping at the United Nations General Assembly Plenary Session,”
(speech, New York, NY: United Nations, September 28, 2015).
See, e.g., Wang, “2013 UNGA Speech.”; State Council, “China’s Peaceful Development,” White Papers
of
the
Government
(Beijing,
China,
September
6,
2011),
available
at
http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7126562.htm, Last accessed November 19, 2018.
650

651

Hence, this is why China is abandoning peaceful development in favor of striving for achievement. See
Yan Xuetong, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement,” The Chinese Journal of
International Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2014), pp. 153–184.
652

See Sears, “China, Russia, and the Long Unipolar Moment.”

298

minimal in this period. Unsurprisingly, in this period there are numerous references by
Chinese FPEs at the UNGA speeches concerning the preservation of international order.
While Chinese FPEs was content, it is also possible to also trace their increasing
assertiveness in these narratives as well. Consider this statement at the 2015 UNGA
Plenary Session:
China will continue to uphold the international order. We will stay
committed to the path of peaceful development through cooperation. China
was the first country to put its signature on the Charter of the United
Nations. We will continue to uphold the international order and system,
underpinned by the purposes and principles of the Charter. China will
continue to stand together with other developing countries. We firmly
support the greater representation and voice of developing countries,
especially African countries, in the international governance system. In
voting at the United Nations, China will always side with the developing
countries. I take this opportunity to announce China’s decision to establish
a 10-year, $1 billion peace and development fund to support the work of the
United Nations, advance multilateral cooperation and promote world peace
and development.653
Here, Xi Jiping is reaffirming China’s desire to uphold international order but also
harkens back to Chinese discourses in the 1990s about international justice and the need
for developed countries to help developing ones. Except, in this case, Jiping provides a
tangible policy position wherein China commits to providing significant developmental aid
to non-Western states and, aid through multilateral cooperation, all the while insisting on
the importance and efficacy of the UN. The raison d’etre of this section is to trace China’s
assertive behavior and correlate them to the strategic environment and FPE narratives, but
it seems that the narratives under scrutiny communicate assertiveness and confidence.
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China, the framework predicts, is more likely to pursue policies consistent with an
order-reforming orientation. There is, however, a complication to examining China’s
behavior in this period: the fact that it is difficult to explicitly decouple issues concerning
the use of force, great-power relations, and conduct vis-à-vis norms, especially in this
period. Order-reforming predicts that a state is more likely to assert itself against perceived
threats, more likely to use force multilaterally but independent from the framework of the
UN, if projecting power distantly, or will only be more assertive. Unlike in the U.S. cases,
it is difficult to reach a definitive judgment on the use of force style/patterns in the Chinese
case because China has not formally used force outside of UN-mandated Peacekeeping
Operations. Chinese FPEs risk-averseness dispels any potential for China to use force. Any
belligerence and unilateral use of force on China’s part has been minuscule and limited to
China’s immediate neighborhood, especially its littoral in the South and East China Seas.
This section will, therefore, focus on China’s continued enthusiastic contributions to the
UN but also to its confrontations with regional rivals over maritime borders.
The framework also expects that China will be diplomatically very active in this
period. A strategy of expansionism means that although a state may prefer amicable
relations with other great powers it will also feel confident enough to expand its diplomatic
links beyond its traditional region and, possibly, encroach on the sphere of influence of
other great-power states. China’s alternative economic order-building in Eurasia in the
form of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), its diplomatic initiatives, and its
expanding diplomatic linkages provide ample evidence for this. Finally, order-reforming
would entail challenging existing norms and rules, more through entrepreneurship rather
300

than the outright negating of established ones. One example of this, and relates to China’s
relations with neighboring states, is the “invention” and implementation by China of an Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the South and East China Seas, while its island
building policies also call into question the legal order of the maritime zone.

6. 4. 3. 1. Use of Force
China’s use of force in this period is likely to conform to leadership. The discourse indeed
suggested an assertive and ambitious attitude. On China’s future patterns of use of force,
the 2015 White Paper states that “In response to the new requirements coming from the
country’s growing strategic interests, the armed forces will actively participate in both
regional and international security cooperation and effectively secure China’s overseas
interests.”654 Emphasizing the importance of acting responsibly and upholding the
principles of the UN, China continued to contribute a large contingent of peacekeepers and
supported the UN System.655
China’s engagement with UN Peacekeeping Operations in this period is
nevertheless rife with contradiction. For example, in 2013 China upped its contributions to
peacekeeping missions by deploying, for the first time, actual combat soldiers.656 As
mentioned in the previous section, China’s former policy was to deploy engineers,
observers, and police officers to these missions. This signals greater integration with
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international institutions and a greater willingness, or ability, to invest in UN operations.
Despite this positive development, China is also under scrutiny due to its overall reluctance
to empower the UN to use force in other instances for peacekeeping purposes. China has
still not dispelled the notion that it is a reactive, or inactive, power that prefers to sit on the
sidelines.
Since participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations does not fully capture the
extent of China’s growing assertiveness vis-à-vis the use of force, the next issue is the
intensification of the conflicts over the South and East China Seas since 2010, primarily
aggravated by China enhanced military capabilities and, concomitantly, assertiveness.657
In addition to China, several other littoral states have laid claim over major islands and
other geographic formations. In the East China Sea, China has a long-standing dispute over
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands with Japan. In the South China Sea, China and several other
littoral states have claimed the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and Scarborough Shoal
which China has been occupying since 2012. Maintaining control over these territories is
deemed essential for the regional states because the two seas are major international
waterways with an extremely high volume in sea traffic. Beyond this strategic utility,
however, both seas are rich in hydrocarbons and can be exploited offshore.
Since 2010, the two regions have witnessed approximately fifty maritime incidents,
most of them featuring China. The confrontations have primarily taken on the form of
harassment and ramming of vessels, among other things, resulting in minor damages and
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casualties. Beyond military posturing, China has also engaged in island building as a form
of power projection.658
None of these activities may seem odd when the history of the region is concerned
since China has used force in far more dramatic a fashion against all most of the littoral
states during the Cold War. While intensity may be lacking, the numbers indeed suggest a
heightened disposition to use force.
6. 4. 3. 2. Relations with Great Powers
As a state’s international environment becomes more permissive, the more likely that it
can afford to undertake ambitious policies. If elites in said state anticipate a benefit to acting
within the institutions of international society, the overall policy disposition will favor
order-reforming strategies in which a state will either greater control over existing
institutions, engage in promoting new norms, or merely constructing new institutions to
restructure the international order through largely peaceful means. China was not only an
active participant in major global fora but also undertook ambitious order-building projects
that expanded its influence across Eurasia. In this period, the framework predicts that China
would make a choice towards expansionism, in which a state revises its existing diplomatic
relations to expand its influence such that it either extends beyond traditional geographic
boundaries, especially into the sphere of influence of other great powers. This may also
entail a conscious drive to establish new diplomatic relations or alliances and the adoption
of a more confident demeanor towards other great powers, albeit without resorting to the
use of force. In practical terms, we can reach a verdict on Chinese conduct in this period
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through its development of AIIB as a type of order-building policy that is expanding
Chinese influence.
Although a peaceful endeavor, AIIB is considered by some to be a revisionist/status
seeking policy.659 These developments can be interpreted as a type of expansionist strategy
because it represents an ambitious policy that expands the traditional horizons and
intellectual limits of existing policies. Furthermore, it bridges distant regions of Eurasia
within a broader economic framework. It is expansionist, also because, to the extent that
the project extends beyond the traditional boundaries of China’s geopolitical engagements
and into areas the spheres of influence of other great powers, albeit in a non-aggressive
way without the use of force.
The AIIB, conceived of by Xi Jiping in 2013 and materialized as a formal,
multilateral investment bank in 2015, seeks to reform the global economic order by
providing an alternative source of developmental and infrastructural investment for
countries. In this sense, AIIB is an alternative to the institution's set up by the Bretton
Woods system, such as the World Bank, and other important financial institutions like the
IMF. Firstly, unlike these institutions, AIIB is agnostic about the conditionality of its aid
and is concerned neither about regime type or their economic systems. Secondly, AIIB
integrates China’s domestic economic needs with the broader development needs of
regional states and is thereby propelling China into the position of a key global economic
actor. Finally, these developments reduce the influence of the United States. In effect,

See Andornino, “The Belt and Road Initiative,” G. John Ikenberry and Darren J. Lim, “China’s Emerging
Institutional Statecraft: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and The Prospects For CounterHegemony,” Project on International Order and Strategy at Brookings (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution, April, 2017), pp. 10-15.
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therefore, China is creating a kind of alternative economic order within the existing
international economic order.
6. 4. 3. 3. Norms
One tricky question that was posed is, in what ways is China reforming international order,
specifically in regards to norms or international law? China does seem to support limited
changes to certain international organizations, like the UN System, which China heartily
endorses. Most discussions about reforming international order in the Chinese case,
however, invariably concerns building an economic order that is fair to developing states.
Most instances, moreover, are instances where China desires to change the functioning of
international organizations, because it has become more assertive, and yet wishes to act
within institutional barriers. These attitudes are hard to distinguish from order-conforming,
enmeshment, strategies. Bearing in mind that China is hardly a paragon of virtue when
upholding norms about R2P and human rights, we are left with few viable instances of
reformism.
This section, therefore, invokes one crucial instance of an innovative (for the
region), albeit recalcitrant, policy influencing China’s neighborhood: the Chinese
implementation of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). ADIZs refer to maritime
areas extending from a nation’s shoreline in which a governmental authority requires that
aircraft (civilian or otherwise) passing through provide identification and location
information in the interest of national security.660 In November 2013, China implemented

Ruwantissa Abeyratne, “In search of theoretical justification for air defence identification zones,” Journal
of Transportation Security, Vol. 5, No. 1 (September, 2011), pp. 87-88.
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an ADIZ encompassing its claimed EEZ in the East China Sea with the purpose of
regulating flights in the region. China implemented this measure due to the intensification
of a long-standing maritime dispute with Japan concerning the fate of the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Island.661 Earlier, the Japanese government purchased several of these islands from their
private owners to “nationalize” the territory. Since this move interfered with China claims
over the region, it sought a way to deny access and, furthermore, coerce other claimants in
the region. Accompanying this decision was an explosion in Chinese naval presence in
Japanese territorial waters (see figure 6.6. below).
From the perspective of upholding international order, the establishment of this
ADIZ was problematic because China is now claiming rights over the claimed EEZs of
other littoral states, like Japan (which arguably was China’s primary target), as well as
South Korea. While few countries accepted the legitimacy of this move, Japan and the U.S.
were displeased. Both countries have made incursions into this territory to signal their
disapproval. With the imposition of this unilateral action, one that has some historical and
legal basis, China engaged in the form of reformism.

661

After the Second World War, Japan had to relinquish its control over the area. The Treaty of San Francisco,
however, had no provisions that the island would be China. China, nevertheless maintained that the island
was historically a part of China and therefore seeks to strengthen its hold over this territory.
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Figure 6. 6. The Rise in Numbers of Chinese Incursions662

Japanese Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, “Trends In Chinese Government And Other
Vessels In The Waters Surrounding The Senkaku Islands, And Japan's Response: Records
Of Intrusions Of Chinese Government And Other Vessels Into Japan's Territorial Sea,”
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6. 5. CONCLUSION
The chapter finds evidence that China is not a “revisionist” state but is only one that had
different attitudes towards international order; self-interest often drove it to pursue
restraint. As a weaker and insecure power within a hostile neighborhood, China’s grand
strategy seemed timid and accommodationist. Throughout the study, however, Chinese
elites made increasingly more references common interests of the international community,
which signals that Chinese FPEs are, at least discursively speaking, becoming more
satisfied with international order. Nevertheless, an order-reforming China has become
increasingly more assertive towards its neighbors, especially concerning its maritime
territories.
On balance, Chinese FPEs narratives on international order consistently supports
the kind of arrangements one would associate with a responsible great power state as it
supports the balance of power and international cooperation. The narratives strictly
promote multilateralism for global governance and underscore the importance of the UN
System as a major global forum for discussion the legitimate use of force in the name of
order. They underscore, also, the importance of Westphalian-style non-intervention in the
domestic politics of other states and, further, take great pains to emphasize that China is
interested in development and helping the third world, unlike the Western powers. This last
narrative, however, can also be traced to a powerful anti-hegemonic narrative and a series
of other narratives that exude dissatisfaction with international order. In the 1990s, Chinese
insistence on sovereignty, non-intervention, and the shift towards a fairer international
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order also betray a “revisionist” streak, which gradually declined but never truly
disappeared.
Overall, Chinese elites about gains and losses remained stable overtime, and there
does appear to be some correlation between negative projects and likelihood of use force.
To elaborate, it is not surprising that a relatively powerful China might be willing to press
its advantages in the South and East China Seas by building islands, harassing neighbors’
vessels, among other things. For China to stage large-scale exercises near Taiwan in the
1990s was much riskier. In other words, there is some support that risk acceptance makes
the use of force much likelier, even when a state has unfavorable circumstances to do so.
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7. CONCLUSION

7.1. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
The framework of this dissertation incorporates material and structural variables with
social and psychological ones. It borrows heavily from Neoclassical Realism and the
English School to show that even within a material environment, among rationallymotivated decision-makers, certain international social forces exist. In this dissertation, the
researcher firstly reexamined the status-quo and revisionism debate and how these fit into
the notion of international order. Next, the dissertation also constructed a typology of
behaviors and strategies and inferred their observable implications. It was argued that
preferences for these strategies lie at the nexus of material constraints filtered and
expressed through the medium of the decision-maker.
As for the decision-makers themselves, interests are in large part formed by
identities, norms, and historically bounded interactions. This dissertation, however, can
only offer a complementary consequentialist argument to possibly trace this dynamic.
Responsible statecraft can originate from a variety of sources, but material and perceptional
factors shape the ambitions of decision-makers. By tracing certain narratives about
international order based on satisfaction and how payoffs are framed, and assuming a
connection between these discourses and interests, one can infer the likelihood that
decision-makers will adopt strategies to uphold or challenge international order. The
findings suggest that satisfaction, and perceived gains, as corroborated by FPEs, might
suggest whether they desire to change the international order, and their risk-propensity to
achieve their goals. In other words, raison de systéme can manifest as the outcome of
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rational, structural and psychological forces. This dissertation merely devised a way to
attempt measuring this phenomenon.
Another broader theoretical implication is that perhaps the employment of domestic
and psychological factors to understand matters of international order. To reiterate
DiCiccio’s diagnosis of the PTT paradigm, it is necessary to examine the sources of support
for, and dissatisfaction towards the status quo through the inclusion of specific unit-level
propositions.663 Here we reach a theoretical impasse of sorts. Ikenberry asserts that elites
will buy into the system; that even authoritarian states, like China, can theoretically become
a solid pillar of the liberal world order of if the hegemon purposefully sought to make it a
stakeholder in the system. The findings of this dissertation support finding to the extent
that China has indeed become, simultaneously, more powerful and more integrated into the
liberal order, while its overall aims seem to be peaceful for the time being.
In time, and in circumscribed ways, even such autocratic states may adopt liberal
and democratic values. The consequences of this process are troubling, however. Even in
an advanced liberal democratic society, the specter of anti-order sentiments looms.664
Liberal norms engender democracy and democracy concomitantly carries with the
possibility of change; i.e., the rise of a governing coalition that rejects the liberal order. Not
only is there ample evidence for this in the democratization and war literature, but recent
developments in the international system suggest that not even mature democracies are
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See DiCiccio, “Power Transition Theory,” p. 22.
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The liberal World order creates winners and losers and disenfranchised groups often seek to overthrow
established domestic orders, which has international consequences.
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immune to these pressures.665 The contradiction is thus: authoritarian states are not an
impediment to an international order, even a rules-based liberal one. In fact, they can be
uniquely relied upon to uphold it. To paraphrase Napoleon, it is not when China rises, that
it will shake the world; it is when it democratizes that will it pose a threat to the rest. From
the previous chapters, the U.S. and China do not have a one-track grand strategy that hardly
ever changes. Perhaps as a long-term trend, the grand strategy may exhibit regularity and
continuity. By interpreting grand strategy as a sum of strategies concerning the means of
statecraft, and in a circumscribed time-period, it was possible to delve into theoretical
controversies and suggest ways to overcome them.
Finally, the contradictory and counterintuitive behaviors of the dominant and rising
power states strongly rebuke the binary understanding of revisionism and status-quo
seeking. Order-retrenchment and, most importantly order-reform, can be thought of as
viable grand strategic-orientations that determine how and how much a state wants to affect
international order. States can seek to “reform” international order under favorable
circumstances while a hegemon can shirk its responsibilities to the detriment of said order.
7.2. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Since each empirical chapter discussed the findings, this section will merely touch on some
important comparative points and other ideas worth reiterating. The general findings of this
dissertation suggest that overtime, China’s environment has become, overall, more
permissive. This is primarily the result of a growing economy and modernizing military.
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Part of this argument reach fruition during a discussion with Robert Jervis, who did not entirely endorse
the uncharitable interpretation of the researcher. October 11, 2018, Florida International University, Miami,
FL.
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Concomitantly, speeches from Chinese FPEs at the UN report increasing satisfaction
towards international order, while making fewer refences that indicate negative framing or
uncertainty. The U.S. meanwhile enjoyed great material preponderance, although its
preponderance was not uniform, and some local dynamics affected its policy choices. More
than in these Chinese case, risk-propensity, as suggested by U.S. FPEs’ framing of gains
and losses, seem to have affected its propensity to use force in some cases.
These findings also correlate well with the foreign policies of both states in the
post-Cold War period, but it might be difficult to speculate about the future. Will China’s
rise, or U.S.’ decline be unpeaceful? The problem with developing a typological framework
for state behavior is that it is better as a framing for state policy and an explanatory theory,
rather than being a predictive one. Deductively, however, permissive environments in
which states are dissatisfied with international order and anticipate future losses will be
prone to aggression. As shown in the trendlines of figures 7.1. and 7.2., Chinese and U.S.
FPEs framing of risks and satisfaction have changed overtime. China is becoming more
powerful and capable of using force but does not necessarily have a motive. The U.S.
meanwhile has become more dissatisfied with international order, and some of its
narratives began to resemble those China in the early 1990s, when China was an orderretrenching state. Admittedly, a figure like Trump skews the discursive elements of U.S.
policy, but even if the Trump period were omitted, the overall trend would not change.
Neither China nor the U.S. are revisionist states, but their adoptive strategies and policy
responses varied overtime.
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Figure 7.1. U.S. v. Chinese Framing of Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction
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Figure 7.2. U.S. v. Chinese Framing of Gains/Losses Compared
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7. 3. LIMITATIONS
This dissertation bears some faults, as will be discussed here. While this dissertation has
developed a creative and widely-applicable framework, it focuses only on two major case
studies. Including more country-cases would have significantly enriched the discussion
while enhancing the credibility of both the framework and the research design. A second
limitation is the data. To ensure the commensurability of data, originality, and richness, the
research had eliminated other viable data sources.
The more serious limitation is the research design that sought to infer a type of
mechanism where by decision-makers gradually adopt, and abandon, certain strategies
overtime in response to their environment. For methodological purposes, it was assumed
that decision-makers generally offer discursive reasoning for their intended policies,
whether to coerce or to convince their audiences. Moreover, it is assumed that their words
can provide collective psychological cues, which might also explain phenomena like riskacceptance, which explains why a state might adopt a riskier or more ambitious policies
despite a lack of freedom of action.
7.4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
It is a very difficult task to offer policy prescription when doing so is anathema to the
project. Afterall, the dissertation fundamentally challenges common wisdom about
assessing the foreign policy dispositions of states. Nevertheless, the theoretical, empirical,
and normative conclusions of this dissertation indelibly point to the same conclusion. A
binary understanding of revisionism and status quo predicated on the relationship between
the dominant state, and its closest challenger does not leverage much analytical strength
for sound policymaking. This dissertation professes a palpable bias in favor of –for lack
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of a better term– English School axioms, such as the critical importance of raison de
systéme, and restraint in sustaining the goals of international life. International order ought
not to ossify into a static constellation of power where great powers cannot exercise their
privileges to maintain or build international order. Nor should the international society
deny rising powers’ justice demands. These principles are too normative and abstract to
mean much.
There is one tangible policy that states can easily if they wish to uphold
international order against rogue and revisionist powers. The first step is to recognize that
any logic informing state behavior will invariably impel them at times to peaceful, and to
destructive behavior in others. Labels like revisionism and status-quo seeking states are
superficial titles that elevate certain ideologies, identities, and agendas while obstructing
sensible policy. As byStephen Walt recently explained in The Hell of Good Intentions,
foreign policy is too important to leave to the hands of ideological amateurs. This is
important because it runs the risk that decision-makers can box certain states as being
unreasonable and insatiable. This in turn can make decision-makers reluctant to accept the
possibility and utility of restraint towards their “foe” and thereby lead to a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
7. 5. FUTURE RESEARCH
Perhaps the most appropriate way to build on this study is to extend the argument to other
country cases. Beyond China and the U.S., many other states have been scrutinized under
the contours of the revisionism and status quo debate. Several countries stand out due to
post-Cold War foreign policies, while some are regularly subjected to scholarly scrutiny.
Firstly, the study can examine other major powers like India and Russia. The latter is
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especially interesting not only due to its unstable history but also due to its resurgence as a
powerful and aggressive state which sought to resist U.S./NATO incursions into the former
Soviet Union but also used force against Georgia and Ukraine. Perhaps the scrutiny of this
framework could help to settle the matter of whether or not Russia is simply a reactive
power, or its elites are really interested in undermining international order.
Secondly, the analysis could be expanded to regional powers like Turkey, which
also went through a tumultuous period in the post-Cold War and adopted an ambitious
foreign policy. Given Turkey’s unprecedented activism in the Middle East, engagement
with sectarian politics, and shifting patterns of cooperation, it is an ideal case study for this
framework. Thirdly, “rogue” states are ideal candidates for theoretical scrutiny. States like
Iran and North Korea are major regional powers, but their alleged recidivist attitudes,
especially with respect to state-sponsorship of terrorism and non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons make these cases ideal candidates for study.
Another potential move could be to go “deep.” That is, the present study can enrich
by bringing to bear discursive and narrative data from a broader variety of sources. To this
end, the study could incorporate other types of UN Speeches, such as Security Council
discussions. Examining domestic narratives could also be valuable since discourse can vary
depending on one’s audience. For example, finding out U.S. Presidents’ tendencies to
invoke the raison de systéme in domestic speeches like the state of the union speeches over
time can reveal broader trends in U.S.’ order-related attitudes. Meanwhile, there is strong
evidence that Chinese elites speak a different tune towards their domestic publics on
matters of security and foreign policy and contrasting the two types of speeches would be
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a worthwhile endeavor.
Finally, a temporal shift may also be merited. The present study was designed in a
way to examine the practical operation of the fundamental institutions of international
society as they manifest in statecraft. By reformulating the framework, the present
framework can possibly open up avenues for cross-fertilization between historical English
School analyses of state behavior with the PTT research paradigm, among other things. In
fact, the increased likelihood of the use force, and the reduced institutional cohesion of pre1945 international orders are ideal testing grounds for propositions about states’ likelihood
of maintaining international order.

319

BIBLIOGRAPHY
ABEYRATNE, Ruwantissa. “In Search of Theoretical Justification for Air Defence Identification
Zones.” Journal of Transportation Security 5, no. 1 (September, 2011): 87-94.
ACHARYA, Amitav. The End of the American World Order. New York, NY: Polity, 2014.
ADAMSON, Fiona. “Democratization and the Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the
1974 Cyprus Crisis.” Political Science Quarterly 116, no. 2 (Summer, 2001): 277-303.
ADLER, David Gray. “‘The Law’: The Clinton Theory of the War Power.” Presidential Studies
Quarterly 30, no. 1 (March, 2000): 155-168.
AHMAD, Ishtiaq. “The US Af-Pak Strategy: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan.” Asian
Affairs: An American Review 37, no. 1 (2010): 191–209.
AHMED, Kamal. “China Goes Big in Davos –And Here’s Why,” BBC (January 17, 2017).
Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.com/news/business-38644971. Last Accessed: February
19, 2017.
ALBRIGHT, Madeline K. “Interview on NBC-TV ‘The Today Show’ with Matt Lauer.” NBC's
Today Show. Columbus, OH: February 19, 1998.
ALDERSON, Kai and Andrew Hurrell, eds. Hedley Bull on International Society. New York, NY:
MacMillan, 2000.
ALEXANDER, Richard. “The Evolution of Social Behavior.” Annual Review of Ecological
Systems 5 (1974): 325-383.
ALLISON, Graham. “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” American Political
Science Review 63, no. 3 (1969): 689-713.
———. Destined for War: Can American and China Escape the Thucydides Trap? Boston, MA:
Houghton Mifflin, 2017.
———, and Phillip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New
York, NY: Longman, 1999.
ANDRESKI, Stanislav. “On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships.” Journal of
Strategic Studies 3, no. 3 (December, 1980): 3-10.
ANDORNINO, Giovanni B. “The Belt and Road Initiative in China’s Emerging Grand Strategy
of Connective Leadership.” China & World Economy 25, no. 5 (2017): 4–22.
320

ANTONIADES, Andreas, Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin. “Great Power Politics and
Strategic Narratives.” The Centre for Global Political Economy, no.7 (March, 2010): 5-7.
APELDOORN, Bastiaan Van and Naná de Graaff. “Corporate Elite Networks and US post-Cold
War Grand Strategy from Clinton to Obama.” European Journal of International Relations
20, no. 1 (2012): 29-55.
———. American Grand Strategy and Corporate Elite Networks: The Open Door Since the End
of the Cold War. New York, NY: Routledge, 2016.
ARIM, Reşat. Foreign Policy Concepts: Conjuncture, Freedom of Action, Equality. Ankara:
Foreign Policy Institute, 2001.
ARMSTRONG, David. Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International
Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
ART, Robert J. “A Defensible Defense: America’s Grand Strategy After the Cold War.”
International Security 15, no. 4 (Spring, 1991): 5-53.
———. A Grand Strategy for America. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009.
AXELROD, Robert. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1980.
BACEVICH, Andrew. American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.
———. The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013.
BAHADOR, Babak, Jeremy Moses, and William Lafi Youmans. "Rhetoric and Recollection:
Recounting the George W. Bush Administration’s Case for War in Iraq." Presidential
Studies Quarterly 48, no. 1 (March 2018): 4–26.
BAKER, Peter. “How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan.” New York Times
(December 5, 2009).
BALDWIN, David A. Economic Statecraft. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985.
——— (ed.). Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. New York, NY:
Columbia University Press, 1993.
BARKIN, J. Samuel. “Realist Constructivism.” International Studies Review 5, no. 3 (September,
2003): 325-342.
321

BARNETT, Michael N. “Culture, Strategy, and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo.”
European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 1 (1999): 5-36.
———, and Jack S. Levy. “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt,
1962-73.” International Organization 45, no. 3 (Summer, 1991): 369-395.
BEACH, Derek and Rasmus Brun Pedersen. Causal Case Study Methods: Foundations and
Guidelines for Comparing, Matching and Tracing. Ann Arbor, IL: The University of
Michigan Press, 2013.
———. Causal Case Study Methods and Guidelines for Comparing, Matching, and Tracing. Ann
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2016.
BECKLEY, Michael. “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” International
Security 36, no. 3 (Winter 2011/2012): 41-78.
BEHRAVESH, Maysam. “State Revisionism and Ontological (In)security in International
Politics: The Complicated Case of Iran and its Nuclear Behavior.” Journal of International
Relations and Development 21, no. 4 (September, 2018): 836–857.
BEIJING. China’s National Defense in 2008. Beijing, Information Office of the State Council of
the People’s Republic of China, January 20, 2009.
BELL, Mark S. and Kai Quek. "Authoritarian Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace."
International Organization 72, no. 1 (Winter,6 2018): 227–242.
BENNET, Andrew and Jeffrey T. Checkel. Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytical Tool.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
BETTS, Richard K. “Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States After the
Cold War.” International Security 18, no. 3 (Winter, 1993-1994): 34-77.
BLACKWILL, Robert D. and Ashley J. Tellis. “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China.”
Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report no. 72 (March, 2015).
BLAINEY, Geoffrey. Causes of War. New York, NY: The Free Press, 1988.
BLUMENTHAL, Sidney. The Clinton Wars. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2003.
BOLTON, John. “Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?” Chicago Journal of
International Law 1, no. 2 (2000): 205–222.

322

BOLTON, M. Kent. The Rise of the American Security State: The National Security Act of 1947
and the Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security
International, 2018.
BOOT, Max. “Myths About Neoconservatism.” In Irwin Stelzer (ed.), The Neocon Reader. New
York: Grove Press, 2004.
BOWDEN, Brett. “In the Name of Progress and Peace: The ‘Standard of Civilisation’ and the
Universalizing Project.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 29, no. 2 (2004): 51-54.
———. “The Ideal of Civilization. Its Origins and Socio-Political Character.” Critical Review of
International Social and Political Philosophy 7, no. 1 (Spring, 2004): 25-50.
BRADLEY, Curtis A. “U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal Court Treaty.”
American Society of International Law 7, no. 7 (May, 2002).
BRANDS, Hal. American Grand Strategy and the Liberal World: Continuity, Change, and
Options for the Future. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010.
———. What Good Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S.
Truman to George W. Bush. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014.
———. Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War
Order. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016.
———. “U.S. Grand Strategy in an Age of Nationalism: Fortress America and its Alternatives.”
The Washington Quarterly 40, no. 1 (Spring, 2017): 73-94.
———. American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press, 2018.
———, and Peter D. Feaver. “Should America Retrench?” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 6
(November/December, 2016): 164–172.
BRENNER, William J. Confounding Power: Anarchy and International Society from the
Assassins to Al-Qaeda. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
BROOKS, Rosa. “Drones and the International Rule of Law.” Ethics & International Affairs 28,
no. 1 (2014): 83-103.
BROOKS, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth. "American Primacy in Perspective." Foreign
Affairs 81, no. 4 (July-August, 2002): 20-33.

323

———. “Hard Times for Soft Balancing.” International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer, 2005): 72‐
108.
———. America Abroad: Why the Sole Superpower Should Not Pull Back From the World. New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016.
BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic
Imperatives. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1997.
BULL, Hedley. “International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach.” World Politics 18, no.
3 (April, 1966): 361-377.
———. “The Twenty Years’ Crisis Thirty Years On.” International Journal 24, no. 4 (Autumn,
1969): 625-638.
———. “Justice in International Relations.” The 1983 Hagey Lectures. University of Waterloo,
1981.
———. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York, NY: Columbia
University Press, 2002 [1977].
———, and Adam Watson. The Expansion of International Society. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1985.
BUSH, George H. W. “September 11, 1990: Address Before a Joint Session of Congress.” Speech,
Washington, DC: Congress of the United States of America, September 11, 1990.
———, and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998.
BUSH, George W. “Speech Delivered by George W. Bush at the United Nations General
Assembly Plenary Session.” Speech, New York, NY: United Nations, November 10, 2001.
———. “Speech Delivered by George W. Bush at the United Nations General Assembly Plenary
Session.” Speech, New York, NY: United Nations, September 11, 2002. Dag
Hammarskjold Library.
———. “Speech Delivered by George W. Bush at the United Nations General Assembly Plenary
Session.” Speech, New York, NY: United Nations, September 23, 2008. Dag
Hammarskjold Library.
BUTTERFIELD, Herbert. “The Balance of Power.” In Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight,
Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics. Harvard, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1966.
324

BUZAN, Barry. People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the
Post-Cold War Era [Second Edition]. Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983.
———. From International to World Society? Cambridge University Press, 2004.
———. “A Leader Without Followers? The United States in World Politics After Bush.”
International Politics 45 (2008): 563.
———. The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century.
Polity, 2009.
———. “China in International Society: ‘Is Peaceful Rise’ Possible?” The Chinese Journal of
International Politics 3 (2010): 5–36.
———. An Introduction to The English School of International Relations: The Societal Approach.
Cambridge: Polity, 2014.
———. “The ‘Standard of Civilisation’ as an English School Concept.” Millennium: Journal of
International Studies 42, no. 3 (2014): 577.
———. “The Logic and Contradictions of ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’ as China’s Grand
Strategy.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 4 (Winter, 2014): 381–420.
———, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Lynne Rienner,
1998.
CANTIR, Christian. “The Allied Punishment and Attempted Socialization of the Bolsheviks
(1917–1924): An English School Approach.” Review of International Studies 37 (2011):
1967-1994.
CARR, E. H. The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International
Relations. Palgrave MacMillan, 2001 [1939].
CHA, Victor D. “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States,
Japan, and Korea.” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (June, 2000): 261-291.
———. Power Play: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2016.
CHAN, Steve. China, the US and Power Transition Theory. Routledge, 2008.
———. "Can't Get No Satisfaction? The Recognition of Revisionist States." International
Relations of the Asia-Pacific 4 (2004): 207-238.
325

———. “Exploring Puzzles in Power-Transition Theory: Implications for Sino-American
Relations.” Security Studies 13, no. 3 (2006): 103-141.
CHECKEL, Jeffrey T. “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory.” World Politics
50, no. 2 (1998): 325.
CHEN, Dingding, Jianwei Wang. “Lying Low No More?: China’s New Thinking on the Tao
Guang Yang Hui Strategy.” China: An International Journal 9, no. 2 (September 2011),
pp. 195–216.
CHENG, Joseph Yu-shek. “China's Foreign Policy in the Mid-1990s, Center for Asian Pacific
Studies, Working Paper Series, No. 28 (1995).
CHOLLET, Derek. The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft. New York,
NY: Praeger, 2005.
CHRISTENSEN, Thomas J. Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and
Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.
———. “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy Toward
East Asia.” International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer, 2006): 81-126.
———. The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power. New York, NY: Norton,
2015.
———, and Jack L. Snyder. “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in
Multipolarity.” International Organization 44, no. 2 (Spring, 1990): 137-168.
CIU, Shunji, Barry Buzan. “Great Power Management in International Society.” The Chinese
Journal of International Politics 9, No. 2 (2016): 181-210.
CLARK, Ian. Hegemony and International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
CLINTON, William J. “Speech Delivered by William J. Clinton at the United Nations General
Assembly Plenary Session.” Speech, New York, NY: United Nations, September 27, 1993.
Dag Hammarskjold Library.
———. “Speech Delivered by William J. Clinton at the United Nations General Assembly Plenary
Session.” Speech, New York, NY: United Nations, September 26, 1994. Dag
Hammarskjold Library.
———. “Speech Delivered by William J. Clinton at the United Nations General Assembly Special
Commemorative Session.” Speech, New York, NY: United Nations, October 22, 1995.
Dag Hammarskjold Library.
326

COLÁS, Alejandro. “Open Doors and Closed Frontiers: The Limits of American Empire.”
European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 4 (2008): 619–643.
COLE, Bernard D. China’s Quest for Great Power: Ships, Oil, and Foreign Policy. Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016.
COOLEY, Alexander, and Jack L. Snyder. Ranking the World: Grading States as a Tool of Global
Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
COOPER, Andrew Fenton, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal. “Bound to Follow?
Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict.” Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 3
(1991): 391–410.
COPELAND, Dale C. "Do Reputations Matter?" Security Studies 7, no. 1 (Autumn 1997): 33-71.
———. The Origins of Major War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000.
———. "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay." International
Security 25, No. 2 (Autumn, 2000): 187-212.
———. “A Realist Critique of the English School.” Review of International Studies 29 (2003):
427-441.
———. "Rationalist Theories of International Politics and the Problem of the Future." Security
Studies 20, no. 3 (2011): 441–450.
———. Economic Interdependence and War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015.
COX, Robert W. “Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations
Theory.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 126-155.
———. “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method.” Millennium:
Journal of International Relations 12, No. 2 (1983): 162-175.
COX, Ronald W. Corporate Power, Class Conflict, and the Crisis of the New Globalization.
Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2019.
CUI, Shunji, and Barry Buzan. “Great Power Management in International Society.” The Chinese
Journal of International Politics (2016): 181-210.
CRESWELL, John W. and Vicki L. Plano Clark. Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods
Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Inc., 2011.
327

DAALDER, Ivo H. Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 1999.
———, and James N. Lindsay. America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in American Foreign
Policy. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2005.

DANCHEV, Alex, and Dan Keohane. International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict 1990–1991.
London: Macmillan Press, 1994.
DANNER, Lukas K. China’s Grand Strategy: Contradictory Foreign Policy? New York, NY:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
DAVENPORT, Tara. “Island-Building in the South China Sea: Legality and Limits.” Asian
Journal of International Law 8, no. 1 (January, 2018): 76-90.
DAVID, Steven R. “Explaining Third World Alignment.” World Politics 43, no. 2 (January, 1991):
233-256.
DAVID, Charles-Philippe, and David Grondin. Hegemony or Empire? The Redefinition of US
Power Under George W. Bush. Burlington, VA: Ashgate, 2006.
DAVIDSON, Jean. “UCI Scientists Told Moscow's Aim Is to Deprive U.S. of Foe.” Los Angeles
Times. December 12, 1988.
DAVIDSON, Jason W. The Origins of Revisionist and Status Quo States. New York, NY:
Palgrave, 2006.
DE GRAAFF, Naná, and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn. “Varieties of US Post-Cold War Imperialism:
Anatomy of A Failed Hegemonic Project And The Future Of US Geopolitics.” Critical
Sociology 37, no. 4 (2011): 403–427.
———. “US-China Relations and the Liberal World Order: Contending Elites, Colliding
Visions?” International Affairs 94, no. 1 (2018): 113-131.
DENG, Yong. China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
DESCH, Michael C. “The Keys that Lock Up the World: Identifying American Interests in the
Periphery.” International Security 14, no. 1 (Summer, 1989): 86-121.
———. “War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?” International Organization 50, no. 2
(1996): 237–68.
328

———. “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies.” International
Security 23, no. 1 (Summer, 1998): 141-170.
———. “America’s Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign
Policy.” International Security 32, No. 3 (Winter, 2007/08): 7-43.
DEUTSCH, Karl. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1957.
———, and J. David Singer. “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability.” World
Politics 16, no. 3 (1964): 390-406.
DEYOUNG, Karen. “Obama’s Decision to Turn to Congress on Syria Decision Triggers Debate.”
Washington Post (September 4, 2013).
DICICCO, Jonathan M. “Power Transition Theory and the Essence of Revisionism.” In William
R. Thompson (ed.), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics (September, 2017).
———, and Jack S. Levy. “Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power
Transition Research Program.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 6 (December,
1999): 675-704.
DONILON, T. “America Is Back In The Pacific And Will Uphold The Rules.” Financial Times
(November 28, 2011): 11.
DORAN, Charles, F. The Politics of Assimilation: Hegemony and its Aftermath. Baltimore, MD:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971.
DOWNS, George W. and Michael A. Jones. “Reputation, Compliance, and International Law.”
Journal of Legal Studies 31 (January, 2002): 95-114.
DREZNER, Daniel W. “Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power
Politics.” International Security 34, no. 2 (Fall, 2009): 7–45.
DUECK, Colin. “New Perspectives on American Grand Strategy: A Review Essay.” International
Security 28, no. 4 (Spring, 2004): 187-215.
———. “Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand Strategy, 2000–2004.” Review of
International Studies 30, no. 4 (2004): 511–535.
———. Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006.

329

———. The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2015.
———. “The Strategy of Retrenchment and Its Consequences.” Foreign Policy Research Institute
(April 13, 2015).
DUMBRELL, John. “Was There a Clinton doctrine? President Clinton’s Foreign Policy
Reconsidered.” Diplomacy and Statecraft 13, no. 2 (2002): 43–56.
———. Clinton’s Foreign Policy Between the Bushes. New York, NY: Routledge, 2009.
DUMCOMBE, Constance and Tim Dunne. “After Liberal World Order.” International Affairs 94,
no. 1 (January, 2018): 25-42.
DUQUE, MARINA G. "Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach." International
Studies Quarterly, no. 0 (2018): 1–16
EARL, Edward M. Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler.
Princeton University Press, 1943.
ECONOMY, Elizabeth, Michael Oksenberg. China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects.
New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999.
EDEL, Charles N. Nation Builder: John Quincy Adams and the Grand Strategy of the Republic.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014.
EDELSTEIN, David M. “Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of Great
Powers.” Security Studies 12, no. 1 (Autumn, 2002): 1-40.
ELDEN, Stuart. The Birth of Territory. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2013.
ENTMANN, Robert M. Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign
Policy. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2004.
ESCUDÉ, Carlos. “Anthropomorphic Fallacy in International Relations Discourse.” WCFIA
Working Paper 94-06 (1994).
ETZIONI, Amitai. “China as a Responsible Stakeholder?” International Affairs 87, no. 3 (2011):
539–553.
EVERA, Stephen V. “Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War.” International
Security 9, no. 1 (Summer, 1984): 58-107.

330

———. “Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn’t: American Grand Strategy after the
Cold War.” Journal of Strategic Studies 13, no. 2 (June, 1990): 1-5.
———. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1997.
FALKNER, Robert and Barry Buzan. “The Emergence of Environmental Stewardship as a
Primary Institution of Global International Society.” European Journal of International
Relations. Forthcoming.
FAZAL, Tanisha M. “State Death in the International System.” International Organization 58, no.
2 (Spring, 2004): 311-312.
FEARON, James D. “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation.” International
Organization 52, no. 2 (Spring, 1998): 269-305.
FERDINAND, Peter. “China and the Developing World.” In David Shambaugh, Ed. Charting
China’s Future: Domestic and International Challenges. London: Routledge, 2010.
FINNEMORE, Martha. National Interests in International Society. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1996.
———. The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2003.
———. “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole
Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up to Be.” World Politics 61, no.1 (January, 2009): 58-85.
FLOCKHART, Trine. "‘Complex Socialization’: A Framework for the Study of State
Socialization." European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 1 (2006): 89–118.
FOOT, Rosemary. “Chinese Strategies in a US-Hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and
Hedging.” International Affairs 82, no. 1 (2006): 77-108.
FOOT, Rosemary, John L. Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell. Order and Justice in International
Relations. Oxford University Press, 2009.
FORDHAM, Benjamin O. "Domestic Politics, International Pressure, and the Allocation of
American Cold War Military Spending." The Journal of Politics 64, no. 1 (February,
2002): 63-88.
FOULON, Michael. "Neoclassical Realism: Challengers and Bridging Identities." International
Studies Review 17 (2015): 635–661. doi: 10.1111/misr.1225.
331

FRAVEL, M. Taylor. “China's Strategy in the South China Sea.” Contemporary Southeast Asia,
33, no. 3, Special Focus: The South China Sea Dispute (December, 2011): 292-319.
———. “Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China's Use of Force in Territorial Disputes.”

International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter, 2007/2008): 44-83.
———. “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation Explaining China’s Compromises in

Territorial Disputes.” International Security 30, no. 2 (Fall, 2005): 46–83.
———. “The Evolution of China’s Military Strategy: Comparing The 1987 And 1999 Editions of

Zhanlüexue.” In James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein, Eds. China's Revolution in
Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People's
Liberation Army. Arlington VA, Center for Naval Analyses, 2002: 79-99.
FREEDLAND, J. “After a Flurry of Early Activity, the Obama Doctrine is Taking Shape.” The
Guardian (March 11, 2009).
FREEDMAN, Lawrence. “Logic, Politics, and Foreign Policy Processes: A Critique of the
Bureaucratic Politics Model.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs
1944-) 52, no. 3 (July, 1976): 434-449.
———. “Grand Strategy in the Twenty-first Century.” Defence Studies 1, No. 1 (Spring 2001):
11-20.
———. Strategy: A History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
———, and Efraim Karsh. The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World
Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.
FRIEDBERG, Aaron L. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–
1905. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.
———. In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand
Strategy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
———. "The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?" International Security 30,
no. 2 (Fall, 2005): 7-45.
———. “Globalization and Chinese Grand Strategy.” Survival 60, no.1 (February-March, 2018):
7-40.
FRIEDBERG, Aaron L. “Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics.” The National Interest, no. 114
(July/August, 2011): 18-27.
332

———. “The Sources of Chinese Conduct: Explaining Beijing's Assertiveness.” The Washington

Quarterly 37, no.4 (2014): 133-150.
———. “Globalization and Chinese Grand Strategy.” Survival 60, no. 1 (2018): 7-40.

FRIEDMAN, Thomas L. “The 1992 Campaign— Issues: Foreign Policy; Clinton’s Foreign Policy
Agenda Reaches Across Broad Spectrum.” New York Times (October 4, 1992).
FULLILOVE, Michael. “China and the United Nations: The Stakeholder Spectrum.” The
Washington Quarterly (August, 2013).
FUKUYAMA, Francis. “The End of History?” The National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 318.
GADDIS, John L. “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System.”
International Security 10, no. 4 (Spring, 1986): 99-142
———. On Grand Strategy. New York, NY: Penguin, 2018.
GAO, Zhiguo, Bing Bing Jia. “The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and
Implications.” The American Journal of International Law 107, no. 1 (January, 2013): 98124.
GELLER, Daniel S. “Power Differentials and War in Rival Dyads.” International Studies
Quarterly 37, no. 2 (June, 1993): 173-193.
GEORGE, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennet. Case Studies and Theory Development in Social
Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005.
GESCHWENDER, James A. "Continuities in Theories of Status Consistency and Cognitive
Dissonance." Social Forces 46, no. 2 (December, 1967): 160-171.
GERSCHENKRON, Alexander. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of
Essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962 [1979].
GIBBS, David N. First Do No Harm Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of
Yugoslavia. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2009.
GILBOA, Eytan. “The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post Cold
War Era” Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 4 (Winter, 1995-1996): 539-652.
GILPIN, Robert W. “The Theory of Hegemonic War.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18,
no. 4 (Spring, 1988): 591-613.
333

———. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
GLASER, Bonie. “China’s Security Perceptions – Interests and Ambitions,” Asian Survey xxxiii,
no. 3 (March, 1993): 252-271.
GLASER, Charles L. and Chaim Kaufmann. “What Is the Offense Defense Balance and Can We
Measure It? Offense, Defense, and International Politics.” International Security 22, no. 4
(Spring, 1998): 44-82.
GODDARD, Stacie E. and Ronald R. Krebs. “Rhetoric, Legitimation, and Grand Strategy.”
Security Studies 24, no. 1 (March, 2015): 5-36.
GOLDGEIER, James M. The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO. Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 1999.
GOLDSTEIN, Avery. Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International
Security. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005.
GONG, Gerrit. The Standard of ‘Civilisation’ in International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1984.
GOUREVITCH, Peter. “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic
Politics.” International Organization 32, No. 4 (Autumn, 1978): 881-912.
GOWAN, Peter. A Calculus of Power: Grand Strategy in the 21st Century. New York, NY: Verso,
2010.
GREEN, Michael J. By More than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the East
Pacific Since 1783. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2017.
GRIECO, Joseph M. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest
Liberal Institutionalism.” International Organization 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988): 485-507.
GUILOT, Nicholas. The Invention of International Relations Theory. New York, NY: Columbia
University Press, 2011.
GULICK, Edward V. Europe's Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the Theory and
Practice of one of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft. New York, NY: W. W.
Norton, 1967.
HAAS, Ernst B. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957. Palo
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958.

334

HAASS, Richard N. “Liberal World Order, R.I.P.” Council on Foreign Relations. March 21,
2018). URL: https://www.cfr.org/article/liberal-world-order-rip. Last Accessed: March 23,
2018.
HALBERSTAM, David. War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals. New York,
NY: Scribner, 2001.
HALLIDAY, Fred. Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power.
London: MacMillan, 1999.
HART, Gary. A Grand Strategy for the United States in the Twenty-First Century: The Fourth
Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
HASLAM, Jonathan. “John Mearsheimer's ‘Elementary Geometry of Power’: Euclidean Moment
or an Intellectual Blind Alley?” In Ernest R. May, Richard Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner
(eds.), History of Neorealism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010: 322-340.
HE, Yin. China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations. Stockholm: Institute for
Security and Development Policy, July 2007.
HEGINBOTHAM, Eric, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L. Heim, Jeff Hagen, Sheng
Li, Jeffrey Engstrom, Martin C. Libibki, Paul DeLuca, David A. Shlapak, David R.
Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle Brady, and Lyle J. Morris. The U.S.-China Military
Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power 1996-2017. Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015.
HELD, David and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (eds.). American Power in the 21st Century.
Cambridge: Polity, 2004.
HENDRICKSON, Ryan C. The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers.
Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002.
HERBST, Jeffrey. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control.
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000.
HERZ, John H. "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 2, no. 2
(1950): 157-180.
HEUSER, Beatrice. The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present.
Cambridge University Press, 2010.
HILL, Charles. Grand Strategies: Literature, Statecraft, and World Order. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2011.
———. World Order. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016.
335

HILLE, Kathrine. “China commits combat troops to Mali.” Financial Times, June 27, 2013.
HIKARU, Yamashita. “The Iraq War, the United Nations Security Council, and the Legitimacy of
the Use of Force.” NIDS Security Reports, no. 6 (September, 2005): 38-92.
HOLLAND, Jonathan. “Chinese Attitudes to International Law: China, the Security Council,
Sovereignty, and Intervention.” NYU Journal of International Law & Politics Online
Forum (July, 2012).
HOLMES, Steven. “Christopher Reaffirms Leading US Role.” New York Times. May 28, 1993.
HOLSLAG, Jonathan. “The Smart Revisionist.” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 56, no. 5
(2014): 95-116.
———. China’s Coming War with Asia. New York, NY: Polity, 2015.
HOPF, Ted. “Polarity, the Offence-Defense Balance, and War.” American Political Science
Review 85, no. 2 (1991): 475-493.
HOWARD, Michael. “Grand Strategy in the Twentieth Century,” Defense Studies 1, No. 1 (Spring
2001): 1-10.
———, and Peter Paret. On War [Vom Krieg]. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
HUNTINGTON, Samuel P. “The U.S.: Decline or Renewal? Foreign Affairs 67, no. 2 (Winter,
1998): 76-96.
HURD, Ian. “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics.” International Organization 53
(1999): 379–408.
———. After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.
———. “Breaking and Making Norms: American Revisionism and Crises of Legitimacy.”
International Politics 44, no. 2-3 (2007): 194-213.
———, and Bruce Cronin (eds.). The UN Security Council and the Politics of International
Authority. Oxford and New York, NY: Routledge, 2008.
HURRELL, Andrew. “One World? Many worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of
International Society.” International Affairs 83, no. 1 (2007): 127–146.
———. “Narratives of Emergence: Rising Powers and the End of the Third World.” Brazilian
Journal of Political Economy 33, no. 2 (April-June, 2013): 203-221.
336

HWANG, Jihwan. “Rethinking the East Asian Balance of Power: Historical Antagonism, Internal
Balancing, and the Korean-Japanese Security Relationship.” World Affairs 166, No. 2 (Fall
2003): 95-108.
IKENBERRY, G. John. “The Future of International Leadership.” Political Science Quarterly
111, no. 3 (Fall, 1996):s 385–408.
———. “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of Postwar Order.” International
Security 23, No. 3 (Winter, 1998/99): 43-78.
———. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major
War. Princeton University Press, 2001.
———. “American Power and the Empire of Capitalist Democracy.” Review of International
Studies 27 (2001): 191-212.
———. “American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror.” Survival 43, no. 3 (2001-02): 19-43.
———. “The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment.” Survival 46, no. 1 (2004): 7–22.
———. Liberal Order & Imperial Ambition: Essays on American Power and World Politics.
Polity, 2006.
———. “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?” Foreign
Affairs 87, No.1 (2008), 23-25.
———. Liberal Leviathan: The Origin, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011.
———. “From Hegemony to the Balance of Power: The Rise of China and American Grand
Strategy in East Asia.” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 23, no. 2
(2014): 41-63.
——— (ed.). Power, Order, and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2014.
———. “The Rise of China and the Future of the Liberal World Order.” The C. Douglas Dillon
Lecture (London: Chatham House, May 7, 2014).
———. “Why the Liberal Order Will Survive.” Ethics & International Affairs 32, no. 1 Special
Issue (Rising Powers and International Order) (Spring, 2018): 17-29.

337

———, and Charles A. Kupchan. “Socialization and Hegemonic Power.” International
Organization 44, no. 3 (Summer, 1990): 283-315.
———, and Joseph M. Grieco. State Power and World Markets: The International Political
Economy. New York, NY: W. W. & Norton, 2002.
———, and Darren J. Lim. “China’s Emerging Institutional Statecraft: The Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank and the Prospects for Counter-Hegemony.” Brookings Institute Project
on International Order and Strategy (April, 2017).
———, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, Eds. International Relations Theory
and the Consequences of Unipolarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
———, Joseph M. Grieco, and Michael Mastanduno. “Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior,
and Systemic Consequences.” World Politics 61, no. 1 (January, 2009): 1-27.
———, Wand Jisi and Zhu Feng. America, China, and the Struggle for World Order. New York,
NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
———,Darren J. Lim. “China’s Emerging Institutional Statecraft: The Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank and The Prospects For Counter-Hegemony.” Project on International
Order and Strategy at Brookings. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, April, 2017.
———, Inderjeet Parmar, and Doug Stokes. “Introduction: Ordering the World? Liberal
Internationalism in Theory and Practice.” International Affairs 94, no. 1 (2018): 1-5.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. “Conversations in International Relations: Interview with
Robert Gilpin.” International Relations 19, no. 3 (2005): 361-372.
———. “Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part I).”
International Relations 20, no. 1 (2006): 105-213.
IZUMIKAWA, Yasuhiro. “Binding Strategies in Alliance Politics: The Soviet Japanese-US
Diplomatic Tug of War in the Mid-1950s.” International Studies Quarterly 0 (2017): 1–
13.
JACKSON, Patrick T. The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science
and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics. New York, NY: Routledge, 2013.
JACKSON, Robert. The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000.
JACQUES, Martin. When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of
the New Global Order. New York, NY: Penguin, 2012.
338

JACOBSEN, Knut Bolstad. “‘Rising and Revising?’ China and the Territorial Status Quo.” MA
Thesis, Trondheim University of Science and Technology, Spring 2014.
JAPANESE Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Trends In Chinese Government And Other Vessels In
The Waters Surrounding The Senkaku Islands, And Japan's Response: Records Of
Intrusions Of Chinese Government And Other Vessels Into Japan's Territorial Sea.” Url:
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.Html. Last Accessed: December 17,
2018.
JERVIS, Robert. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 2 (January,
1978): 167-214.
———. The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984.
———. “Understanding the Bush Doctrine.” Political Science Quarterly 118, no. 3 (Fall, 2003):
365-388.
———. “The Remaking of a Unipolar World Order.” The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 3 (2006):
7-19.
———. Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2010.
———, and Jack L. Snyder. Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power
Competition in the Eurasian Rimland. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
JIAXUAN, Tang. “Speech Delivered by Tang Jiaxuan at the United Nations General Assembly
Plenary Session.” Speech, New York, NY: United Nations, November 11, 2001. Dag
Hammarskjöld Library.
JINGSI, Li, Lin Su, Eds. Contemporary World Economy and Politics. Beijing: Renmin University
Press, 1999.
JINTAO, HU. “Speech Delivered by Hu Jintao at the United Nations General Assembly Plenary
Session.” Speech, New York, NY: United Nations, September 14, 2005. Dag
Hammarskjöld Library.
JIPING, Xi. “Speech Delivered by Xi Jiping at the United Nations General Assembly Plenary
Session.” Speech, New York, NY: United Nations, September 28, 2015. Dag
Hammarskjöld Library.
JIPING, Xi. “Speech Delivered by Xi Jiping at the United Nations General Assembly Plenary
Session.” Speech, New York, NY: United Nations, September 28, 2015. Dag
Hammarskjöld Library.
339

JISI, Wang. “China's Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way.” Foreign
Affairs 90, no. 2 (March/April, 2011): 68-79.
JOFFE, Josef. “’Bismarck’ or ‘Britain’? Toward and American Grand Strategy After Bipolarity.”
International Security 19, no. 4 (Spring, 1995): 94-117.
JOHNSON, CHALMERS. The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the
Republic. New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2004.
JOHNSTON, Alastair I. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese
History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998.
———. “Is China a Status-Quo Power?” International Security 27, No. 4 (Spring, 2003): 5-56.
———. Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2008.
———, and Robert S. Ross, Eds. Engaging China: The Management of and Emerging Power.
London & New York, NY: Routledge, 1999.
KACOWICZ, Arie M. “Explaining Zones of Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers?” Journal
of Peace Research 32, no. 3 (August, 1995): 265-276.
KADERCAN, Burak. “Making Sense of State Survival: Refining the Treatment of State
Preferences in Neorealist Theory.” Review of International Studies 39 (2013): 1017-1037.
KAGAN, Donald. Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1969.
KAGAN, Robert. The Return of History and the End of Dreams. New York, NY: Vintage, 2009.
———, and William Kristol, "The Present Danger." National Interest, no. 59 (Spring, 2000): 5769.
KAHNEMAN, Daniel, and Amor Tversky. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under
Risk.” Econometrica 47, no. 2 (1979): 263-291.
KAIM, Markus. Great Powers and Regional Orders: The United States and the Persian Gulf.
Ashgate, 2008.
KAPLAN, Robert D. The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells us about the coming
Conflicts. New York, NY: Random House, 2012.

340

———. “Eurasia’s Coming Anarchy: The Risks of Chinese and Russian Weakness.” Foreign
Affairs 95, no. 2 (March/April 2016).
KASPERSEN, Lars Bo and Jeppe Strandsbjerg (eds.). Does War Make States? Investigations of
Charles Tilly’s Historical Sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
KATZENSTEIN, Peter (ed.). The Culture of National Security. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1996.
KAUFMANN, Stuart, Richard Little, William C. Wohlforth, (eds.) The Balance of Power in World
History. Palgrave, 2007.
KAWASAKI, Tsuyoshi. “The Empire of the Rising Sun Was No Jackal.” In The Challenge of
Grand Strategy: The Great Powers and the Broken Balance Between the World Wars.
Edited by J. W. Taliaferro, N. M. Ripsman, and S. E. Lobell, 224-245. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013.
KAYAOĞLU, Turan. Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the
Ottoman Empire, and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
KEELE, Paul. “’Just Backward Children’: International Law and the Conquest of Non-European
Peoples.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 49, no. 2 (1995): 192-196
KEENE, Edward. Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World
Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
———. “A Case Study of the Construction of International Hierarchy: British Treaty-Making
Against the Slave Trade in Early Nineteenth Century.” International Organization 61, no.
2 (2007): 317-319.
KENNEDY, Paul. Rise and Fall of Great Powers. New York, NY: Random House, 1987.
———. “Grand Strategies and Less-than-Grand Strategies: A Twentieth-Century Critique.” In
War, Strategy, and International Politics: Essays in Honour of Sir Michael Howard. Edited
by L. Freedman, P. Hayes, and R. O'Neill, 227-242. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992.
———. “Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition.” In Grand Strategies
in War and Peace. Edited by Paul Kennedy, 1-10. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1992.
KEOHANE, Robert O. “International Institutions: Two Approaches.” International Studies
Quarterly 32, no. 4 (December, 1988): 379-396.
341

———. “Martin Wight’s, The Three Traditions.” American Political Science Review 86, no. 4
(1992): 1112-1113.
———. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005 [1984].
———, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Power and Interdependence [4th Edition]. Boston, MA: Longman,
2012.
KINSELLA, David Todd. “No Rest for the Democratic Peace.” American Political Science Review
99, no. 3 (August, 2005): 453-457.
KIRSHNER, Jonathan. “The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of
China.” European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 1 (2010): 53-75.
KISSINGER, Henry A. A World Restored: Castlereagh, Metternich, and the Problems of Peace
1812-1822. Boston, MA: Houghton Miflin, 1957.
———. On China. New York, NY: Penguin, 2011.
———. On World Order. New York, NY: Penguin, 2016.
KLARE, Michael T. “Oil and empire? Rethinking the War with Iraq.” Current History 102, no.
662 (March, 2003): 129-135
KLOTZ, Audie, Deepa Prakash. Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist
Guide. Palgrave, 2009.
KRASNER, Stephen. “Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland).” Foreign Policy
7 (1972): 159-179.
———. "Transforming International Regimes: What the Third World Wants and Why."
International Studies Quarterly 25, no. 1 (March, 1981): 119-148.
———. “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables.”
International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 185-205.
KRATOCHWIL, Friedrich. Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and
Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989.
KRAUTHAMMER, Charles. “The Unipolar Moment.” Foreign Affairs 70, No. 1 (1990/1991):
23-33.
342

KRIPPENDORFF, Klaus. Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publishing Inc., 2004.
KUBALKOVA, Vendulka, Nicholas G. Onuf, and Paul Kowert. International Relations in a
Constructed World. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1998.
KUHN, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions [Second Edition]. Chicago, IL: The
University of Chicago Press, 1970.
KURTZ, Marcus J. Latin American State Building in Comparative Perspective: Social
Foundations of Institutional Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
KYDD, Andrew H. “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other.”
Security Studies 7, no. 1 (October, 1997): 115-154.
LAFEBER, Walter. “The Last War, the Next War, and the New Revisionists.” Democracy 1
(1981): 93-101.
LAI, Brian, and Dan Slater. “Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation
in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950-1992." American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 1
(2006): 113-126.
LAKE, Anthony. “Confronting Backlash States,” Foreign Affairs 73, No. 2 (1994): 45-55.
LAKE, David. Hierarchy in International Relations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009.
LANDLER, Mark. “Obama Threatens Force against Syria.” New York Times (August 21, 2012).
LANG, Anthony F. Jr. Punishment, Justice, and International Relations: Ethics in the Post-Cold
War System. New York, NY: Routledge, 2008.
LARSON, Deborah, and Alexei Shevchenko. “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to
US Primacy.” International Security 34, no. 4 (Spring, 2010): 63–95.
LARUS, Elizabeth Freund. “China's New Security Concept and Peaceful Rise: Trustful
Cooperation or Deceptive Diplomacy?” American Journal of Chinese Studies 12, no. 2
(October, 2005): 219-24.
LAYNE, Christopher. “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace.” International Security
19, no. 2 (Autumn, 1994): 5-49.
———. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy."
International Security 22, no. 1 (Summer, 1997): 86-124.
———. “Rethinking American Grand Strategy: Hegemony or Balance of Power in the 21st
343

Century?” World Policy Journal 15, no. 2 (Summer, 1998): 8-28.
———. “The ‘Poster- Child for Offensive Realism’: America as a Global Hegemon.” Security
Studies 12, No. 2 (Winter 2002/3): 120-164.
———. “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of US’ Unipolar Moment.”
International Security 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006): 7-41.
———. The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2006.
———. “The Influence of Theory on Grand Strategy: The United States and a Rising China.” In
Annette Freyberg-Inan, Ewan Harrison, and Patrick James, eds. Rethinking Realism in
International Relations: Between Tradition and Innovation. Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2009:103–135.
———. “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 1
(March, 2012): 203-213.
———. “The US-Chinese Power Shift and the End of the Pax Americana.” International Affairs
94, no. 1 (2018): 89-111.
LEBOW, Richard Ned. The Tragic Vision of Politics Tragedy of Realism: Ethics, Interests, and
Orders. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
———. Cultural Theory of International Relations. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
2008.
———. Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010.
LEE, Lavina Rajendram. US Hegemony and International Legitimacy: Norms, Power and
Followership in the Wars on Iraq. New York, NY: Routledge, 2010.
LEGRO, Jeffrey W. Great Power Strategies and International Order. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2005.
———. Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2005.
———, and Andrew Moravcsik. “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security 24, no. 2
(Fall, 1999): 5-55.

344

LEMKE, Douglas, and William Reed. “Regime Types And Status Quo Evaluations: Power
Transition Theory and the Democratic Peace.” International Interactions 22, no. 2 (May
1996): 143-164.
LEMKE, Douglas, and Suzanne Werner. “Power Parity, Commitment to Change, and War.”
International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 2 (June, 1996): 235-260.
LEMKE, Douglas, and Ronald L. Tammen. “Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China.”
International Interactions 29 (2003): 269-271.
LEVERETT, Flynt, Wu Bingbing. "The New Silk Road and China’s Evolving Grand Strategy."
The China Journal, no. 77 (January, 2017): 110-132.
LEVINGER, Matthew, and Laura Roselle. “Narrating Global Order and Disorder.” Politics and
Governance 5, no. 3 (2017): pp. 94-98.
LEVY, Jack S. War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975. University Press of Kentucky,
1983.
———. "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical
Analysis." International Studies Quarterly 28, no. 2 (1984): 219-238.
———. “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War.” World Politics 40, no. 1
(October, 1987): 82-107.
———. “Domestic Politics in War.” In Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (eds.), The Origin
and Prevention of Major Wars. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
———. “Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical
Problems.” Political Psychology 13, no. 2, Special Issue: Prospect Theory and Political
Psychology (June, 1992): 283-310.
———. “Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations.” International Studies
Quarterly 41, no. 1 (March, 1997): 87-112.
———. “Preventive War: Concepts and Propositions.” International Interactions 37, no. 1
(2011): 87-96.
———, and William R. Thompson. “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally Against the
Leading Global Power? International Security 35, no. 1 (Summer, 2010): 7-43.
LEVY, Jack and Michael Barnett. “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of
Egypt, 1962-73.” International Organization 45, no. 3 (Summer, 1991): 369-395.

345

LEVY, Jack. “Domestic Politics and War.” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4
(Spring, 1988): 653-673.
LEXIAN, Fang. “On Deng Xiaoping Diplomatic Thoughts of Transcending the Differences of
Social Systems and Ideologies.” World Economics and Politics, no. 11 (1998): 18-20.
LI, Mingjiang. “Ideological Dilemma: Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet Split 1962–63.” Cold
War History 11, no. 3 (2011): 387-419.
LIANG, Ce. “The Rise of China as a Constructed Narrative: Southeast Asia's Response to Asia's
Power Shift.” The Pacific Review 31, no. 3 (2018): 279-297.
LIEBER, Keir A. and Gerard Alexander. “Waiting for Balancing: Why the World is Not Pushing
Back.” International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer, 2005): 109‐137.
LIEBER, Robert. Retreat and its Consequences: American Foreign Policy and the Problem of
World Order. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
LIFF, Adam P. and G. John Ikenberry. “Racing toward Tragedy? China’s Rise, Military
Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma.” International Security 39, No.
2 (Fall 2014): 52–91.
LILLI, Eugenio. New Beginnings in US-Muslim Relations: President Obama and the Arab
Awakening. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
LITTLE, Richard. The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and
Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
———, and John Williams, eds. The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World. New York, NY:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
LOBELL, Stephen E., Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds.). Neoclassical Realism,
the State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
LUSTICK, Ian S. “The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political Backwardness’ in
Historical Perspective,” International Organization 51, no. 4 (Autumn 1997): 653-683.
LUTTWAK, Edward N. Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, From the First Century A.D. to the
Third. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.
———. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Belknap Press; 1987 [2001].
———. The Rise of China vs. The Logic of Strategy. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University, 2012.
346

LYALL, Jason M. K. “Paths of Ruin: Why Revisionist States Arise and Die in World Politics.”
Ph.D. Dissertation: Yale University, 2005.
MACDONALD, Paul K., and Joseph M. Parent. Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and
Retrenchment. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018.
MANDELBAUM, Michael. "Foreign Policy as Social Work." Foreign Affairs 75, no. 1
(January/February 1996): 16-32.
MANKOFF, Jeffrey. “The Politics of US Missile Defense Cooperation with Europe and Russia.”
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 88, no. 2 (March,
2012): 329-347.
MANSFIELD, Edward D., and Jack L. Snyder. “Democratization and the Danger of War.”
International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer, 1995): 5-34.
MARTEL, William C. Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for and Effective
American Foreign Policy. Cambridge University Press, 2015.
MARTÍN, Félix E. The Militarist Peace in South America: Conditions for War and Peace. New
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
MARTIN, Jacques. When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of
a New Global Order. New York, NY: Penguin, 2012.
MARTIN, Lisa. “Self-Binding.” Harvard Magazine, September/October (2004): 13.
MASTANDUNO, Michael. “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand
Strategy After the Cold War.” International Security 21, no. 4 (Spring, 1997): 49-88.
———. “System Maker and Privilege Taker: U.S. Power and the International Political Economy.
World Politics 61, no. 1 (January, 2009): 121-154.
MASTERS, Daniel, and Robert M. Alexander. "Prospecting for War: 9/11 and Selling the Iraq
War." Contemporary Security Policy 29, no. 3 (2008): 434-452.
MATTERN, Janice Bially. Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational
Force. New York, NY: Routledge, 2005.
———, and Ayşe Karakol. “Hierarchies in World Politics.” International Organization 70, no. 3
(Summer, 2016): 623-654.
MAXWELL, Joseph A. A Realist Approach for Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications Inc., 2011.
347

MAZLOOMI, Esmaeil, Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh, and Mohd Aminul Karim. “From Status
Inconsistency to Revisionism: Russian Foreign Policy After the Color Revolutions.”
Japanese Journal of Political Science (2018): 1-18.
MCKEOWN, Ryder. “Norm Regress: US Revisionism and the Slow Death of the Torture Norm.”
International Relations 23, no. 1 (2009): 5-25.
MEAD, Walter R. “An American Grand Strategy: The Quest for Order in A Disordered World.”
World Policy Journal 10, no. 1 (Spring, 1993): 9-37.
———. “The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers.” Foreign Affairs 93
(May-June 2014): 69-79.
MEARSHEIMER, John J. “Back to The Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War.”
International Security 15, no. 1 (Summer, 1990): 5-56.
———. Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.W. Norton & Company, 2001.
———. “China’s Unpeaceful Rise.” Current History 105, No. 690 (2006): 160-162.
———. “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia,” Chinese Journal of
International Relations 3, no. 4 (2010): 381-396.
———. “Imperial by Design.” The National Interest (December, 2010). Available at:
http://nationalinterest.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576.
———. “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin.”
Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (September/October, 2014): 1-12.
———. The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2018.
———, and Stephen M. Walt. The Israel Lobby and American Foreign Policy. New York, NY:
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007.
———, and Stephen M. Walt. “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand
Strategy.” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 4 (2016): 70-83.
MEINECKE, Friedrich. Machiavellianism: The Doctrine of Raison d’état and its Place in Modern
History. Yale University Press, 1962.
MEISER, Jeffrey W. Power and Restraint: The Rise of the United States 1898-1941. Georgetown
University Press, 2015.
348

MENDELSOHN, Barak. “Sovereignty Under Attack: The International Society Meets the Al
Qaeda Network.” Review of International Studies 31, (2005): 45–68.
———. “The Future of al-Qaeda: Lessons from the Muslim Brotherhood.” Survival: Global
Politics and Strategy 60, no. 2 (April–May 2018): 151–178.
MERCER, Jonathan. "Anarchy and Identity." International Organization 49, no. 2 (Spring, 1995):
229-252.
———. "Reputation and Rational Deterrence Theory." Security Studies 7, no. 1 (Autumn, 1997):
100-13.
MEROM, Gil. “Realist Hypotheses on Regional Peace,” Journal of Strategic Studies 26, no. 1
(March, 2003): 109-135.
MICHAELS, Jeffrey. “NATO after Libya.” The RUSI Journal 156, no. 6 (2011): 57.
MICHALAK, Stanley. A Primer in Power Politics. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc.,
2001.
MILEVSKY, Lukas. The Evolution of Grand Strategic Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2016.
MILLER, Benjamin. "Between the Revisionist and the Frontier State: Regional Variations in State
War-Propensity." Review of International Studies 35, no. 1 (2009): 85–119.
———. “Explaining Changes in U.S. Grand Strategy: 9/11, the Rise of Offensive Liberalism, and
the War in Iraq.” Security Studies 19, no. 1 (2010): 26–65.
MILLER, Paul D. “Five Pillars of American Grand Strategy.” Survival: Global Politics and
Strategy 54, no. 4 (2012): 7-44.
———. “Reassessing Obama’s Legacy of Restraint.” War on the Rocks (March 6, 2017).
MILNER, Helen. “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique.”
Review of International Studies 17, no. 1 (January, 1991): 67-85.
MINTZ, Alexander. “How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Poliheuristic Perspective.” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 48, no. 1 (February, 2004): 3-13.
MISKIMMON, Alister, Ben O’Loughlin and Laura Roselle. Strategic Narratives: Communion
Power and the New World Order. New York, NY: Routledge, 2013.

349

MITZEN, Jennifer. “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and The Security
Dilemma.” European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (2006): 341–370.
MONTEIRO, Nuno P. Theory of Unipolar Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2014.
MONTEN, J. “The Roots of The Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, And Democracy Promotion
In Us Strategy.” International Security 29, no. 4(2005): 112–156.
MONTGOMERY, Evans Braden. “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s Rise and
the Future of U.S. Power Projection,” International Security 38, no. 4 (Spring, 2014): 115149.
———. In the Hegemon’s Shadow: Leading States and the Rise of Regional Powers. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2016.
MORAVCSIK, Andrew. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Politics.” International Organization 51, no. 4 (Autumn, 1997): 513-553.
MORGENTHAU, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. McGraw
Hill, 2005 [1948].
MORRISAY, John. The Long War: Centcom, Grand Strategy, and Global Security. The
University of Georgia Press, 2017.
MURRAY, Robert. System, Society, and the World: Exploring the English School of International
Relations. E-International Relations Publishing, 2015.
MURRAY, Williamson. “Thoughts on Grand Strategy.” in The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy,
Diplomacy, and War Edited by W. Murray, R. H. Sinnreich, and J. Lacey, 1-33,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
———, Richard H. Sinnreich and James Lacey, Eds. The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy,
Diplomacy, and War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
———, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein Eds. The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and
War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
MYLONAS, Harris. The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and
Minorities. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
NATHAN, James A. Soldiers, Statecraft, and History: Coercive Diplomacy and International
Order. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.

350

NARAYANAN, Raviprasad. “The Chinese Discourse on the ‘Rise of China,’” Strategic Analysis
Journal 31, no. 4 (2007): 645-663.
NARIZNY, Kevin. “Both Guns and Better, or Neither: Class Interests in the Political Economy of
Rearmament.” American Political Science Review 97, no. 2 (2003): 203-220.
———. The Political Economy of Grand Strategy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007.
———. “On Systemic Paradigm and Domestic Politics: A Critique of the Newest Realism.”
International Security 42, no. 2 (Fall, 2017): 155-190.
NAVARI, Cornelia. “English School Methodology.” In Cornelia Navari and Daniel M. Green
(eds.), Guide to the English School in International Studies. Wiley-Blackwell, 2014.
NEWMAN, Edward, and Benjamin Zala. “Rising Powers and Order Contestation: Disaggregating
the Normative from the Representational.” Third World Quarterly 39, no. 5 (2018): 871888.
NINCIC, Miroslav. “Loss Aversion and the Domestic Context of Military Intervention.” Political
Research Quarterly 50, no. 1 (March, 1997): 97-120.
NOONAN, Michael, and John Hillen. “The Promise of Decisive Action.” Orbis 46, no. 2 (Spring,
2002): 229-246.
NUENDORF, Kimberly A. The Content Analysis Guidebook. 2nd Edition. Los Angeles, CA: Sage,
2017.
NYE, Joseph S. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. Basic Books, 1990).
OAKES, Amy. “Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands.” Security
Studies 15, no. 3 (2006): 431-461.
OBAMA, Barack H. “Speech Delivered by Barack H. Obama at the United Nations General
Assembly Plenary Session.” Speech, New York, NY: United Nations, September 24, 2009.
———. “Speech Delivered by Barack H. Obama at the United Nations General Assembly Plenary
Session.” Speech, New York, NY: United Nations, September 24, 2013.
OGUNNOIKI, Adeleke Olumide. “The Emergence of China as a Global Power and The South
China Sea Disputes: A Peaceful Rise or A Threat to International Order?” International
Journal of Advanced Academic Research 4, no. 4 (April 2018): 48-78.
ONEA, Tudor A. US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Restraint versus Assertiveness
from George H. W. Bush to Barack Obama. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
351

———. “Between Dominance and Decline: Status Anxiety and Great Power Rivalry.” Review of
International Studies 40, no. 1 (2014): 125-152.
———. “Immoderate Greatness: Is Great Power Restraint a Practical Grand Strategy?” European
Journal of International Security 2, no. 1 (2017): 111-132.
OPPERMANN, Kai. “Delineating the Scope Conditions for Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy
Decision Making: The Noncompensatory Principle and the Domestic Salience of Foreign
Policy.” Foreign Policy Analysis 25 (2014): 23-41.
ORGANSKI, A. F. K. World Politics. New York, NY: Alfred Knopf, 1958.
———, and Jacek Kuegler. The War Ledger. The University of Chicago Press, 1980.
OWEN, John M. “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace.” International Security 19, no. 2
(Fall, 1994): 87-125.
OYE, Kenneth. “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy.” World Politics 38, no. 1. (October,
1985): 1-24.
———. Cooperation Under Anarchy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
PANG, Zhongying. “China's Non-Intervention Question.” Global Responsibility to Protect 1, no.
2 (January, 2009): 237–252.
PAPE, Robert A. “Soft balancing Against the United States.” International Security 30, no. 1
(Summer, 2005): 7‐45.
PARENT, Joseph M. Uniting States: Voluntary Union in World Politics. Oxford University Press,
2011.
———, and Paul K. MacDonald. “The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to
Move Forward.” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 6 (November/December, 2011): 32–47.
PARMAR, Inderjeet S. Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the
Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1939–1945. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
———. “Catalysing events, think tanks and American foreign policy shifts: A comparative
analysis of the impacts of Pearl Harbor 1941 and 11 September 2001.” Government and
Opposition 40, no. 1 (2005): 1–25.
———, Linda B. Miller, and Mark Ledwidge (eds.). Obama and the World: New Directions in
US Foreign Policy. London: Routledge 2014.
352

PAUL, Thazha V. “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy.” International Security 30, no. 1
(Summer, 2005): 46‐71.
———. “The Accommodation of Rising Powers.” In Thazha V. Paul (ed.), Accommodating
Rising Powers: Past, Present, Future. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
———, James J. Wirtz, and Michael Fortman, eds. Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the
21st Century. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004.
———, Deborah W. Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, (eds.). Status in World Politics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
PODLISKA, Bradley F. Acting Alone: A Scientific Study of American Hegemony and Unilateral
Use-of-Force Decision Making. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010.
POND, Elizabeth. “The Dynamics of the Feud Over Iraq.” In D. Andrews (ed.), The Atlantic
Alliance Under Stress: U.S.- European Relations After Iraq. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005.
POPESCU, Ionut C. “Grand Strategy vs. Emergent Strategy in the Conduct of Foreign Policy.”
Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 3 (2018): 438-460.
PORTER, Patrick. “Why America’s Grand Strategy Has Not Changed Power, Habit, and the U.S.
Foreign Policy Establishment.” International Security 42, no. 4 (Spring, 2018): 9–46.
POSEN, Barry R. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the
World Wars. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986.
———. "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony." International
Security 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003): 5–46.
———. “Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 1
(January/February 2013): 127.
———. Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2014.
———, and Andrew L. Ross. “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy.” International
Security 21, no. 3 (Winter, 1996-1997): 5-53.
POWELL, Robert. “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory.” The
American Political Science Review 85, No. 4 (Dec. 1991): 1303-1320.
353

PRESTOWITZ, Clyde V. Jr. Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good
Intentions. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2003.
PU, Xiaoyu, Randall L. Schweller. “Status Signaling, Multiple Audiences, and China’s BlueWater Naval Ambition.” In William C. Wohlforth and Deborah Welch Larson, eds. Status
in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
PURI, Samir. "The Strategic Hedging of Iran, Russia, and China: Juxtaposing Participation in the
Global System with Regional Revisionism." Journal of Global Security Studies 2, no. 4
(2017): 307–323.
PUTNAM, Robert D. “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games.”
International Organization 42, No. 3 (1988): 427-460.
QICHEN, Qian. “Speech Delivered by Quichen at the United Nations General Assembly Plenary
Session,” (speech, New York, NY: United Nations, October 4, 1990).
QUEK, Kai, and Alastair I. Johnston. “Can China Back Down? Crisis De-escalation in the Shadow
of Popular Opposition.” International Security 2, No. 3 (Winter 2017/18): 7–36.
QIMAO, Chen “The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Its Crux and Solutions.” Asian Survey 36, no. 11
(November, 1996): 1055-1066.
QIN, Yaqing. “Development of International Relation Theory in China: Progress Through
Debates.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 11(2011): 231-257.
RACHMANN, Gideon. “Illiberal Capitalism.” Financial Times (January 9, 2008).
RAMPTON, David and Suthaharan Nadarajah. “A Long View of Liberal Peace and its Crisis.”
European Journal of International Relations 23, No. 2 (2014): 441-465.
RAPKIN, David P. and William R. Thompson, Transition Scenarios: China and the United States
in the Twenty-First Century. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2013.
RATHBUN, Brian. “A Rose By Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism As The Logical And
Necessary Extension Of Structural Realism.” Security Studies 17, no. 2 (2008): 294–321.
———. “Is Anybody Not an (International Relations) Liberal?” Security Studies 19, no. 1 (2010):
2-25.
REN, Mu. “China’s Non-intervention Policy in UNSC Sanctions in the 21st Century: The Cases
of Libya, North Korea, and Zimbabwe.” Ritsumeikan International Affairs12 (2014): 101–
134.

354

RENSHON, Jonathan. “Status Deficits and War.” International Organization 70, no. 3 (2016):
513–550.
———. Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in International Politics. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2017.
RESENDE-SANTOS, Joao. Neorealism, the State, and the Mass Army. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007.
REUS-SMIT, Christian. The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional
Rationality in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998.
RIDING, Alan. “The World; In Latin America, Noriega Is A Principle.” The New York Times,
April 24, 1988.
RIELLY, John. “The Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy Legacy.” Dans Politique Américaine
12, no. 3 (2008): 73-86.
RINGMAR, Erik. Identity, Interest, and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention
in the Thirty Years War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
RIPSMAN, Norrin M., Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Stephen E. Lobell. Neoclassical Realist Theory
of International Politics. Oxford: University Press, 2016.
ROSATO, Sebastian. “On Democratic Peace.” In Christopher J. Coyne and Rachel L. Mathers
(eds.), Handbook on the Political Economy of War. Cheltenham: Elgar, 2011: 281-314.
ROSE, Gideon. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.” World Politics 51, No. 1
(1998): 144-172.
ROSECRANCE, Richard N., and Arthur A. Stein (eds.), The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993.
ROSS, Robert S. “Beijing as a Conservative Power, Foreign Affairs Vol. 76, No. 2 (March-April,
1997): 33-44.
———. “Assessing the China Threat.” The National Interest, No. 81 (Fall, 2005): 81-87.
———. “On the Fungibility of Economic Power: China’s Economic Rise and the East Asian
Security Order.” European Journal of International Relations (2018): 1-26.
ROY, Denny. “Assertive China: Irredentism or Expansionism?” Survival 61, no. 1 (2019): 51-74.
ROTH, Ariel I. Leadership in International Relations: The Balance of Power and the Origins of
World War II. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
355

ROVNER, Joshua. “A Long War in the East: Doctrine, Diplomacy, and the Prospects for a
Protracted Sino-American Conflict.” Diplomacy & Statecraft 29, no. 1 (2018): 129-142.
———, and Caitlin Talmadge. “Hegemony, Force Posture, and the Provisions of Public Goods:
The Once and Future Role of Outside Powers in Securing Persian Gulf Oil. Security Studies
23, no. 3 (2014): 548-581.
RUGGIE, John G. “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in
the Postwar Economic Order.” International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 380.
———. Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization. New York:
Routledge, 1998.
RUSSETT, Bruce, and John R. O’Neal. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and
International Organizations. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co., 2001.
SAMUELSON, William, and Richard Zeckhauser. “Status Quo Bias in Decision Making.”
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1 (1988): 7-59.
SANDS, Phillipe. Lawless World: America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules—From
FDR’s Atlantic Charter to George W. Bush’s Illegal War. New York, NY: Viking, 2005.
SELDEN, Zachary. Alignment, Alliance, and American Grand Strategy. Ann Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan Press, 2016.
SENN, Martin, and Jodok Troy. “The Transformation of Targeted Killing and International
Order.” Contemporary Security Policy 38, no. 2 (2017): 175-211.
SCHLOSSER, Nicholas J. The Surge. Washington, DC: Center of Military History United States
Army Washington, 2017.
SCHWELLER, Randall L. “Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More
Pacific?” World Politics 44, no. 2 (January, 1992): 235-269.
———. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.” International Security
19, no. 1 (Summer, 1994): 72-107.
———. “Neorealism’s Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?” Security Studies 5, No. 3
(1995-1996): 90-121.
———. Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest. Columbia
University Press, 1998.
356

———. “Realism and the Present Great-Power System: Growth and Positional Conflict Over
Scarce Resources.” In Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Unipolar
Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War. New York, NY: Columbia
University, 1999.
———. “The Problem of International Order Revisited: A Review Essay.” International Security
26, no. 1 (Summer, 2001): 161-186.
———. Unanswered Threats: Political Constrains on the Balance of Power. Cornell University
Press, 2006.
———. “The Future is Always Uncertain and the End is Always Near.” Cambridge Review of
International Affairs 24, no. 2 (June, 2011): 175-184.
———. “Rising Powers and Revisionism in Emerging International Orders.” Valdai Papers,
No.16 (May 2015).
———, and Xiaoyu Pu. “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of
U.S. Decline.” International Security 36, no. 1 (Summer, 2011): 41-72.
SCIOLINO, Elaine. “The Clinton Record: Foreign Policy; Bosnia Policy Shaped by U.S. Military
Role.” The New York Times (July 29, 1996).
SEARS, Nathan. “China, Russia, and the Long Unipolar Moment: How Balancing Failures are
Actually Extending US Hegemony” The Diplomat (April 27, 2016). URL:
https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-russia-and-the-unipolar-moment/ Last Accessed:
December 17, 2018.
SENSLIE, Stig. “Questioning the Reality of China’s Grand Strategy.” China: An International
Journal 12, no. 2 (August, 2014): 161-178.
SHAMBAUGH, David. China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2013).
SHIFRINSON, Joshua R. Itzkowitz. “Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the U.S.
Offer to Limit NATO Enlargement.” International Security 40, no. 4 (Spring, 2016): 7-44.
———. Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2018.
———, and Michael Beckley. “Correspondence: Debating China’s Rise and U.S. Decline.”
International Security 37, no. 3 (Winter, 2012/13): 172-181.

357

SINGER, David J., Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and
Major Power War, 1820-1965.” In Bruce Russett (ed.), Peace, War, and Numbers. Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage.
SIPRI Factbook, “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2017.” Solna, Sweden: SIPRI, 2018.
SKIDMORE, David, William Gates. “After Tiananmen: The Struggle over U.S. Policy toward
China in the Bush Administration.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 27, no. 3, The
Presidency in the World (Summer, 1997): 514-539.
———. The Unilateralist Temptation in US Foreign Policy. New York, NY: Routledge, 2011.
SLATER, Graham. “Foreign Policy Evaluation and the Utility of Intervention.” Ph.D.
Dissertation, Miami, FL: Florida International University, 2017.
SNYDER, Richard C., H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (eds.). Foreign Policy Decision-Making:
An Approach to the Study of International Politics. New York, NY: The Free Press, 1962.
SNYDER, Jack L. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Cornell
University Press, 1991.
———. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and National Conflict. New York, NY: W. W.
& Norton and Co., 2000.
———, and Robert Jervis. Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power
Competition in the Eurasian Rimland. Oxford University Press, 1991.
———, and Edward Mansfield. “Democratization and the Danger of War.” International Security
20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 7-8.
SOLINGEN, Etel. Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn: Global and Domestic Influence on Grand
Strategy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.
SØRENSEN, Georg. Rethinking the New World Order. New York, NY: Palgrave, 2016.
STÄHLE, Stefan. “China's Shifting Attitude Towards United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.”
The China Quarterly, no. 195 (September, 2008): 631-655.
STANZEL, Angela. “Grand Designs: Does China have a ‘Grand Strategy’?” European Council
on Foreign Relations, No. 234 (October, 2017).
STATE Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Military Strategy,
Beijing, May 2015.
358

STEIN, Arthur A. “The Hegemon’s Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the
International Economic Order.” International Organization 38, no. 2 (Spring, 1984): 355386.
———, and Steven F. Lobell. “Geostructuralism and International Politics: The End of the Cold
War and the Regionalization of International Society.” In David A. Lake and Patrick M.
Morgan (eds.), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World. University Park, PA:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997: 101–122.
STIVACHTIS, Yannis A. International Order in a Globalizing World. Burlington, VA: Ashgate
Publishing, 2007.
STOKES, Doug. “Trump, American Hegemony and the Future of the Liberal International Order.”
International Affairs 94, no. 1 (2018): 133-150.
———, and Sam Raphael. Global Energy Security and American Hegemony. Baltimore, MD: The
John Hopkins University Press, 2010.
STRACHEN, Hew. “The Lost Meaning of Strategy.” Survival 47, no. 3 (2005): 22-54.
STROIKOS, Dimitrios. “Introduction: Rethinking the Standard(s) of Civilisation(s) in
International Relations.” Millennium –Journal of International Studies 42, no. 3 (2014):
546-556.
SUETTINGER, Robert. Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.
SUTTER, Robert. China’s Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the End of the Cold War
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2012).
SUBRAMANIAN, Arvind. Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance.
Washington, DC: Petersen Institute for International Economics, 2011.
SWAINE, Michael D. America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First
Century. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011).
TALIAFERRO, Jeffrey W. Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.
———. “State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource- Extractive
State.” Security Studies 15, no. 3 (2006): 464-495.
———. “Neoclassical Realism and the Study of Regional Order.” In Thazha V. Paul (ed.),
International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012: 74-103
359

———, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Stephen E. Lobell (eds.). The Challenge of Grand Strategy: The
Great Powers and the Broken Balance Between the World Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2013.
TAMMEN, R. “The Organski Legacy: A Fifty-Year Research Program.” International
Interactions 34, no. 4 (December, 2008): 314–332.
TANG, Shipping. “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis.” Security Studies 18, no. 3
(2009): 587-623.
———. “China and the Future of International Orders.” Ethics & International Affairs 32, no. 1
(2018): 31-43.
TAYLOR, Nicholas. "China as a Status Quo or Revisionist Power? Implications for Australia."
Security Challenges 3, no. 1 (February, 2007): 29-45.
TELLIS, Ashley J. “China’s Grand Strategy.” Claws Journal (Summer, 2010).
———.The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power. New York, NY: W. W.
Norton, 2015
THAYER, Bradley A. Darwin and International Relations: On Evolutionary Origins of War and
Ethnic Conflict. Lexington, KT: The University of Kentucky Press, 2009 [2004].
THE WHITE HOUSE. National Security Directive 26: U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf.
Washington DC: The White House, October 2, 1989.
———. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington, DC: White House, January
1, 1993.
———. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: The
White House, September, 2002.
THOMPSON, John A. A Sense of Power: The Roots of America’s Global Role. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2015.
THUCYDIDES. Peloponnesian War. In Robert B. Strassler (ed.), The Landmark Thucydides: A
Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster,
1996.
TILLY, Charles. Coercion and Capital: European States 990-1990. Blackwell, 1990.

360

TINSLEY, H. E. A. and S. D. Brown (Eds.). Handbook of Applied Multivariate Statistics and
Mathematical Modeling. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 2000.
TOMASKY, Michael. “Obama the Un-Bush Woos the UN.” The Guardian (September 23, 2009).
TOMZ, Michael. "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental
Approach." International Organization 61, (Fall 2007): 821–40.
TRACHTENBERG, Mark. “The Question of Realism: A Historian’s View.” Security Studies 13,
no. 1 (Autumn, 2003): 156-194.
———. “The Problem of International Order and How to Think About It.” The Monist 89, no. 2
(2006): 201-231.
TRUBOWITZ, Peter. Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition & American Statecraft. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011.
TVERSKY, Amos and Daniel Kahnemann. “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice.” Science 211, no. 4481 (January 30, 1981): 453-458.
TYLER, Patrick E. “U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop.” New York Times,
March 8, 1992.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Soviet Military Power. Washington: Department of
Defense, 1990.
U.S. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT. National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.
Washington, DC: The White House, 1995.
VAN DER PIJL, K. The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class. London: Verso, 1984.
———. Global Rivalries: From Cold War to Iraq. London and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2006.
WÆVER, Ole. “Securitization and Desecuritization.” In Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security.
Columbia University Press, 1995.
WALT, Stephen M. “The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy.”
International Security 14, no. 1 (Summer, 1989): 5-49.
———. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990.
———. Revolution and War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.
———. “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse.” Survival 39, no. 1 (1997): 156-179.
361

———. “Keeping the world ‘Off-Balance’: Self-Restraint and U.S. Foreign Policy.” In G. John
Ikenberry (ed.), America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2002.
———. Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy. New York, NY: W. W.
& Norton, 2005.
———. The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S.
Primacy. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2018.
WALTZ, Kenneth N. Man, the State, and War. Columbia University Press, 1959.
———. “Stability of a Bipolar World.” Daedalus 93, no. 3 Population, Prediction, Conflict,
Existentialism (Summer, 1964): 881-909.
———. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.
———. “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics” in
Neorealism and Its Critics, edited by Robert O. Keohane. New York, NY: Columbia
University Press, 1986.
———. “Neorealist Thought and Neorealist Theory.” Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1,
Theory, Values and Practice In International Relations: Essays In Honor Of William T.R.
Fox (Spring/Summer, 1990): 21-37.
———. “International Politics is Not Foreign Policy.” Security Studies 6, no. 1 (Autumn, 1996):
54-57.
———. “Structural Realism after the Cold War.” International Security 25, no. 1 (Summer, 2000):
5-41.
———. “Correspondence: Fair Fights or Pointless Wars.” International Security 28, no. 3
(2003/04): 181.
WANG, Yuan-Kang. “Offensive Realism and the Rise of China.” Issues & Studies 40, no. 1
(March 2004): 173-201.
WANG, Yi. “Speech Delivered by Yi Wang at the United Nations General Assembly Plenary
Session.” Speech, New York, NY: United Nations, September 27, 2013. Dag
Hammarskjöld Library.
WANG, Jianwei. “China’s Evolving Attitudes and Approaches Toward UN Collective Security.”
In G. John Ikenberry, Wang Jsi, and Zhu Feng, Eds. American, China, and the Struggle for
World Order: Ideas, Traditions, Historical Legacies, and Global Visions. New York, NY:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015): 104-131.
362

WARD, Stephen M. “Status Immobility and Systematic Revisionism in Rising Powers.” Ph.D.
Dissertation. Washington DC: Georgetown University, May 29, 2012.
———. Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers: Obstructed Ambitions. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2017.
WATSON, Adam. “Systems of States.” Review of International Studies 16 (1990): 99-109.
———. The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis. New York,
NY: Routledge, 1992.
———, and Hedley Bull. Expansion of International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1985.
WEEKS, Jessica L. “Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of
International Conflict." American Political Science Review 106, no. 2, (2012): 326-347.
WELDES, Jutta. Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
WENDT, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999.
———. “The State as a Personal in International Theory.” Review of International Studies 30, no.
2 (2004): 289–316.
WHEELER, Nicolas. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
WHITING, Allen S. “China's Use of Force, 1950-96, and Taiwan.” International Security26, no.
2 (Fall, 2001): 103-131.
WIGHT, Martin. “Why is There No International Theory,” in Martin Wight and Herbert
Butterfield (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics
(Harvard University Press, 1966): 1-26.
———. Systems of States. Leicester University Press, 1977.
WILLIAMS, William Appleman. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, Fiftieth Anniversary
Edition. New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2009 [1959/ 1972].
WILLIAMS, Kristen P., Stephen E. Lobell, and Neal G. Jesse (eds.), Beyond Great Powers and
Hegemons: Why Secondary States Support, Follow, Or Challenge. Stanford University
Press, 2012.
363

WOHLFORTH, William C. “Neorealist Thought and Neorealist Theory.” Journal of International
Affairs 44, no. 1, Theory, Values and Practice In International Relations: Essays In Honor
Of William T.R. Fox (Spring/Summer, 1990): 21-37.
———. “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War.” Princeton Institute for
International and Regional Studies 61, no. 1 (January, 2009): 28-57.
———. “Realism and the End of the Cold War.” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter, 19941995): 91-129.
———. “International Politics is Not Foreign Policy.” Security Studies 6, no. 1 (Autumn, 1996):
54-57.
———. “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24, no. 1 (Summer, 1999): 541.
———. “Structural Realism after the Cold War.” International Security 25, no. 1 (Summer, 2000):
5-41.
———. “Correspondence: Fair Fights or Pointless Wars.” International Security 28, no. 3
(2003/04): 181.
———. “Gilpinian Realism and International Relations.” International Relations 25, no. 4
(2011): 499-511.
———, et al. “Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History.” European Journal of
International Relations 13, no. 2 (2007): 155-185.
WOLF, Reinhard. “Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: The Significance of Status
Recognition.” International Theory 3, no. 1 (February, 2011): 105–42.
———. “Rising Powers, Status Ambitions and the Need to Reassure: What China Could Learn
from Imperial Germany’s Failures.” The Chinese Journal of World Politics 7, no. 1 (2014):
185-219.
WOLFERS, Arnold. Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics. The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1962.
WOLFOWITZ, Paul. “Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Press Conference in Brussels.” Speech,
Brussels: September 26, 2001.
WOODWARD, Bob. The Commanders: The Pentagon and the First Gulf War, 1989-1991. New
York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2002.
364

YAHUDA, Michael. The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific. London: Routledge, 2004:
298–305;
YAHUDA, Michael. “China’s Recent Relations with Maritime Neighbours.” The International
Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs 47, no. 2 (2012): 30-44.
YAMAGUCHI, Shinju. “Strategies of China’s Maritime Actors in the South China Sea A
Coordinated Plan Under the Leadership of Xi Jinping?” China Perspectives, China’s
Policy in the China Seas 3 (2016): 23-31.
YAN, Xuetong, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement,” The Chinese Journal
of International Politics 7, no. 2 (2014): 153–184.
YANG, Jian. The Pacific Islands in China’s Grand Strategy: Small States, Big Games. New York,
NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
YE, Zicheng. Inside China’s Grand Strategy: The Perspective from the People’s Republic.
Lexington, KY: The University of Press of Kentucky, 2011.
YETIV, Steve A. The Persian Gulf Crisis. Westport, London: Greenwood Press, 1997.
———. The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972-2005.
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008.
YU, Wanli. “Breaking the Cycle? Sino-US Relations Under George W. Bush.” In Masafumi Iida
(ed.), China’s Shift: Global Strategy of the Rising Power. Tokyo: National Institute for
Defense Studies, 2009.
YUAN, Jing-Dong. “China’s Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO).” Journal of Contemporary China 19, No. 67 (November, 2010): 855–
870.
ZAKARIA, Fareed. “Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay.” International Security 17,
no. 1 (1992): 192.
———. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1998.
———. “The Post-Imperial Presidency.” Newsweek (December 5, 2009). Available at:
http://www. newsweek.com/2009/12/04/the-post-imperial-presidency.html.
ZARAKOL, Ayşe. “After Defeat: Turkey, Japan, Russia and the Grand Strategy of Assimilation.”
Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Wisconsin-Madison, June 2007).

365

———. After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West. Cambridge University Press,
2011.
ZARTMAN, William I. Imbalance of Power: US Hegemony and International Order. LynneReinner Publishers, 2009.
ZHANG, Feng. Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions In East Asian
History. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015.
ZHANG, Xiaoming. "China In The Conception Of International Society: The English School's
Engagements With China." Review of International Studies 37, no. 2 (April, 2011): 763786.
ZHANG, Yongjin. “‘China Anxiety’: Discourse and Intellectual Challenges.” Development and
Change 44, no. 6 (2013): 1407-1425.
ZHENG, Bijian. “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status.” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5
(September/October, 2005): 18–24.
ZIONTS, David M. “Revisionism and Its Variants: Understanding State Reactions to Foreign
Policy Failure.” Security Studies 15, no. 4 (October–December 2006): 631–657.
ZOELLICK, Robert. “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? Remarks to National
Committee on US-China Relations.” Speech, New York City, NY: September 21, 2005.

366

APPENDIX
Percentage of References to Narratives (U.S. 1990-2018)
Year
Gains
Losses

1990
16.23
0.87

Criticize
Exceptionalism
Unilateralism
Pretext

1991
11.17
1.97

Reform
Satisfaction

1993
10.12
7.98

1994
12.65
2.01

0.42

1.86

0.42
0.88

1995
2.61
4.37

1996
3.23
1.94

2.99

4.68

1997
9.94
2.47

1998
4.68
2.32

1999
8.49
0.94

2000
4.08
0.94

2001
0.87
0.73

2002
1.33
18.41

2003
7.56
6.37

6.42

2.24

1.52

0.52
0.66
0.46
17.06

2.20
1.57

4.06

7.30
1.34
6.41
4.44

0.97

3.84

1.43

10.26
0.95
5.65
17.80

3.67
3.86
15.95
7.88
0.89
3.15

5.58
4.01
14.21
12.78
1.92

19.49
0.92
5.51
1.94
2.42

18.70
1.63
3.86
2.86
18.74

11.79
1.38
9.56
3.93
1.43
1.18

1.03
32.76

5.97
38.89

10.79

27.09

17.48

0.22

3.99

Negative Rel.
Sovereignty
Dissatisfaction
Praise
Interest
International
Rebuke
Positive Rel.

1992
11.73
7.46

1.36

0.93

0.65

8.02

0.00

7.67
9.04
8.94
8.19
2.41
5.00

3.99
1.88
5.25
4.49
4.06
3.27

2.43
3.92
14.94
7.72
3.94
5.90

1.86
4.04
10.49
8.64
3.97
2.42

1.30
0.77
3.51
13.15

0.93
2.92
4.38
1.30

0.22
3.16
8.60
7.96

0.97
6.40
15.19
8.26

3.80

1.60

0.63

0.54

1.37
34.95

3.07
22.02

8.29
44.71

5.18
34.74

0.80
22.03

7.34
17.54

1.06
21.41

4.60
34.99

24.40

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Year

4.58

1.52

9.13

12.29

7.71

9.54

5.51

4.48

3.08

8.36

7.23

2.21

6.86

4.49

9.85

Gains

6.08

5.03

5.66

4.96

8.18

9.94

7.41

3.76

0.70

6.37

4.24

4.26

2.96

9.34

1.49

Losses

1.26

1.16

5.93

7.59

0.87

4.21

1.23

2.37

0.76

2.51

5.17

0.88

13.32

13.7

Criticize

1.45

4.07

7.38

3.25

3.42

1.58

2.39

4.17

1.62

23.92

18.8

Exceptionalism

0.59

4.51

3.72

Unilateralism

4.31

11.1

Pretext

0.29

2.63

Negative Rel.

7.30

7.32

Sovereignty

4.81
0.84
1.27

0.49

1.26
4.32

4.30

1.08

7.25

2.05

1.84

1.29

0.80

7.66

2.44

2.28

0.53

7.25

5.53

0.24

8.18

5.48

11.68

12.74

16.30

9.51

6.49

5.24

3.15

16.13

10.18

13.57

2.74

53.65

57.2

Dissatisfaction

2.64

3.80

10.83

3.56

9.07

3.92

1.60

4.80

3.92

1.60

4.80

0.75

2.38

3.49

4.83

Praise

4.26

4.75

0.54

12.43

5.35

15.61

9.41

6.59

3.99

17.56

12.10

9.75

10.64

7.02

2.4

7.80

6.73

8.76

6.64

11.16

12.16

8.00

8.96

5.11

8.03

13.95

15.60

13.78

15.44

1.46

1.61

0.28

1.36
1.40

1.94

2.30

18.25

17.58

5.01
20.13

27.64

1.10

2.13
1.30

1.82

2.60

6.26

0.81
1.27

0.50

0.28
25.86

33.37

21.47

21.65

13.02
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29.01

33.45

34.49

28.07

27.26

Interest
International
Rebuke

1.08

Positive Rel.

1.16

Reform

10.9

Satisfaction

Percentage of References to Narratives (China 1990-2018)
Year

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Gains
Losses

17.76
8.9

4.03
2.84

10.54
9.52

7.08
5.79

9.15
3.18

8.92
4.15

10.81
6.49

8.67
8.24

7.1
2.74

7.02
5.49

4.09
3.03

6.44
6.19

8.3
0.53

10.26
4.55

1.1
1.94
9.67

1.74
0.78
6.64
2.09
0.72
2.72
14.69
1.53
7.47
5.78
1.51
0.51

0.42

4.97

1.61
2.06
1.33

2.43
4.98
3.11

6.22
5.99
4.49

7.07
3.44
1.09

8.72
5.86
5.76
1.01

3.53
3.16
3.81

2.68
2.6

9.99
3.14

3.11
7.26
2.89

6.48
17
2.79
2.91
5.07

6.98
23.68
1.74
7.88
3.25

2.52
14.12
0.55
12.56
9.81
4.53

10.02
32.26
0.8
9.67
8.67
1.39

4.75
15.25
4.22
9.75
10.03

0.93
6.21
1.05
19.03
7.05

1.74
6.19
18.7
4.77
18.7

3.21
14.38
30.46
2.99
30.46

6.4
26.93
12.32
26.93

1.73
11.73
37.46
3.24
37.46

2.28

10.66
38.11
2.13
38.11

Criticize
Exceptionalism
Justice
Pretext
Negative Rel.
Sovereignty
Dissatisfaction
Praise
Interest
International
Rebuke
Positive Rel.
Reform
Satisfaction
Multipolarity/Order
Satisfaction Total

2004
5.86
4.77

2005
5.53
1.37

5.27
17.98
5.48
6.75
1.98
4.36
0.98
19.55
19.55

16.8
10.52
16.8

2006
5.62
1.17

2007
8.17
4.39

0.81

7.73
0.75

8.53
1.75

7.04
8.1

3.88
14.58

3.96
24.07
1.02
5.69
9.87

7.87
12.87
3.82
7.99
1.85

2.14
2.59
3.54
3
1.01
7.05
19.33
4.01
4.77
5.02

8.76
25.34
5.5
25.34

5.91
19.57
0.98
19.57

4.47
18.27
2.49
18.27

1.7
4.99

9.12
15.81
15.81

2008
10.84
3.72

2009
11.26
5.14

2010
12.05
1.93

2011
11.49
4.72

2012
11.34
2.37

2013
10.94
4.07

2014
6.35
3.79

2015
7.11
1.46

1.5
0.38

3.05
1.06

0.89

1.15

0.78

0.9
1.51
0.17
0.33

1
6.7
2.65
1.04

2.96

3.5
14.84

2.96

29.96
12.07

1.05
25.32
3.42

0.71
28.33
9.23
0.76

16.47

11.01

46.26

50.04

6.38
4.48
48.41

1.53
2.34

1.14
1.31

1.74

1.32

0.74

2016
7.32
4.23

2017
14.31
0.92

29.41
1.5
29.41

0.76

Criticize
Exceptionalism
Justice
Pretext
Negative Rel.
Sovereignty
Dissatisfaction

0.5
0.77

1.74

1.5
2.82

0.41
1.15

2.58
5.46

2.04
2.82

0.45
3.36

1.44
5.55

0.89

1.15

1.33
3.36

27.89
5.59

3.3
22.51
2.96

25.01
17.01

18.39
2.33

15.92
7.1

23.89
4.01

27.44
6.42

5.03
18.91
8.74

28.84
11.16

19.13
18.47

28.85
6.22

23.7
9.46

2.83
4.58
2.02
41.27

8.49

1.17
23.02

1.49
2.37
0.64
31.76

5.35
5.3
9.65
43.81

28.77

42.02

20.72

368

1.2
32.68

12.64
41.15

3.7
2.78
41.3

11.12
43.56

19.52
4.14
19.52

1.22
2.87
35.7
1.55
35.7

Year
Gains
Losses

2.8
5.25

1.15

9.3
9.41
0.81

2.28
15.54
2.76
20.79
8.06

2018
7.22
4.08

8.48

8.17
0.62
41.65

13.13

Praise
Interest
International
Rebuke
Positive Rel.
Reform
Multipolarity
Satisfaction
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